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There is a tendency for those involved in public discourse about climate change, from 
politicians and pundits to climate scientists and corporate public relations firms, to 
engage in a rhetorical strategy of attempting to distinguish science “fiction” from science 
“fact” in the global warming debate.  These terms, “fact” and “fiction,” are deployed 
colloquially, with a casualness that conceals their conceptual significance to climate 
change discourse.  Consider UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon’s November 2007 
address to the IPCC, upon the release of the Fourth Assessment Synthesis Report: “These 
scenes are as frightening as a science fiction movie.  But they are even more terrifying 
because they are real.”  Similarly, after the 2006 publication of Sir Nicholas Stern’s 
review of the likely economic impacts of climate change, British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair declared the predictions the most important report on the future published by the 
Government since it came to power in 1997.  Blair, like Moon, described the report as 
“terrifying,” and said, “This disaster is not set to happen in some science fiction future 
many years ahead, but in our lifetime.”  Drawing upon the imaginative power of science 
fiction to make their point, Moon and Blair simultaneously re-inscribe popular notions of 
science fiction as disconnected from practical concerns. 
Within literary studies, and even within the field of “Literature and the Environment,” 
little attention has been paid to the important role of science fiction in constructing an 
“ecological imagination” for the 21st century, and even less consideration has been given 
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to discourses of climate change per se.   In their anthology, Beyond Nature Writing 
(2001), Karla Armbruster and Kathleen Wallace argue that ecocriticism must move 
beyond its predilection for “nature writing” -- beyond creative non-fiction essays 
exploring and celebrating the human place in nature, such as those by Henry Thoreau, 
John Muir, Annie Dillard, Barry Lopez and others.  Motivated by a postmodern critique 
of the concepts of “nature” and “wilderness,” this shift in literary critical methodology 
resonates in historically significant ways with the conceptual and political challenges that 
anthropogenic global climate change poses for reconsidering the human relationship to 
the non-human world.  Of the articles collected in Beyond Nature Writing, however, only 
one addresses science fiction, and none deal explicitly with climate change. 
In his 1959 Rede lecture at Cambridge, C.P. Snow famously criticized the mutual 
suspicion and incomprehensibility developing between the two cultures of the sciences 
and the humanities.  In a different context three years later, in her expose of the dangers 
of DDT, Rachel Carson lamented what she saw as an over-specialization within the 
sciences.  For Carson, there were not just two cultures failing to communicate, but many.  
Since the 1970s, climate change, perhaps more thoroughly than any other environmental 
concern, has forced an ecological interdisciplinarity back into the natural sciences.  What 
has been less clearly recognized, however, is that the challenges of global climate change 
also reach across the two culture divide.  The most significant variables in models of 
possible future climates involve humans and how we choose to respond to our situation.  
How we conceive of ourselves, what we imagine we might do, socially, economically, 
politically, in our land use patterns and our transportation habits, matters significantly.  
Constructing potential emissions scenarios is fundamentally a storytelling project.  
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Science fiction, by definition a genre that bridges the two culture divide, is well-
positioned to tell these stories; indeed, science fiction acts as an oft-unacknowledged 
source and supplement to scenario-thinking in scientific and policy realms. 
This dissertation offers a consideration of the place of science fiction within climate 
change discourse and a meditation on the significance of climate change within literary 
discourse.  The popular distinction between science fact and science fiction 
oversimplifies both terms, re-casting them as synonyms for truth and falsity.  The desire 
for this distinction results from naïve positivism with regard to the character and purpose 
of the scientific method, and it produces a narrowing of the imaginative and descriptive 
possibilities of fiction.  The science of climate change is, in large part, a narrative 
endeavor, and it is the shape of this narrative that is being contested in debates over 
climate change rhetoric and how to frame global warming concerns.   
Long relegated to the margins of criticism, I argue that science fiction is the central 
genre of climate change.  Scenario thinking, of increasing complexity and realism, is the 
goal for political policy making and corporate strategizing with regard to climate change 
and other risk-filled possibilities.  Likewise, this is the goal of at least one strand of 
literary science fiction.  Thinking about climate change is an imaginative project, and 
novelists may well hold the key to describing its potential consequences in ways that 
make climate change personally significant.   
Climate change has the narrative potential, it seems, to disrupt the status quo – to 
offer a window of time within which change, whether political, social, economic, or 
personal, is possible, if only because it has become necessary.  The changes essential for 
a transition to sustainability, James Gustave Speth suggests, require a broad shift in 
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consciousness prompted by a sober consideration of crisis, out of which emerges not a 
fortress mentality, but a new world vision – the articulation of a narrative that offers an 
alternative to the current structure of global capitalism and still resonates with traditional 
values of community, health, and connection to nature.  As science fiction author Kim 
Stanley Robinson argues in his short essay “Imagining Abrupt Climate Change,”  
climate change has struck our species before, and we have adapted…in these past 
crises, even prospered.  It could happen again...; no reason to despair; no reason to 
deny all problems and carry on stupidly in our destructive ways and ridiculously 
unjust economic system; rather, time to adapt….  But the story of that adaptation 
has to be told, and told many times over, I think, so we can imagine it better, and 
see how we might take the first small steps. (IACC, 18) 
Expanding the boundaries of ecocriticism involves a reconsideration of science fiction, an 
archaeology of the future that includes a study of environmental apocalypse and utopia.  
This dissertation is a first step towards that process. 
In Chapter 1, I offer three terms as essential for cultural criticism in the 21
st
 
century: climate change, apocalypse, utopia.  I present a genealogy of each term along 
with reflections on the ways in which these terms acquire unique resonances in relation to 
one another.  These essays offer a theoretical framework that operates heuristically in the 
chapters that follow, as I develop a more textured analysis of the ways these concepts 
play out in particular novels, films, scientific articles, and public policy documents.   
Chapter 2 develops an analysis of three fictional representations of climate change -- 
T.C. Boyle’s A Friend of the Earth (2000), Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (2003) 
and The Year of the Flood (2009), and Octavia Butler’s Parable of the Sower (1993).  All 
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three authors are concerned with articulating the phenomenology of climate change.  Set 
in the diminished environment of 2025, Boyle’s novel emphasizes the common generic 
ancestry of utopia and satire in its critique of radical environmentalism.  Atwood’s novels 
foreground concerns about biotechnology, while her narrative interrogates the social 
consequences of the polarization between the sciences and humanities identified by 
Snow.  Butler’s novel offers insight into the ways that climate change intersects with 
issues of race and gender, at the same time as it presents a narrative of sustainable 
community, arguing for the possibility of emancipatory agency even within a dystopian 
world. 
Chapter 3 presents an analysis of three 2004 representations of abrupt climate 
change in the context of Bush administration policies toward climate change and in the 
wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks.  Abrupt climate change is a low probability, 
high risk scenario, and stands outside the scope the IPCC reports.  Beginning with a 2003 
Pentagon-sponsored report on abrupt climate change, this chapter considers the practice 
of scenario-thinking and its relationship to science fiction.  Close readings of Roland 
Emmerich’s film The Day After Tomorrow (2004), Michael Crichton’s novel State of 
Fear (2004), and Kim Stanley Robinson’s novel Forty Signs of Rain (2004) illuminate 
the distinctive contours of the eco-political imagination taking shape during this time.  
The Day After Tomorrow foregrounds spectacle over science, mapping the rhetoric of 
nuclear catastrophe onto climate change.  State of Fear operates as a rebuttal and 
palliative, suggesting that global warming is unproven theory and overstated threat.  Kim 
Stanley Robinson’s Forty Signs of Rain imagines a scientifically nuanced abrupt climate 
change scenario and the policy measures necessary to adapt successfully.   
6 
 
Chapter 4 opens up into a consideration of Kim Stanley Robinson’s larger oeuvre.  I 
begin with a review of Robinson’s award-winning Mars trilogy, Red Mars (1993), Green 
Mars, (1994), and Blue Mars (1997).  Robinson’s experiments with purposeful 
terraforming on Mars implicitly critique the accidental terraforming that anthropogenic 
climate change produces on Earth, and they anticipate the problematic geoengineering 
solutions proposed in the Science in the Capital trilogy.  Next, I focus on a full analysis 
of Robinson’s Science in the Capital trilogy.  After Forty Signs of Rain, Robinson 
published Fifty Degrees Below (2005) and Sixty Days and Counting (2007).   
Thematically, the last two novels are largely concerned with a presidential transition of 
power and the potential for systemic change that comes with it.  Published in the years 
leading up to the 2008 presidential elections, they are positioned to directly engage public 
and political discourse on climate change.  The title of the final novel refers to the first 
sixty days of the new presidential administration, and the novel models one set of policy 
shifts that might effectively confront the challenge of climate change.  Characteristically, 
Robinson illuminates alternative economies and social arrangements in these novels, but 
more clearly than his speculations in the Mars trilogy, Robinson’s Science in the Capital 
trilogy, set in an alternate present, emphasizes utopian experiments already in existence.  
Arguably then, Robinson shifts generic modes, moving from utopia to manifesto. 
In addition to the IPCC, the UN also sponsors two other assessment initiatives that 
employ scenario thinking – the Global Ecosystem Outlook Reports (GEO), and the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA).  These scenarios perform many of the same 
discursive functions that characterize science fiction: they deploy what Darko Suvin 
terms a novum in order to prompt a cognitive estrangement that produces an implicit 
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critique of our current socio-politico-technological landscape, and they suggest the 
possibility of radical structural reform.   Reading science fiction alongside these scenarios 
allows us to ask, in what ways are problematic assumptions and abstractions built into 
these models?  Science fiction, as source and supplement to scenario literature, retains 
enduring value because of its concern with singularity.  In the end, I argue for the 
importance of utopia as a participatory project and a methodology, over and above any 











Scientific developments can define meaningful benchmarks in the history of 
aesthetics and literature.  The science of climate change, begun speculatively in the late 
19
th
 century, and articulated over the last forty years with the help of increasingly 
sophisticated models and diverse data sources, marks such a shift in the cultural 
imaginary.  The science of climate change prompts us to imagine our own planet as 
another world—to imagine ourselves inhabiting a fundamentally altered environment—
and it asks that we recognize a human role in engineering that world.  As we enter the 
21
st
 century, it is incumbent upon literary scholars to reconsider the changing contours of 
cultural discourse in light of these developments in climate science. 
Raymond Williams describes Keywords as a work that takes place in an “area 
where several disciplines converge but in general do not meet.  It has been based on 
several areas of specialist knowledge but its purpose is to bring these, in the examples 
selected, into general availability” (17).  The interdisciplinarity of Raymond Williams’ 
work, published just over a decade after Rachel Carson’s appeal for integrative thinking 
in Silent Spring, might meaningfully be thought of as ecological in its approach.  
Significantly, Williams included “ecology” in his 1983 edition of Keywords.1  My project 
in this chapter occupies a similarly interdisciplinary space and has similar aims.  My 
                                                          
1
 John Bellamy Foster has argued that an ecological perspective is characteristic of Marxist analysis. See 
Marx’s Ecology (2000) for an account of Marx’s concern with agriculture and soil ecology. 
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purpose is to update and elaborate our critical lexicon in light of what might be 
understood as a paradigm shift in the human understanding of planetary ecology.  My 
analysis emerges from the intersections of political economy and the physical sciences, 
literature, history, and culture theory.  In the open-ended spirit of Williams’ work, I offer 
the following three terms as essential vocabulary for cultural criticism in the 21
st
 century: 
climate change, apocalypse, utopia.  In elucidating these terms, I hope to contribute a 
toolbox of concepts for use in understanding the relationship between literary and cultural 
production, economics, and ecology in the 21
st
 century. 
This keyword vocabulary is, in part, a remediative project.  Ecocriticism has just 
begun to think productively about climate change, despite its emergence as a school of 
analysis in the same decade as global warming gained widespread media attention.
2
  
Ecocritics have only begun to interrogate the apocalyptic rhetoric employed by 
environmentalists, and they have yet to theorize utopia, perhaps because that term seemed 
so out of fashion in American intellectual thought at the end of the twentieth century.  A 
critical awareness of each of these terms is urgent for ecocriticism in the 21
st
 century.  
My aim is to make the use of these terms—climate change, apocalypse, utopia--at once 
critical and constructive.   
First, I construct a history of climate change research extending back to the 19
th
 
century.  Approaching the present, I focus on the publication of the IPCC Assessment 
Reports as a documentary of a growing scientific consensus on climate change as well as 
a discursive space in which the highly politicized significance of key scientific terms is 
                                                          
2
 James Hansen’s 1988 testimony before Congress about global warming marks the beginning of 
widespread media attention to climate change.  The Association for the Study of Literature and 
Environment (ASLE) was formed in 1992. 
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formally negotiated.  In particular, I argue that the IPCC emissions scenarios are where 
science fiction meets science fact.  The IPCC maintains a database of over 400 emissions 
scenarios, articulated at various regional and global scales, some of which are policy 
neutral and many of which are policy proscriptive.  These qualitative scenario storylines 
are entered into GCM computer models for forecasting global climate, and they emerge 
as quantitative information.  I argue that the possible futures represented by these 
emissions scenarios tend to be articulated within either an apocalyptic or a utopian 
generic frame. 
Next, in my consideration of apocalypse, I untangle the common conflation of 
apocalypse and catastrophe, emphasizing the etymological understanding of apocalypse 
as an “unveiling.”  Climate change might best be understood as apocalyptic in this sense; 
it reveals structures of power in new ways, offering the opportunity for scrutiny and 
revision.  I acknowledge the place of apocalyptic narratives in culture wars and their 
coincidence with religious and ideological extremism, and I comment upon the use of 
apocalyptic rhetoric in environmentalist discourse.  I distinguish between tragic and 
comic apocalyptic frames, and I highlight the colloquial elision of a utopian element 
characteristic of traditional apocalyptic narratives, arguing that apocalypse and utopia 
should properly be understood in dialectical relation to one another. 
Finally, in my consideration of utopia, I distinguish between the pejorative senses 
of the term, in which utopian is taken to mean impractical or coercive, and the 
reconstructive sense of the term, in which utopianism is understood as an ongoing project 
of imagining and enacting a better world.  I emphasize the shapes utopianism took in the 
American context in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, arguing for an important and 
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unrecognized connection between utopianism’s critique of industrial capitalism and the 
development of environmentalism in the United States.  By the mid-20th century, 
however, utopianism took on totalitarian connotations and became less popular in 
political discourse, until, with the end of the Cold War, utopianism was deemed largely 
irrelevant.  I argue for a recovery of the utopian project, following Fredric Jameson’s 
defense of utopia in the historical moment of late-capitalism.  Jameson formulates the 
phrase anti-anti-utopianism to describe the self-conscious formal experimentation of 
American science fiction writers like Samuel Delaney and Ursula LeGuin.  In its 
playfulness with the forms and limits of utopian thought, the aim of anti-anti-utopian 
writing is to free the imagination from the present.  Erin McKenna articulates the positive 
complement to Jameson’s double negative, recommending a “process model of utopia,” 
based on a feminist reading of Dewey’s theorization of democracy, emphasizing 
experimentalism and the cultivation of flexible and critical habits of mind. 
 
Climate Change 
  Meteorologically speaking, the term “climate,” whether the climate of a specific 
region or of the Earth as a whole, refers to the statistical average, over time, of the 
conditions that occur there.  For example, with a sufficient archive of numerical 
measurements, it is possible for meteorologists to speak about the climate of Washington, 
D.C. in the following manner:  
In the month of November between 1971 and 2000 in Washington D.C., the 
average daily high temperature was 14˚ C, the average daily low was 1˚ C, and 
0.3 cm of precipitation fell.  These average values, along with averages of other 
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meteorological quantities such as humidity, wind speed, cloudiness, and snow and 
ice coverage, define the November climate of Washington over this period. 
(Dessler and Parson 6) 
Climate, then, is a quantified abstraction of sensuous experience, often reconstituted at 
scales different from that of human phenomenology.  It is impossible to directly 
experience climate.  Instead, what we experience is the weather.  This distinction between 
climate and weather has implications for how climate change is communicated to the 
public.  It is impossible, for example, to talk about a causal connection between changes 
in the climate and particular weather phenomena.  Thus, while global warming might be 
characterized by more violent storms, climate scientists cannot say that Hurricane Katrina 
was caused by global warming.  This is also an issue of representation.  There is a degree 
of untranslatability in the charts and graphs that reveal climate trends.  As a series of 
averages, indexes of world climate, Mike Hulme explains in Why We Disagree About 
Climate Change (2009), both hide and reveal – they hide the diversity of weather 
experienced in local places by local people, and at the same time, “by collapsing all this 
diversity into a single numerical index, [they reveal] the behaviour of a large and 
complex global system” (Hulme, 8-9). 
What is climate change?  What is global warming?  In the first footnote of the 
IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, the authors clarify that  
Climate change in IPCC usage refers to any change in climate over time, whether 
due to natural variability or as a result of human activity.  This usage differs from 
that in the Framework Convention on Climate Change, where climate change 
refers to a change of climate that is attributed directly or indirectly to human 
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activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and that is in addition 
to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods. (2)   
The IPCC authors define climate change independently of anthropogenic or non-
anthropogenic origins, whereas in the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the 
term exclusively denotes anthropogenic origins.  Maintaining a purposeful broadness in 
their use of the term, the IPCC authors proceed to explain within the report that there is 
broad scientific consensus that the Earth is warming and that humans are contributing 
significantly to this warming.   
In other contexts, the term global warming is used interchangeably with the term 
climate change.  According to the Environmental Protection Agency website,  
Global warming is an average increase in the temperature of the atmosphere near 
the earth’s surface, and in the troposphere, which can contribute to changes in 
global climate patterns.  Global warming can occur from a variety of causes, both 
natural and human induced. (http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/basicinfo.html)   
These definitions demonstrate a degree of slippage in the terms as they are used in both 
popular and scientific discourse, and they point to areas of inquiry and debate.  The 
differences between the terms “climate change” and “global warming” ostensibly indicate 
a distinction between climate shifts in any direction and an overall warming trend.  To 
use the term global warming, then, involves a more specific area of inquiry and a second 
level of conjecture.  The EPA definition emphasizes this warming trend, and it embraces 
both anthropogenic and non-anthropogenic causes.  The differences between these terms 
have rhetorical implications.  The term global warming, for example, sounds more 
ominous than climate change, and yet it famously loses its affective impact during the 
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cold months of winter.  In this dissertation, I use the terms climate change and global 
warming fairly interchangeably, and I include the anthropogenic hypothesis as a default 
connotation.  The anthropogenic dimensions of climate change have profound 
implications for the ways that we understand ourselves as individuals and as 
communities, and they prompt a radical reconsideration of the human relationship to the 
non-human world. 
Many histories of the science of climate change begin in the 19
th
 century, with 
French scientist Joseph Fourier’s hypothesis about what we have come to call the 
“greenhouse effect.”  Coincident with the industrial revolution, the 19th century provides 
a useful starting point for the story of climate change, although of course human attempts 
to understand the Earth’s climate extend farther into the past.  The etymology of the word 
“climate,” as Mike Hulme points out, takes us back to ancient Greece, where as early as 
the sixth century BC, Parmenides used the word klima to differentiate between zones on 
the Earth’s surface, from tropical to arctic.  Moving forward to the 19th century, Hulme 
argues, our contemporary understandings of climate must also be understood in the 





centuries.  Hulme points to Alexander von Humboldt and American meteorologist 
Matthew Maury as important figures promoting the standardization of meteorological 
measurements that contributes to the shape of contemporary climate science (4-7). 
In The Discovery of Global Warming, Spencer Weart highlights the role of British 
scientist John Tyndall tested, who in 1859 tested the opacity of gases thought to comprise 
the atmosphere.  These were the first experiments to test Fourier’s hypothesis that the 
Earth’s atmosphere intercepts radiation emitted from the surface.  As a part of the 
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experiment, Tyndall tested the methane-laden coal gas that was piped into his laboratory 
for lighting.  The gas was opaque to infrared rays, and Tyndall discovered that CO2 was 
similarly opaque.  Spencer Weart points to the irony of Tyndall’s inspiration, writing, 
“thus the Industrial Revolution, intruding into Tyndall’s laboratory in the form of a gas 
jet, declared its significance for the planet’s heat balance” (3).   
 The name most associated with the early science of climate change is that of 
Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius, who proposed that changes in atmospheric CO2 
could have been responsible for past ice ages.  The example of Arrhenius reminds us that 
speculation about climate change in the future is rooted in attempts to understand the 
prehistoric past.
3
  There is, therefore, a kind of deep-historical sensibility involved in 
thinking about climate change.  Arrhenius’s hypothesis imagined a series of volcanic 
events as the major trigger for CO2 fluctuations, but in their compilation of CO2 
emission source estimates, Arrhenius’s colleague Arvid Hogbom included a calculation 
of CO2 emitted by factories and industry.  This prompted a thought experiment – what if 
humans, through industrialization, doubled the CO2 concentration of the atmosphere?  
Arrhenius calculated that such an increase might raise the Earth’s average temperature by 
as much as five degrees Celcius.
4
  Arrhenius published his calculations in 1896, and his 
thought experiment takes on renewed significance as carbon emissions increase toward 
that very concentration.  According to Spencer Weart, current global climate models 
                                                          
3
 Early speculations about climate change should be understood particularly in response to Louis Agassiz’s 
ice age theory.   
4
 Interestingly, Arrhenius presumed that such an increase in temperature would prove beneficial and would 
increase crop yields. 
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account for greater degrees of complexity in the climate system and estimate between 
two and four degrees Celcius for a similar increase in carbon dioxide (Weart 5-8).  
 Moving into the 20
th
 century, Spencer Weart points to Guy Callendar, Charles 
David Keeling, and Roger Revelle as emblematic figures in the history of climate change 
research.  In 1938, Callendar presented calculations linking anthropogenic CO2 
emissions and global warming to the Royal Meteorological Society.  An amateur scientist 
paid little heed at the time, Callendar was the first scientist to attempt to detect large-scale 
climate change and attribute that change to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.  In 
the second half of the 20
th
 century, driven by World War II and the Cold War, 
considerable governmental funding went into improving scientific quantification of the 
Earth’s atmospheric and ocean cycles, in order understand how nuclear fallout might be 
dispersed.  Corresponding to the development of political institutions such as the United 
Nations, science also developed in international arenas.  In particular, the International 
Geophysical Year in 1957-58 was influential in the development of climate-change 
science.  Both Weart and Hulme point to Roger Revelle at Scripps Institution of 
Oceanography and Hans Seuss at the University of Chicago, who received funding to 
establish baseline atmospheric carbon dioxide measurements as a part of the IGY.
5
  
Revelle and Seuss hired Charles David Keeling to run their measurement experiments.  
Keeling set up sites at Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii and at the American scientific 
base in Antarctica.  His measurements from these sites demonstrated that carbon dioxide 
                                                          
5
 In his report to Congress about the International Geophysical Year in 1957, Roger Revelle was one of the 
first to use the metaphor of a spaceship to explain our relationship to the planet, saying “the Earth itself is a 
spaceship.” (Weart 43). 
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concentrations were rising steadily at both locations (Hulme 54).  The graph of these 











In the 1970s and 80s, improvements in computer technology significantly 
influenced climate research.  In the 1970s the development of new general circulation 
models (GCMs) of the global atmosphere improved climate simulations.  Mike Hulme 
identifies Syukuro Manabe and Richard Wetherald at Princeton University as the 
developers of the first model to simulate a three dimensional response of global climate 
to a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide.  In the 1980s, ice core samples from 
Greenland and Antarctica suggested the possibility of abrupt climate shifts in the past.  In 
1987, Wallace Broecker published his “Unpleasant surprises in the greenhouse?” in 
Nature, hypothesizing that a disturbance in oceaninc thermohaline circulation might 
cause a radical shift in climate (Hulme 56-57).  This possibility of abrupt climate change 
occupies a special place in the popular consciousness, as we will observe in Chapter 3. 
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 For the purposes of this dissertation, I want to focus in particular on the 
development of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).  In 1988, the 
IPCC was established by the World Meteorological Association (WMO) and the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to assess the scientific, technical, and socio-
economic information relevant for understanding of the risk of human-induced climate 
change.  The IPCC is neither a strictly scientific nor a strictly political body, but a hybrid 
organization – a scientific body with strong links to politics (Weart 158).  The IPCC was 
designed to provide an authoritative assessment of results from climate science as an 
input to policy makers.  The IPCC’s goal is not to conduct original science, but rather to 
synthesize the science that has been conducted around the world in policy-relevant ways.   
The IPCC has published four major assessment reports and several other reports 
in its nearly twenty-five year history.  According to Richard Somerville, one of the 
coordinating lead authors for the 2007 Report, these reports have expressed increasing 
certainty that human activity contributes significantly to global climate change and that 
climate change will become more serious in the years to come.  The main writing of the 
Fourth Assessment Report was done by a team of 152 authors, chosen by the IPCC from 
more than 700 candidates nominated by governments.
6
  Somerville describes the process 
of writing the 18 page Summary for Policymakers in this way:  
The IPCC first appoints a group of about 33 “Drafting Authors.”  We drafted a 
summary, the governments commented on our draft, we revised it, and they 
reviewed it again.  Then, at an IPCC plenary held in Paris in early 2007, the 
                                                          
6
 Some interesting statistics about the Fourth Assessment Report authors include the following: 25% had 
earned their highest academic degree in the last 10 years; 75% were not previous IPCC authors, 35% were 
from developing countries and countries with economies in transition (Somerville 96). 
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governments formally accepted the full report and then spent nearly a week 
approving the Summary.  This approval process consists of a formal meeting 
(with full parliamentary procedure and simultaneous interpretation in the six 
official languages of the UN) lasting several long days, in which the governments 
consider the report line by line, and often word by word. (96-97) 
The organizational structure of the IPCC demonstrates the interconnectedness of science 
and politics with regard to climate change, while the drafting procedure demonstrates the 
ways in which the language that is used to discuss the problem is politically charged. 
I want to emphasize here that climate change has a history as an idea, that climate 
science has a history as a social enterprise.  Moreover, this scientific history points to 
only one set of changing ways in which we think about the climate.  Climate also 
operates figuratively.  It is built upon and gives rise to metaphor.  We might talk about 
trends in politics and the economy in terms of “climate,” just as we might speak about the 
“atmosphere” of social spaces such as restaurants or movie theaters.  In this way the term 
climate has both meteorological and metaphorical meanings, as Mike Hulme 
alliteratively argues.  Science fiction author Kim Stanley Robinson has further suggested 
that when we talk about climate change, even in a scientific sense, we are engaging in a 
sort of metonymy.  Climate change operates as an omnibus term signifying species 
extinction, ocean acidification, pollution, habitat loss, groundwater depletion, 
deforestation, desertification, soil loss, as well as other ecological consequences.  Taken 
together, Robinson argues, what we are actually talking about is a general systems crash.  
Climate change, in its strictest meteorological sense, Robinson argues, is just one 
symptom of a much larger problem and project. 
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The historian Dipesh Chakrabarty argues that climate change has profound 
implications for the humanities.  Chakrabarty begins with the thesis that “anthropogenic 
explanations of climate change spell the collapse of the age old humanist distinction 
between natural history and human history” (201).  Chakrabarty takes inspiration for this 
claim from Paul Crutzen, a Nobel laureate chemist, and Eugene Stormer, and a marine 
scientist, who were the first to call the geologic era we live in “the Anthropocene” in 
order to emphasize the human impact on climate and ecology.  Chakrabarty quotes 
Crutzen’s 2002 article in Nature: 
For the past three centuries, the effects of humans on the global environment have 
escalated.  Because of these anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide, global 
climate may depart significantly from natural behavior for many millennia to 
come.  It seems appropriate to assign the term “Anthropocene” to the 
present,…human dominated, geological epoch, supplementing the Holocene—the 
warm period of the past 10-12 millennia.  The Anthropocene could be said to 
have started in the latter part of the eighteenth century, when analyses of air 
trapped in polar ice showed the beginning of growing global concentrations of 
carbon dioxide and methane.  This date also happens to coincide with James 
Watt’s design of the steam engine in 1784. (qtd in Chakrabarty, 209) 
We see in Crutzen’s history of the Anthropocene once again a coincidence with the 
industrial revolution.  This coincidence is important, as climate change operates, I argue, 
in large part as a critique of industrial society.  Focusing on issues of agency, 
Chakrabarty is particularly struck by the idea that humans have become what Naomi 
Oreskes terms “geological agents.”  Chakrabarty writes, “to call human beings geological 
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agents is to scale up our imagination of the human.”  Noting that humans have always 
been biological agents, he argues that “we can become geological agents only historically 
and collectively, that is, when we have reached numbers and invented technologies that 
are on a scale large enough to have an impact on the planet itself” (206-207). 
Chakrabarty’s second thesis is that “the idea of the Anthropocene, the new 
geological epoch when humans exist as a geological force, severely qualifies humanist 
histories of modernity/globalization” (207).  It does so by calling into a new kind of 
question Western notions of freedom.  Chakrabarty argues that “the mansion of modern 
freedom stands on an ever expanding base of fossil fuel use,” and he explains that this 
fact has been elided in traditional accounts of modernity: “in no discussion of freedom in 
the period since the Enlightenment was there ever any awareness of the geological 
agency that human beings were acquiring at the same time as and through processes 
closely linked to their acquisition of freedom” (208).  Western notions of freedom 
famously elide the unpalatable things upon which they depend, such as slavery, but 
Chakrabarty argues for a special way in which we have been blind to the consequences of 
our collective actions on the biosphere.  Chakrabarty’s point here has an analogy in the 
ecological critique of classical economics that it does not account for environmental 
externalities in its cost-benefit analyses.  To the extent that our constructions of the 
market define our notions of freedom, we might say that the history of Enlightenment 
thought has similarly externalized the environmental consequences of the development of 
our modern conceptions of the individual. 
Chakrabarty’s third thesis is that “the geological hypothesis regarding the 
anthropocene requires us to put global histories of capital in conversation with the species 
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history of humans” (212).  Climate change, Chakrabarty argues, forces a species 
understanding of humans that goes against the grain of a historical methodology that has 
emphasized the role of the individual and the collective in political and economic 
contexts that do not account for our geological agency.  The ecological limits of the 
planet are, as yet, an unaccounted factor in histories of globalization; moreover, those 
limits are independent of politics and economy.  Chakrabarty argues that “whatever our 
socioeconomic and technological choices, whatever the rights we wish to celebrate as our 
freedom, we cannot afford to destabilize conditions (such as the temperature zone in 
which the planet exists) that work like boundary parameters of human existence.  These 
parameters are independent of capitalism or socialism” (218).  Globalization and global 
warming might be born from overlapping processes, but they are not reducible to one 
another.  Climate change, Chakrabarty argues, “will no doubt accentuate the logic of 
inequality that runs through the rule of capital….  But the whole crisis cannot be reduced 
to a story of capitalism.  Unlike the crises of capitalism, there are no lifeboats here for the 
rich and privileged” (221).  Chakrabarty is surely correct that climate change will 
accentuate the inequality that characterizes global capitalism, though I am less convinced 
of his assertion that the rich will not find ways to escape the damage and capitalize on the 
crisis. 
Chakrabarty’s fourth and final thesis is that “the cross-hatching of species history 
and the history of capital is a process of probing the limits of historical understanding” 
(220).  This is once again an issue of representation and phenomenology.  Chakrabarty 
puts it this way: 
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We humans never experience ourselves as a species.  We can only intellectually 
comprehend or infer the existence of the human species but never experience it as 
such.  There could be no phenomenology of us as a species.  Even if we were to 
emotionally identify with a word like mankind, we would not know what being a 
species is, for, in species history, humans are only an instance of the concept 
species as indeed would be any other life form.  But one never experiences being 
a concept. (220) 
This point is relevant to issues of agency and representation.  Chakrabarty’s argument 
about the difficulty of conceptualizing ourselves as a species is similar to the point that 
we cannot directly experience climate.  Trying to conceptualize our collective impact on 
the planet’s ecosystem coincides with an attempt to conceptualize ourselves as a species.  
There is a temporal and a spatial disconnect between cause and effect that exceeds 
individual human phenomenology.  Susanne Moser describes this problem as a tension 
between “homo sapiens’ brain versus homo technologicus’ power” (34).  As a species, 
the argument goes, we have evolved to make short-term decisions, while our technology 
has developed long-term consequences beyond the capacity of our decision making 
apparatus to understand and manage.   
There are other challenges to representing climate change.  In particular, there is 
the degree of complexity and uncertainty involved.  Uncertainty in the science of climate 
change has many sources, including the scale, complexity, and unpredictability of chaotic 
systems like the atmosphere or the oceans.  The most important source of uncertainty, 
however, results from humans being a part of the future in question.  As Mike Hulme 
argues, “individual and collective human choices five, twenty or fifty years into the 
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future are not predictable in any scientific sense” (83).  This is where literature comes 
into the study of climate change, and where the humanities have a role to play in 
understanding the future.  
It will be instructive to return to the IPCC.  The IPCC uses an analytical tool 
called scenario planning in order to talk about the future in policy relevant ways.
7
  In 
scenario planning, a scenario is an account of a plausible future.  Rather than trying to 
predict a specific future or to estimate the probability of particular outcomes, scenario 
planning uses a set of scenarios to explore the range of uncertainty surrounding the future 
consequences of decisions.  Scenario planning was originally developed within the 
military as a strategic planning methodology.  Herbert Kahn and the RAND Corporation 
developed scenarios to anticipate the possibility of various kinds of nuclear exchanges 
between the United States and the Soviet Union.  Here again we see the influence of the 
Cold War and nuclear armament on the ways that we think about climate change.  In the 
1970s scenario planning made its mark in the corporate business world with Royal Dutch 
Shell’s strategic planning team used scenarios to successfully navigate the oil crisis.8   
Questions about what climate change will look like in the future present a unique 
entry point for scenario planning into scientific discourse.  Future greenhouse gas 
emissions are a source of uncertainty, as they are dependent in large part on human 
factors, from policy proscriptions to technological development.  In order to explore this 
                                                          
7
 While the IPCC generally steers clear of doing original research, the working group investigating 
emissions scenarios has generated a set of scenarios unique to the IPCC.  Arguably, this is one area in 
which the IPCC is doing more than just assessment and synthesis. 
8
 The scenario planning community is densely interconnected.  Shell Oil was a pioneer of scenario 
planning, and several people involved with Shell have moved on to other organizations.  A group of people 
from Shell and Whole Earth magazine, including Peter Schwartz and Stewart Brand, founded the Global 
Business Network, a scenario consulting firm.  Wired magazine, a descendant of the Whole Earth Catalog 
via CoEvolution Quarterly, has published a number of articles on scenario planning. 
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uncertainty, the IPCC has developed a set of scenarios to represent a range of driving 
forces and emissions possibilities.  The IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios 
describes scenarios as “alternative images of how the future might unfold and an 
appropriate tool with which to analyse how driving forces may influence future emissions 
outcomes and to assess associated uncertainties” (3).  The IPCC explicitly excludes 
outlying “surprise” or “disaster” scenarios.  The authors warn that “any scenario 
necessarily includes subjective elements and is open to various interpretations.  
Preferences for the scenarios presented here vary among users” (3).  They maintain a 
level of neutrality, if not objectivity: “No judgment is offered in this Report as to the 
preference for any of the scenarios and they are not assigned probabilities of occurrence, 
neither must they be interpreted as policy recommendations” (3).  We shall return to this 
point, but for now, let us simply observe that there is a tension between the ideal of 
disinterested scientific experimentation and scenario construction, which is inevitably 
subjective, describing possible futures that will be interpreted differently by readers based 
upon their political persuasion, personal backgrounds and interests, or other relevant 
factors. 
The IPCC explains that “Four different narrative storylines were developed to 
describe consistently the relationships between emission driving forces and their 
evolution and add context for the scenario quantification.  Each storyline represents 
different demographic, social, economic, technological, and environmental 
developments, which may be viewed positively by some people and negatively by 
others” (3).  Once again, the IPCC authors make the point that reader response will vary.  
What we further see in this description is that the IPCC scenarios are where science 
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fiction meets science fact.  In the process of constructing the IPCC scenarios, qualitative 
storylines are entered into various computer models for forecasting global climate, and 
they emerge as quantitative information.  I want to argue that this process of 
quantification participates in a larger rhetorical project – the numbers confer a sense of 
authority to the qualitative storylines at the same time as they prompt the reader to forget 
that these futures exist in the imagination.  Our positivistic assumptions about the 
scientific enterprise anchor these numbers in ‘the real.’   
In order to quantify the storylines, the IPCC used six global circulation models, 
and each scenario represents a specific quantitative interpretation of one of four 
storylines.  The IPCC refers to scenarios based on the same storyline as “families.”  The 








(IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios, 2000) 
While these specific scenarios are unique to the IPCC, these scenarios are related to a 
larger body of scenario literature, and they align themselves with recognizable literary 
traditions.  The scenario families that the IPCC and other scenario organizations describe 




 century utopian and dystopian 
literature.  There are echoes in these storylines of Morris and Bellamy, Orwell and 
Huxley.  In this way, scenarios are where politics intersects with climate science.  The 
quantifications at the end of the scenarios are, to an extent, apolitical.  How we arrive at 
those numbers is the political question.   
To put the IPCC scenarios in context, it will be helpful to look at them alongside 
two other examples of scenario use.  Garry Peterson et. al. provide a good synopsis of the 
history of scenario planning in their 2003 article “Scenario-Planning: a Tool for 
Conservation in an Uncertain World.”  In the 1970s, strategic planners at Shell famously 
used scenarios to investigate uncertainties in the global oil market.  Contrary to 
expectations that oil prices would remain low, one of these scenarios envisioned a 
coalition of oil exporting countries limiting oil production in order to raise prices.  The 
scenario planning exercise led Shell to increase the efficiency of its refining and shipping 
29 
 
operations in order to prepare for this possibility.  When oil prices rose later in the 
decade, these changes allowed Shell to adapt more quickly than competitors.  Similarly, 
in the 1980s, scenario planners at Shell explored the possibility of a decline in oil prices 
due to non-OPEC discoveries and conservation.  Once again Shell adopted a business 
strategy at odds with prevailing opinion and outperformed its competitors, this time 
moving from one of the smallest multinational oil companies to the second largest 
(Peterson et al. 363).  These examples illustrate the way in which the value of scenario 
planning lies in its capacity for exploring improbable futures.  In this case, Shell is a 
minor character against a backdrop of world forces that are largely out of its control.  The 
scenarios play out a variety of backdrops against which Shell might make decisions in its 
own best interests.  There is also an interesting tension in this example.  As a decision 
making tool, scenario planning claims to have value regardless of which future plays out.  
Scenario planning explicitly does not aim to predict the future, and yet this case is 
noteworthy precisely because Shell’s scenario planning group did predict something 
close to the future that emerged.   
In a different but related context, scenario planning was used in South Africa 
during the transition from apartheid.  Leaders from South Africa’s businesses, political 
groups, including senior ministers in the African National Congress, and civil society met 
in a series of workshops to discuss the driving forces shaping the country.  Notably, the 
exercise was facilitated by members of the strategic planning group at Shell Oil.  This is 
not just coincidence -- Shell has significant holdings off the South African coast.  The 
participants developed four scenarios that were widely publicized around the country:  
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1.) Ostrich: in which negotiations to end apartheid fail and minority rule 
continues;  
2.) Lame Duck: in which the negotiated transition to majority rule is slow, 
complicated, and indecisive;  
3.) Icarus: in which the transition is successful, but the new government enacts 
unsustainable, populist economic policies leading to an economic crisis;  
4.) Flight of the Flamingos: in which gradual improvement in the social and 
economic status of South Africans occurs as diverse groups work together. 
(Peterson et al. 363)   
According to Peterson et al., “The aim of the scenarios was to enrich the negotiation 
process by creating shared awareness of some of the potential traps (e.g., excessive 
spending, an overly narrow focus on the details of transition, and insufficient change), 
and it improved the quality of the transition to democracy” (363).  The Monte Fleur 
example is noteworthy in several respects.  In this case, the workshop participants helped 
to create the scenarios, which operated as a set of shared political narratives.  The 
participants were both author and audience.  In this example, the workshop participants 
also played a large role as characters in determining the shape of the future that would 
play out.  In contrast to the earlier example in which Shell Oil makes business decisions 
against a backdrop of world forces out of its control, in South Africa, the backdrop 
becomes the foreground.  The shape of the future that plays out is more directly 
determined by the decisions of the scenario users. 
The IPCC scenarios are global in scale and world-historical in scope.  At this 
scale, there is some question as to who the users of these scenarios are meant to be.  The 
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IPCC distinguishes between “end users” and “intermediate users” for their scenarios.  
End users are policy and decision makers who use scenario outputs in decision making 
processes, whereas intermediate users are researchers who use scenarios from another 
segment of the research community as inputs into their own work.  Among potential end 
users for their scenarios, the IPCC identifies national governments, sub-global 
multinational decision making bodies (the European Union), global public and 
intergovernmental organizations such as the World Health Organization, private sector 
organizations at various scales, regional and local governments, non-governmental 
organizations and civil society organizations, and local communities (IPCC Towards 
New Scenarios 7). 
In all of these scenarios, one finds a purposeful simplification and abstraction of 
the narrative.  Global scenarios are concerned with agency at the level of the collective – 
corporations, nation states, occasionally a global citizen’s movement.  They are also 
concerned with identifying “drivers” – economics, technology, policy.   Literary science 
fiction, on the other hand, retains an important concern with the individual.  Some 
scenario literature suggests that scenario construction is an ongoing process, proliferating 
in various scales.  So, while global metanarratives are one project, regional and local 
micronarratives are also a part of the mosaic. 
None of these scenarios are truly disinterested.  The storylines inevitably presume 
or imagine a certain politics; they can work to destabilize our conception of the world as 
it is, or they can work to naturalize it.  I want to emphasize the importance of who writes 
and who uses these scenarios.  As a reader, perhaps the most important question is what 
kind of agency one has access to within the story.  There is a danger that the shapes these 
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narratives take might be overdetermined by the politics of their end-users.  As we shall 
have more than one occasion to observe, disaster scenarios can be used to justify radical 
reform, and it is as often the case that these scenarios prophesy war and famine in ways 
that undergird nativist policy measures as it is the case that they imagine more creative 
solutions to social problems. 
We should also consider the possibility of and desire for narrative actualization.  
In addition to a critical mode, there is a constructive mode within which these scenarios 
operate.  In the process of anticipating particular futures, interested parties might 
consciously or unconsciously work to bring them into being.  In the example of South 
Africa, the “Flight of the Flamingos” narrative served as an overt goal towards which the 
workshop participants and South African society might work.  There is a way in which 
these narratives of the future guide our understanding of the present.  
On the one hand, I want to make the philosophical point that all science has an 
important narrative component, and that science is shot through with metaphor.  In this 
context, I want to emphasize the importance of thought experiment, conjecture, and 
theoretical science.  On the other hand, I also want to argue for a special way in which 
narrative operates in the science of climate change through the use of scenario planning.   
Scenarios are also where literature intersects with climate science.  Science fiction and 
scenario thinking are both written in the subjunctive mode.  Science fiction acts as both 
source and supplement to scenarios in the scientific and policy realms, with enduring 
value because of its concern with singularity.   
Scenario thinking argues for itself as the dominant generic mode of late 
modernity, and in many ways this seems accurate.  The CIA employed screenwriters to 
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imagine scenarios around the capture of Osama Bin Laden.  Scenario thinking is a mode 
of risk analysis, and as Ulrich Beck argues, our current era is that of a global, risk society.  
This risk analysis dimension to scenarios accounts for Richard Posner’s seriousness in his 
cost-benefit analysis of Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake.  Moreover, there is at work 
in all of this literature a dialectic of apocalypse and utopia.   
In her article “Writing in the Anthropocene,” Kate Rigby argues that 
contemporary environmental writers should write in the mode of “prophetic witness.”  
Such writing, she argues, “would seek to disclose the catastrophic consequences of 
continuing on our current ecocidal path and awaken us to another way of thinking and 
being: one that holds the promise of reconciling urban industrial society with the Earth” 
(1).  Rigby’s underlying model here is biblical, and she builds her argument on an 
analysis of Judith Wright’s poem “Dust,” which operates, she argues, in this prophetic 
mode.  Rigby ends with a call to action: “The challenge for writing in the anthropocene, 
in the shadow of ecocide,..is to find new ways of raising our voices from the level of ‘idle 
chatter’ to that of a biting and stinging ecoprophetic witness” (10).  
 
Apocalypse 
  There is a distinctively apocalyptic strand to discussions of climate change.  As an 
example, consider that Dipesh Chakrabarty begins his theses on climate change with a 
meditation on Alan Weisman’s The World Without Us.  Weisman’s book builds from a 
thought experiment of human extinction: “Picture a world from which we have all 
suddenly vanished.”  It is interesting that Chakrabarty begins from this example -- 
Weisman’s thought experiment comes closer to the rapture of Tim LaHaye’s Left Behind 
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series than it does to any global warming scenario published by the IPCC.  I take 
Chakrabarty to be making a narrative point about climate change and the limits of 
imagination – we perceive climate change as a kind of break in the historical narrative, or 
in scenario planning terms, a branch point in history.  The future on the other side of this 
break remains, to a certain extent, unimaginable.  And yet, Chakrabarty’s use of 
Weisman’s thought experiment also illustrates, in ways that he leaves largely unpacked, 
how popular conceptions of climate change intersect with older and deeper anxieties 
about the end of the world.   
Apocalypse is an older idea than climate change.  For at least 3,000 years, 
ecocritic Greg Garrard writes, “a fluctuating proportion of the world’s population has 
believed that the end of the world was immanent” (85).  Garrard locates the origins of 
apocalypticism in Zoroastrianism: “Notions of the world’s gradual decline were 
widespread in ancient civilizations, but Zoroaster bequeathed to Jewish, Christian, and 
later secular models of history a sense of urgency about the end of the world” (85).  
Importantly, however, the word apocalypse has not always referred to the end-times.  The 
etymological root of apocalypse is the Greek apokalypsis, meaning “unveiling” or 
“uncovering.”  I want to emphasize this etymological understanding of apocalypse.  
Climate change might best be understood as apocalyptic in this sense; rather than 
bringing about the end of the world, climate change offers a kind of heuristic frame.  
Through this narrative frame, we are made aware of formerly invisible structures of 
power, offering opportunity for scrutiny and revision.   
The eschatological connotation of apocalypse developed as it became associated 
with the book of Revelation in the New Testament, which records the revelation of St. 
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John of Patmos.  As a part of the Christian canon, the Revelation of St. John has 
contributed a set of images and a language through which Western culture has come to 
understand the end-times.  Perhaps more importantly, the book of Revelation offers a 
way to understand the present as the end-times, and this is a powerful political narrative.  
In his History of the End of the World, Jonathan Kirsch writes that “the words and 
phrases of Revelation, its stock figures and scenes, have been recycled and repurposed by 
artists and poets, preachers and propagandists—all in service of some religious or 
political or cultural agenda” (3).  
The apocalyptic genre as we know it today is the product of sociopolitical crisis, 
and it is a story of the end of empire.  John of Patmos was likely a Jewish war refugee, 
viewing the occupying Roman army with contempt.  In highly symbolic language, the 
book of Revelation prophesies the downfall of the Roman empire, and it played 
particularly well with audiences who resented Roman occupation.  It is for this reason 
that D.H. Lawrence writes that Revelation “is above all what some psychologists would 
call the revelation of a thwarted “superiority” goal, and a consequent inferiority complex” 
(73).  Lawrence argues that the book of Revelation “resounds with the dangerous snarl of 
the frustrated, suppressed collective self, the frustrated power-spirit in man, vengeful.  
But it contains also some revelation of the true and positive Power-spirit” (73).  We shall 
return to Lawrence’s acknowledgement of the positive side of Revelation, but let us 
remain with the critical side a little longer. 
There is a deep psychological dimension to thinking about the end-times.  
According to Frank Kermode, apocalypse is “a pattern of anxiety that we shall find 
recurring, with interesting differences, in different stages of modernism.  Its recurrence is 
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a feature of our cultural tradition, if not ultimately of our physiology” (96).  Kermode’s 
analysis builds upon D.H. Lawrence’s argument that “We always want a “conclusion”, an 
end, we always want to come, in our mental processes, to a decision, a finality, a full-
stop.  This gives us a sense of satisfaction.  All our mental consciousness is a movement 
onwards, a movement in stages, like our sentences, and every full-stop is a mile-stone 
that marks our “progress” and our arrival somewhere” (93).  Apocalypse, then, is not so 
much about predicting the end of the world as it is about making us feel as though we are 
a part of a critical moment in history.  As Kermode succinctly puts it, “Crisis is a way of 
thinking about one’s moment, and not inherent in the moment itself.” (101)  In 
Apocalyptic Transformation: Apocalypse and the Postmodern Imagination, Elizabeth 
Rosen explains that apocalypse “is an organizing structure that can create moral and 
physical order while also holding the possibility of social criticism that might lead to a 
reorientation in the midst of a bewildering historical moment” (xiii). 
In popular culture, we have come to associate apocalypse with catastrophe, but in 
the Christian tradition, the apocalypse is both an end and a new beginning.  After the 
great battle between good and evil, there follows the inheritance of a New Jerusalem and 
the 1,000 year reign of Jesus on Earth.  Yet as scholars such as Elizabeth Rosen have 
noted, apocalyptic literature has evolved to include stories that lack this vital feature of 
the myth.  Rosen argues that postmodern apocalyptic narratives have jettisoned the 
positive element that characterizes more traditional stories of apocalypse: 
these grimmer eschatological tales are strictly stories of endings.  Such stories, 
which I am calling “neo-apocalyptic,” are focused on cataclysm.  They neither 
offer nor anticipate a New Jerusalem, per se.  This form sees the apocalyptic 
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genre’s message of hope largely subsumed by its emphasis on destruction, even 
though the main intent of the traditional story of apocalypse was to provide its 
audience with hope of a better world.  To this extent, then, neo-apocalyptic 
literature is a literature of pessimism; it functions largely as a cautionary tale, 
positing potential means of extinction and predicting the gloomy probabilities of 
such ends.  If these tales exhibit judgment, it is of the sort that assumes that no 
one deserves saving and that everyone should be punished.  The traditional 
optimistic conclusion and intent to inspire faith disappear in neo-apocalyptic 
literature, replaced by imaginative but definitive End scenarios. (xv) 
The point I want to make here is that apocalypse and utopia are traditionally connected, 
but that contemporary understandings of apocalypse have severed that connection.  
Rosen’s argument about neo-apocalyptic literature coincides with a colloquial conception 
of apocalypse that elides any positive vision.  I want to make a similar argument in an 
environmental context.  The narrative of climate change is frequently a narrative of 
environmental catastrophe, without any positive vision to balance the scales.  We tend to 
think of climate change in terms of endings, rather than in terms of beginnings. 
Much environmentalist discourse deploys apocalyptic rhetoric.  Lawrence Buell 
has argued that “Apocalypse is the single most powerful master metaphor that the 
contemporary environmental imagination has at its disposal” (285).  Greg Garrard 
devotes a chapter of Ecocriticism to apocalypse, and he points to several texts in the 
environmentalist canon that make extensive use of the trope, from Rachel Carson’s Silent 
Spring (1962), to Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb (1972), to Al Gore’s Earth in the 
Balance (1992) (Garrard 93).  And in An Inconvenient Truth and elsewhere, Al Gore 
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frequently refers to watching the evening news about climate related weather 
catastrophes as taking “a nature hike through the book of Revelation.” 
This apocalyptic rhetoric tends to polarize responses.  In From Apocalypse to Way 
of Life, Frederick Buell explains that “Since Rachel Carson, environmental crisis has 
rapidly evolved and substantially changed in form, not just in nature, but also in human 
discourse about it.  Announcing itself as apocalypse, environmental crisis has been 
debunked, resisted debunking, has been reworked, and has been dramatically diversified 
and expanded, resurfacing in unusual new forms” (xii).  Buell’s analysis explicates the 
conservative response to environmentalism that emerged during the 1980s and 1990s.  
This anti-environmentalism, Buell argues, emerged as an aspect of the larger neo-
conservative resurgence after the 1970s.  Buell’s history of anti-environmentalism 
includes figures and organizations like James Watt, Ronald Regan’s Secretary of the 
Interior, Rush Limbaugh, Newt Gingrich, Elizabeth Whelan, co-founder of the American 
Council on Science and Health, Ron Arnold, Alan Gottlieb, Julian Simon, the Heritage 
Foundation, the Cato Institute, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and others.  Their 
standard line of attack has been to vilify environmentalists as “pathological crisis-
mongers, Chicken Littles, apocalypse abusers, false prophets, joyless, puritanical 
doomsters, chic-apocalyptic neo-primitives, sufferers from an Armageddon complex, and 
toxic terrorists” (34).  Despite this response, Buell argues, the discourse of environmental 
crisis has persisted and evolved, and retains value.   
As powerful a structure as apocalypse is for understanding the world, it is also 
dangerous.  The critique of environmental doomsayers should prompt at least this 
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reflection.  Drawing upon Lawrence, and Kermode, Greg Garrard describes several 
characteristics of apocalyptic narratives worthy of consideration:  
the social psychology of apocalypticism that has historically inclined such 
‘embattled’ movements to paranoia and violence; the extreme moral dualism that 
divides the world sharply into friend and enemy; the emphasis upon the unveiling 
of trans-historical truth and the corresponding role of believers as the ones to 
whom, and for whom, the veil of history is rent.  But most importantly, for our 
purposes, apocalypticism is inevitably bound up with imagination, because it has 
yet to come into being.  To use the narratological term, it is always ‘proleptic’.  
And if, sociologically, it is ‘a genre born out of crisis’ it is also necessarily a 
rhetoric that must whip up such crises to proportions appropriate to the end of 
time.  This dialectic in which apocalypticism both responds to and produces 
‘crisis’ will be important in our evaluation of it as an ecocritical trope. (86) 
Garrard is cautious in his approach to the deployment of apocalyptic rhetoric for 
environmentalist purposes.  Apocalyptic rhetoric, he argues, polarizes people, engenders 
violence and paranoia, and produces crisis as much as it responds to it.  At the same time 
Garrard, like Buell, sees both persistence and value in the narrative of environmental 
apocalypse.  Garrard also highlights the proleptic character of apocalypse, the way that it 
is bound up with the imagination of the future.  Apocalypse, in this way, bears a distinct 
resemblance to science fiction.   
Interrogating further the relationship between positive and negative visions within 
apocalyptic narratives, Garrard distinguishes between tragic and comic apocalypse.  
Garrard draws upon rhetorician Stephen O’Leary to suggest that “the drama of 
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apocalypse is always shaped by a ‘frame of acceptance’ that may be either ‘comic’ or 
‘tragic.’  The choice of frame will determine the way in which issues of time, agency, 
authority and crisis are dramatized.” (87)  O’Leary writes:  
Tragedy conceives of evil in terms of guilt; its mechanism of redemption is 
victimage, its plot moves inexorably toward sacrifice and the ‘cult of the kill’.  
Comedy conceives of evil not as guilt, but as error; it’s mechanism of redemption 
is recognition rather than victimage, and its plot moves not toward sacrifice but to 
the exposure of fallibility. (qtd in Garrard, 87).  
Garrard highlights the characteristic features of tragic apocalyptic rhetoric in Rachel 
Carson’s Silent Spring, for example:  “the warning is presented in terms of absolute 
authority; the material threat is ‘evil’, and so, by association, are the authors of it; the 
consequences of failure to heed the warning are catastrophic, and the danger is not only 
imminent, but already well under way” (95).    A comic frame of acceptance, on the other 
hand, sees a way through the catastrophe, or learns lessons from the experience of loss.  
This comic mode, Garrard argues, is more appropriate for environmental apocalypse, 
which, ideally, is “not about anticipating the end of the world, but about attempting to 
avert it by persuasive means” (99).   Garrard argues that “Eschatological 
narrative…brings with it philosophical and political problems that seriously compromise 
its usefulness, especially in its radical, tragic form” (105). 
Garrard asks, “is environmental ‘crisis’ unreal, a discursive construct worthy of 
deconstruction but not millennial panic?” (107).  This is a central question with regard to 
climate change discourse.  He concludes that   
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Whilst the strategic dangers of such rhetoric may be identified along with its 
somewhat disreputable genealogy, its validity must ultimately be judged by a 
careful consideration of historical trends and from the variety of projections of, 
say, global population or climate change that legitimate scientific discussion will 
produce.  Ecocritics must assess the scale and import of scientific consensus, and 
in the final analysis defer to it, even as they analyse the ways such results are 
shaped by ideology and rhetoric. (107)  
Garrard argues here for the different kinds of authority that scientists and humanists have 
with regard to environmental crisis.  I wish to qualify his argument that ecocritics must 
defer to scientific consensus, however, by suggesting that even the “variety of projections 
of…global population or climate change that legitimate scientific discussion will 
produce” are as much ideology and rhetoric as they are falsifiable scientific hypotheses.  
The distinction between the sciences and the humanities does not hold with regard to 
scenario planning. 
In Apocalypse and the Writings on Revelation, D.H. Lawrence spends time 
discussing the oracles of the classical world:  
The old oracles were not supposed to say something that fitted plainly in the 
whole chain of circumstance.  They were supposed to deliver a set of images or 
symbols of the real dynamic value, which should set the emotional consciousness 
of the enquirer, as he pondered them, revolving more and more rapidly, till out of 
a state of intense emotional absorption the resolve at last formed; or, as we say, 
the decision was arrived at.  As a matter of fact, we do very much the same, in a 
crisis.  When anything very important is to be decided we withdraw and ponder 
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and ponder until the deep emotions are set working and revolving together, 
revolving, revolving, till a centre is formed and we “know what to do”.  And the 
fact that no politician today has the courage to follow this intensive method of 
“thought” is the reason of the absolute paucity of political mind today. (93-94) 
Lawrence’s description here offers some insight into how we might better understand 
scenarios about climate change as well as the apocalyptic frame within which 
environmentalists communicate global warming.  These narratives are stories meant to 
help interpret uncertain times.  They are not deterministic nor predictive; rather, they are 
imagistic, intended to inspire creative reflection. 
In Living in the End Times, Slavoj Zizek argues that “the global capitalist system 
is approaching an apocalyptic zero-point.  Its “four riders of the apocalypse” are 
comprised by the ecological crisis, the consequences of the biogenetic revolution, 
imbalances within the system itself (problems with intellectual property; forthcoming 
struggles over raw materials, food and water), and the explosive growth of social 
divisions and exclusions.” (x).  Zizek’s use of the apocalyptic framework to understand 
contemporary social life points again to the heuristic power of the apocalyptic paradigm.  
At the same time, his description of the various contributing factors to our sense of crisis 
is reminiscent of Kim Stanley Robinson’s sense that when we talk about climate change, 
we are talking about a much larger and more multi-dimensional crisis.  Zizek uses 
Elizabeth Kubler-Ross’s five stages of grief (denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and 
acceptance) to describe the reactions available within our collective social consciousness 
with regard to the “forthcoming apocalypse”:  
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The first reaction is one of ideological denial: there is no fundamental disorder; 
the second is exemplified by explosions of anger at the injustices of the new 
world order; the third involves attempts at bargaining (“if we change things here 
and there, life could perhaps go on as before”); when the bargaining fails, 
depression and withdrawal set in; finally, after passing through this zero-point, the 
subject no longer perceives the situation as a threat, but as the chance of a new 
beginning. (xi-xii). 
Zizek’s psychological analysis of collective response to crisis brings us to the other side 
of the dialectic of apocalypse and utopia and points again to the positive vision implicit in 
the traditional apocalyptic narrative.  After passing through the zero point, Zizek argues, 
the subject perceives the chance of a new beginning.   
 
Utopia 
Under consideration in the relationship between apocalypse and utopia is a 
historical dialectic as well as a mythical narrative structure.  Apocalypse and utopia are 
fundamental psychological categories for understanding the world.  Furthermore, this 
dialectic arises from the dynamics of the natural world itself.  It is a dialectic of death and 
rebirth.  It is evident in the cycle of the seasons, and in the revolution of day and night. 
In any discussion of utopia, it is necessary to distinguish between the pejorative 
senses of the term, in which utopian is taken to mean impractical or coercive, and the 
reconstructive sense of the term, in which utopianism is understood as a project of 
imagining and enacting a better world.  The tension between these two interpretations is 
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central to utopian thought.  Indeed, Thomas More’s foundational text reminds us that the 
word ‘utopia’ contains this tension, at once the ‘good place’ and ‘no place.’9   
More’s Utopia is the “eponymous prototype” for the genre.  In “Science Fiction 
and Utopia: A Historico-Philosophical Overview,” Carl Freedman argues that “there is 
probably no other comparatively abundant literary [genre] that can be traced so 
unambiguously—and often explicitly—to a single text” (72).  He points to Swift’s overt 
mention of More’s text in his prefatory letter in Gulliver’s Travels (1726), Samuel 
Butler’s Erewhon (1872), William Morris’s News from Nowhere (1890), Wells’s A 
Modern Utopia (1905), and Ursula LeGuin’s “ambiguous utopia,” The Dispossessed 
(1974) as evidence of generic affiliation in title as well as form (72).  Freedman argues 
that the texts that form the core of the utopian canon are Plato’s Republic, Thomas 
More’s Utopia, Tomasso Campanella’s City of the Sun, and Etienne Cabet’s Voyage en 
Icare.   
If More coined the word, however, he was not the first to give form to the dream 
of a better world.  In The Shape of Utopia, Robert Elliott argues that utopia is an aspect of 
a deeper and older tradition: “Insofar as utopia incorporates man’s longings for the good 
life, it is part of a complex of ideas that includes the Golden Age, the Earthly Paradise, 
the Fortunate Isles, the Islands of the Blest, the Happy Otherworld, and so on.  The 
archetypal text, at least for the Western world, is that of Hesiod” (4).  Elliott suggests the 
connections between utopia and the Saturnalian festival, suggesting its carnivalesque 
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 Terry Eagleton calls Utopia “the most self-undermining of literary forms.”  “If an ideal society can be 
portrayed only in the language of the present, it risks being betrayed as soon as we speak of it.  Anything 
we can speak of must fall short of the otherness we desire.  Utopias rebel against the unimaginativeness of 
the present, and in so doing, find themselves simply reproducing it.  All utopian writing is also 




dimensions:  “The uninhibited words of carnival are everywhere akin.  This is the 
language of satire before satire becomes literature; it is preliterary as well as subliterary.  
These utterances are ritual gestures, marked off from real life by the parenthesis of the 
holiday” (14).  Elliott’s argument for the ritual basis of carnival helps us to understand 
utopia as a formal structure.  Elliott explains how utopia and satire are related:  
Satire and utopia seem naturally compatible if we think of the structure of the 
formal verse satire, usually characterized by two main elements: the 
predominating negative part, which attacks folly or vice, and the understated 
positive part, which establishes a norm, a standard of excellence, against which 
folly and vice are judged.  The literary utopia, on the other hand, reverses these 
proportions of negative and positive—as the Russian writer Eugene Zamyatin 
says, utopias have a plus sign—presentation of the ideal overweighing the 
prescriptive attack on the bad old days which Utopia has happily transcended. 
(22) 
We can see in Elliott’s description of the differences between satire and utopia a 
connection as well to apocalypse.  Apocalypse and utopia are formally connected in a 
similar way to satire and utopia.  Apocalypse is predominantly negative, but traditionally 
operates in the service of some positive vision, whereas utopia is positive, but often 
involves a negative aspect as well.  As Jameson suggests, even the most positive utopian 
vision contains a catastrophe insofar as it involves a radical break from the present. 
Carl Freedman argues for three important senses of the term utopia.  The first 
sense refers to the literary genre inaugurated with More’s 1516 text.  The second, 
political-economic sense of utopia refers to the polemical writings of Marx and Engels in 
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which they deprecate alternative conceptions of socialism as “utopian,” in contrast to 
their own “scientific” version.  The “utopian socialists” included Robert Owen, Charles 
Fourier, Henri de St. Simon, Cabet, and others.  Finally, Freedman argues, utopia has a 
hermeneutic sense.  He locates this hermeneutic in the writing of the Frankfurt School, 
and particularly in the work of Ernst Bloch.
10
  Freedman writes,  
For Bloch utopia is not so much a matter of description or planning as it is a way 
of thinking and of reading: a utopian hermeneutic construes fragmentary 
prefigurations of an unalienated (communist) future in the cultural artefacts of the 
past and present, including many that on the surface may not seem particularly 
progressive.  Though it is possible to contrast critique and utopia, the latter...can 
be understood also as an aspect of critique. (73)   
Freedman is not alone in drawing upon Bloch; Bloch’s broad understanding of the 
utopian impulse in The Principle of Hope offers a basis for wide ranging cultural 
criticism – Jameson, for example, also draws heavily on Bloch.  Bloch argues that the 
utopian impulse is a fundamental psychological response to a sense of lack in the world.  
Bloch finds expressions of the utopian impulse in myths and literature, but also in other 
cultural forms, from music to architecture.   
Lyman Tower Sargent published his famous “Three Faces of Utopianism” in 
1967.  Sargent’s essay offers terminological nuance, distinguishing between “eutopia,” 
“utopia,” “dystopia,” and “anti-utopia” as categories of utopian thought.  Sargent’s 
definitions are worth rehearsing in this keywords context: 
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 The Principle of Hope was written in exile during the 1930s and published in the German Democratic 




Utopia—a non-existent society described in considerable detail and normally 
located in time and space. 
Eutopia or positive utopia—a non-existent society described in considerable 
detail and normally located in time and space that the author intended a 
contemporaneous reader to view as considerably better than the society in which 
that reader lived. 
Dystopia or negative utopia—a non-existent society described in considerable 
detail and normally located in time and space that the author intended a 
contemporaneous reader to view as considerably worse than the society in which 
the reader lived. 
Utopian satire—a non-existent society described in considerable detail and 
normally located in space and time that the author intended a contemporaneous 
reader to view as a criticism of that contemporary society. 
Anti-utopia—a non-existent society described in considerable detail and 
normally located in time and space that the author intended a contemporaneous 
reader to view as a criticism of utopianism or some particular eutopia. 
Critical utopia—a non-existent society described in considerable detail and 
normally located in time and space that the author intended a contemporaneous 
reader to view as better than contemporary society but with difficult problems that 
the described society may or may not be able to solve and which takes a critical 
view of the utopian genre. (9) 
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Sargent’s definitions help to elaborate the modes within which utopian writing can 
operate, delineating the different functions it might perform.  In particular, Sargent’s 
notion of critical utopia is important to later theorists such as Tom Moylan.  It is also 
worth mentioning Karl Mannheim’s distinction between ideology and utopia.  For 
Mannheim, ideology preserves the status quo, while utopia transforms it.  Pictures of 
ideal societies need not be utopian, according to Mannheim’s definition, as they might be 
ideological in their effect. 
In “The Imaginary Reconstitution of Society: Utopia as Method,” Ruth Levitas 
argues for the important architectural functions that utopia performs.  The imaginary 
reconstitution of society, IROS, is both an analytical and a political method, and it 
involves “the construction or constitution of society as it is, as it might be, as it might not 
be, and as it might be hoped for or feared.”  In doing so, it offers both “an archeological 
or analytical mode, and an architectural or constructive mode” (47).  Levitas quotes from 
Miguel Abensour to explain her understanding of the educative function of utopia.  For 
Abensour, utopia prompts two kinds of intellectual response: 
Our habitual values (the “commonsense” of bourgeois society) are thrown into 
disarray.  And we enter Utopia’s new-found space: the education of desire.  This 
is not the same “a moral education” towards a given end: it is rather, to open a 
way to aspiration, to “teach desire to desire, to desire better, to desire more, and 
above all to desire in a different way” (quoted in Levitas 56) 
On the one hand, utopias prompt a critical response to contemporary society.  The status 
quo becomes estranged.  On the other hand, utopias provide concrete alternatives.  In this 
way, utopias re-educate our desires towards new ends and means.  According to Levitas, 
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“The strength of IROS or the utopian method is precisely that it deals with the concrete 
instantiation of values, enabling a level of real exploration and judgment.”  “Without a 
certain element of closure,” she argues, without “specificity, commitment, and literalism 
about what would actually be entailed in practice, serious criticism is impossible” (57).  
At the same time, Levitas argues, these alternatives should not be seen as static; they are 
a part of a process – a methodology of imagining concrete alternatives – which might 
then undergo further critique and refinement through this ongoing process. 
There is an important American tradition of utopian thought.  In the early years of 
the American industrial era, a host of utopian communities propagated around the 
country.  Many of these 19
th
 century utopian experiments fused a critique of capitalism 
with an embrace of Christianity -- we might think here of Quaker and Amish 
communities across New England, or of the Oneida Community in New York.  George 
Ripley’s “Brook Farm” community famously inspired Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The 
Blithedale Romance.  Thoreau’s Walden ought also to be understood in this context.  
There is a fundamental tension at the heart of the American dream.  Utopianism has 
always battled with capitalism, which has its own utopian logic, but which has its roots in 
imperialism.   
Many utopian novels were published into the first part of the 20
th
 century, some 
making a considerable impact on political discourse.  Edward Bellamy’s Looking 
Backward produced such a response, with readers forming Bellamy societies in support 
of the reforms promoted in the novel.  Upton Sinclair’s critique of industrialism in The 
Jungle was counterbalanced by his practical utopian experiment at Helicon Hall, which 
opened near Englewood, New Jersey in 1906 with twelve families.  If The Jungle offers 
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Sinclair’s apocalyptic vision of unchecked capitalism, Helicon Hall represented his 
reconstructive vision of society.
11
  Charlotte Perkins Gilman published the feminist 
utopia Herland in 1915.  We might also see in this history of utopian thought its 
coincidence with the history of climate change.  The utopian experiments that offered 
alternatives to market capitalism at the dawn of the industrial era acquire a renewed 
relevance as we enter its twilight. 
Utopia also has its share of critics.  As a result of Stalinism and the Cold War, 
utopianism took on totalitarian connotations.  We can see this shift in attitude reflected in 
dystopian novels like Brave New World and 1984.  In The Open Society and Its Enemies 
Karl Popper argues that utopianism is dangerous, and that utopia can only be imposed by 
force.  Finally, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
scholars such as Francis Fukuyama argued that utopianism faces charges not just of 
impracticality and coerciveness, but also of irrelevance.  With the emergent hegemony of 
global capitalism, Fukuyama argued, we arrived at the end of history, where, in Margaret 
Thatcher’s terms, there is no alternative.12   
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 When Helicon Hall burned to the ground only four months after opening, Sinclair defended the 
experiment, saying, “I have lived in the future” (qtd in Jensen viii).  After Helicon Hall was destroyed by 
fire, Sinclair wrote a utopian play – The Millennium – set in the year 2002.  Fascinatingly, King Camp 
Gillette was also a utopian socialist.  He published a book entitled The Human Drift (1894) that imagines 
all industry taken over by a publicly-owned company and the country powered by Niagara Falls.  His last 
book The People’s Corporation (1924) was written with Upton Sinclair. 
12
 Kim Stanley Robinson argues of these criticisms, “There are a lot of problems in writing utopias, but 
they can be opportunities.  The usual objections, that they must be boring, are often political attacks, or 
ignorant repeating of a line, or another way of saying, “No expository lumps please, it has to be about me.”  
The political attacks would be interesting to parse.  “Utopia would be boring because there would be no 
conflicts, history would stop, there would be no great art, no drama, no magnificence.”  This is always said 
by white people with a full belly.  My feeling is that if they were hungry and sick and living in a cardboard 
shack they would be more willing to give utopia a try.  And if we did achieve a just and sustainable world 
civilization, I’m confident there would still be enough drama, as I tried to show in Pacific Edge.  There 
would still be love lost, there would still be death.  That would be enough.  The horribleness of unnecessary 
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In Archaeologies of the Future, Fredric Jameson argues that utopian thought 
acquires a renewed relevance in confronting the historical moment of late capitalism.  
Jameson argues that “the Utopian form itself is the answer to the universal ideological 
conviction that no alternative is possible, that there is no alternative to the system.  
Utopia thus now better expresses our relationship to a genuinely political future than any 
other current program of action.”  The formal flaw (so called) of utopia, its radical break 
from realpolitik, thus becomes its rhetorical and political strength: “it forces us precisely 
to concentrate on the break itself, on the unrealizable in its own right.”   Jameson argues 
against Fukuyama’s declaration of “end of history,” suggesting that “Utopia recovers its 
vocation at the very moment where the undesirability of change is everywhere 
dogmatically affirmed.” (231) 
In The Task of Utopia, Erin McKenna defends a pragmatic, feminist approach to 
utopianism, arguing convincingly that the charges of coerciveness and totalitarianism 
properly apply only to the end-state utopia.  End-state utopias emphasize goals, taking an 
instrumental approach that might allow any means as permissible in order to achieve an 
overriding end goal.  End-state utopias fail to creatively integrate means and ends in their 
quest for the better world.  As a result, end-state utopias also face the charge of being 
static.  They lack dynamism and drama.  They fail to appreciate and encourage our 
continued participation in the formation of the future. 
Adapting Sartre’s slogan about being neither communist nor anti-communist, but 
instead anti-anti-communist, Jameson formulates the phrase anti-anti-utopianism to 
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describe the formal experimentation of Cold War American SF writers like Philip Dick, 
Samuel Delaney, and Ursula LeGuin.  In its playfulness with the forms and limits of 
utopian thought, the aim of anti-anti-utopian writing is to free the imagination from the 
present, rather than trying to offer inevitably impoverished pictures of what life in the 
future is going to be like.  Jameson’s anti-anti-utopianism, I would argue, offers a useful 
starting point for rethinking the character of utopia – playful and experimental, constantly 
cognizant of the pitfalls of its own endeavor. Erin McKenna formulates this problematic 
even more productively.  Rather than taking the double-negative non-stance of anti-anti-
utopianism, McKenna recommends a “process model of utopia,” based on a feminist 
reading of Dewey’s theorization of democracy, emphasizing experimentalism and the 
cultivation of flexible and critical habits of mind.   Our adherence to capitalism comes 
from a lack of will-power and a failure of imagination.  Utopia is the mode of thought 
most precisely calibrated for addressing our current political moment.  What global 
warming makes clear is that we need an alternative to industrial capitalism as it has been 








THE END OF NATURE 
 
The scientific narrative of climate change acquired an important level of 
international consensus in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  In The Discovery of Global 
Warming, Spencer Weart explains that the World Climate Conference in Geneva in 1979 
prompted the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the International Council 
of Scientific Unions (ICSU) to collaborate in establishing the World Climate Research 
Program (WCRP).  At a 1985 conference in Villach, Austria, the assembled scientists 
issued a warning and a call to action: “in the first half of the next century a rise of global 
mean temperature could occur which is greater than any in man’s history….  While some 
warming of climate now appears inevitable due to past actions, the rate and degree of 
future warming could be profoundly affected by governmental policies” (qtd. in Weart, 
151). 
In the popular imaginary of the United States, however, global warming remained 
largely below the radar until the summer of 1988.  Newspaper coverage of climate 
change was limited, and the public was either unaware of the threat or saw climate 
change as a problem only for the distant future (Weart 154).  Then several events brought 
climate change into broad public awareness.  Most histories point to the summer of 1988 
as a turning point, when North America suffered an extreme heat wave and James 
Hansen testimony before Congress that a long-term warming trend was underway and 
that the greenhouse effect was to blame.  In The Science and Politics of Global Climate 
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Change (2006) Andrew Dessler and Edward Parson point out that “this extreme summer 
followed a period of intense worldwide publicity about the Antarctic ozone hole and the 
successful negotiation of the Montreal Protocol…to control the responsible chemicals….  
[P]oliticians and the public were primed to consider the possibility that human activities 
could be disrupting the global climate” (12).  The UN General Assembly passed a 
resolution declaring the climate a “concern to mankind” and established the International 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).  News coverage increased, and later in 1988, instead of 
naming a “Person of the Year,” Time magazine named the “Endangered Earth” the 
“Planet of the Year” (Dessler and Parson 12).   
The following year, Bill McKibben published The End of Nature (1989), his 
landmark work on global warming.  A staff writer for The New Yorker for much of the 
1980s, The End of Nature was McKibben’s first book, and it is regarded as the first book 
for a general audience about global climate change.  “We just happen to be living at the 
moment when the carbon dioxide has increased to an intolerable level,” writes 
McKibben.  “We just happen to be alive at the moment when if nothing is done before we 
die the world’s tropical rain forests will become a brown girdle around the planet that 
will last for millennia….  We just happen to be living in the decade when genetic 
engineering is acquiring a momentum that will soon be unstoppable” (194).  Like Rachel 
Carson’s Silent Spring (1962), The End of Nature was serialized in The New Yorker 
before it was published by Random House in 1989.  And like Silent Spring, The End of 
Nature deploys apocalyptic rhetoric in order to convey a sense of urgency.  McKibben 
warns against a dystopian future of global warming and genetic engineering at the same 
time as he offers an apocalyptic elegy for wilderness.  “An idea, a relationship, can go 
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extinct, just like an animal or a plant,” writes McKibben; “The idea in this case is 
‘nature,’ the separate and wild province, the world apart from man to which he adapted, 
under whose rules he was born and died” (48).  In the past, McKibben argues, we 
damaged parts of the environment.  Now we were destroying the biosphere, 
fundamentally altering and diminishing the world in which we lived.   
Entering the public sphere at the close of the Cold War, I argue that climate 
change took on distinctive resonances as it filled a void in the political imaginary left 
vacant by the collapse of the USSR.  The end of the cold war marked the so-called 
victory of free-market capitalism.  With the disappearance of the explicit critique of 
capitalism that the Soviet Union constituted, a question remained – from what 
perspective can one offer a critique of the dominant political-economic order?  The 
answer, it seems, lay in the limits of the planet itself.    In his article “Dystopia and the 
End of Politics,” Benjamin Kunkel elaborates the connections between global warming 
and the fall of the Soviet Union:  
petroleum exports made up some 60 percent of the USSR’s foreign currency 
earnings, and the same high oil prices that buoyed the Soviet rivalry with the 
United States encouraged conservation in the West.  When, in the mid-eighties, 
oil prices collapsed, it not only helped finish off the USSR but increased fuel 
consumption outside the Soviet bloc, which in turn accelerated global warming, 
along with…the depletion of the earth’s oil reserves” (89).   
When the energy crisis of the 1970s gave way to cheap oil in the 1980s, it prompted the 
collapse of the Soviet economy at the same time as it created the illusion that capitalism 
no longer faced the resource challenges of the previous decades.  Kunkel argues that 
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“many of our newer anxieties turn…on the idea that the oil intensive planetary 
transportation system so vital to the functioning of contemporary capitalism ultimately 
abets climate change, the arrival of peak oil, and the circulation of viruses, while 
globalized financial markets are capable of spreading contagions (as in the “Asian flu” of 
1998) of a different kind” (89).13 
In this same context, climate change took on the connotations of nuclear 
catastrophe.  The 1980s represented the culmination of a nuclear arms race that had lasted 
almost half a century; the possibility of a nuclear catastrophe had been the predominant 
apocalyptic scenario for so long that it had carved deep impressions in the public 
imagination.   Moreover, the resonance of nuclear apocalypse that continues to cling to 
climate change is more than just an echo.  The shape of climate change rhetoric was 
determined in part by environmentalists and activists who organized around issues of 
nuclear weapons and waste and then adapted their messages and strategies to combat 
climate change.  The Union of Concerned Scientists, for example, which had originally 
organized because of concerns about nuclear technology, made climate change an official 
priority in the 1980s.  Climate change and nuclear catastrophe both represent apocalyptic 
critiques of human technology.  The temporal scales on which the two scenarios operate, 
however, is vastly different.  Nuclear catastrophe can happen in an instant; climate 
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 More recently, Slavoj Zizek argues that “The contours of a new Cold War are…appearing on the 
horizon—and, this time, it will be a conflict literally fought in very cold conditions.  On August 2, 2007 a 
Russian team planted a titanium capsule with a Russian flag under the ice caps of the North Pole….  
Its…goal was to secure for Russia the vast energy riches of the Arctic: according to current estimates, up to 
one quarter of the world’s untapped oil and gas sources may lie under the Arctic Ocean.  Russia’s claims 
are, predictably, opposed by four other countries whose territory borders on the Arctic region: the United 




change happens slowly.  Nuclear catastrophe is a critique of technological hubris and 
human aggression; climate change is a general critique of the industrial order.   
During the 1990s the IPCC published its first two assessment reports, and at the 
1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro more than 150 states signed the “United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change.”  Dessler and Parson point out that during 
the Clinton administration (1993 – 2001), conservatives maintained a powerful influence 
in Congress, and despite Vice President Al Gore’s commitment to climate issues, the 
administration was largely ineffective in its approach to global warming.  In From 
Apocalypse to Way of Life, Fredrick Buell argues that the political Right resisted the 
scientific narrative of ecological crisis, opting instead for a combination of religious 
exceptionalism, nationalism, and technological optimism, while the critical edge of the 
Left went the way of postmodernism, fragmentation, and simulacra.  The proliferation of 
media and communications technology overwhelmed the arena of discursive production 
and seemed totalizing.  In this context, Buell argues, apocalyptic and utopian frames vied 
for dominance with one another; apocalypse predominated, but this chapter will illustrate 
ways in which we can also see the persistence, resurgence, and rearticulation of a 
dormant utopian aesthetic. 
This chapter develops an analysis of three fictional representations of climate change 
-- T.C. Boyle’s A Friend of the Earth (2000), Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (2003) 
and The Year of the Flood (2009), and Octavia Butler’s Parable of the Sower (1993) – 
each of which offers insight into the science and policy of climate change, as well as the 
changing shape of environmentalist rhetoric from the 1990s to the present.  Set in the 
diminished environment of 2025, Boyle’s novel emphasizes the common generic 
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ancestry of utopia and satire, conducting a critique of late 20
th
 century American radical 
environmentalism and its shortcomings in the face of global climate change.  Atwood’s 
novels foreground concerns about biotechnology and corporatocracy in an extrapolation 
of what Naomi Klein terms “disaster capitalism.”  Oryx and Crake interrogates the social 
consequences of the polarization between the sciences and humanities identified by 
Snow, while The Year of the Flood offers a vision of radicalism founded in food.  Finally, 
in Butler’s novel, climate-induced stresses on ecological services and the privatization of 
the commons collude to prompt the deterioration of civil society.  Like Atwood’s novels 
to this extent, Butler goes farther in presenting a class, race, and gender conscious 
critique of climate change.  The most utopian of the texts under consideration, Butler’s 
Parable juxtaposes this narrative of decline with a counter-narrative of sustainable 
community coming together across divisions that often hinder cooperation, arguing for 
the hope of emancipatory agency even within a dystopian world.  What justifies this 
constellation of texts is that they all offer commentary on the decade of the 1990s. They 
are, in an important sense, pre-9/11 texts, although Atwood’s novels blur that boundary.  
All three authors are concerned with the lived experience of a changed climate—the 
phenomenology of climate change.  In contrast to the novels in the next chapter, which 
focus on the changing climate itself, these novels imagine a future on the other side of 
climate change.  They do not require any specific trigger mechanism to make their 
futures plausible.  The change has already happened.  To that extent, they are fatalistic.  
They might optimistically be read as warnings—possible futures to avoid.  
Pessimistically, they might be understood as a kind of futuristic critical realism. 
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T.C. Boyle is not often thought of as a science fiction writer, but A Friend of the 
Earth is a clear example of speculative futurism, and the degree of scientific literacy 
within the novel argues for its inclusion as science fiction.  Boyle has received number of 
literary awards, including the PEN/Faulkner Award, the PEN/Malamud Prize, the 
PEN/West Literary Prize, the Commonwealth Gold Medal for Literature, the National 
Academy of Arts and Letters Award for Prose Excellence. 
Set in 2025, A Friend of the Earth offers satirical commentary on American 
radical environmentalism of the late 20
th
 century.  Boyle imagines a biosphere altered by 
global warming – one in which massive species extinction has occurred and a resistant 
strain of the deadly mucosa virus has proliferated around the globe.  The weather pattern 
in southern California alternates between extreme drought and flash floods, and in this 
diminished landscape, the novel’s protagonist, Tyrone O’Shaughnessy Tierwater – a 
former eco-activist in the radical group Earth Forever! -- now manages a menagerie of 
animals “only a mother could love,” owned by super-rich pop-star, Maclovio Pulchris.  
The plot develops when Andrea, Tierwater’s former lover and step-mother to his 
daughter Sierra, contacts him after twenty years.  She convinces Tierwater to allow 
another Earth Forever! member, April Wind, to interview him for a biography of Sierra.  
Through this device, the reader learns about Tierwater’s involvement in the radical 
environmental movement of the late 1980s and 90s.  As the weather gets worse in the 
future, the animals must be moved from their cages and into the Pulchris mansion, where 
they wreak havoc.  As the plot resolves, Ty and Andrea drive north to an old Earth 
Forever! cabin in the Sierra Nevada mountains to begin their young-old lives anew – 
achieving a version of the middle-class American dream.  The novel ends on a note of 
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ironic optimism, limned by the dystopian vision with which it is self-consciously 
complicit.  Throughout the novel, Boyle conducts a humorous, critique of late 20
th
 
century American radical environmentalism and its shortcomings in the face of global 
climate change.  
Boyle’s novel displays a self-conscious engagement with several discourses 
within American environmentalism.  Through allusion, Boyle’s protagonist / narrator 
locates himself in a literary environmental tradition that includes Thoreau, Muir, Rachel 
Carson, and especially Edward Abbey.  Set in a diminished ecosystem that makes these 
authors seem nostalgic rather than visionary, Boyle also sets his novel at a critical 
distance from this literary tradition.  As Tierwater remarks early in the novel, “I’m an 
environmentalist, after all—or used to be; not much sense in using that term now” (Boyle 
8).  A Friend of the Earth injects postmodern irony and self-reflexivity into this 
environmental tradition, using humor to critique a genre already filled with satire – 
Boyle’s novel self-consciously twists the humor of Edward Abbey and the letters and 
articles published in Earth First! pamphlets.  At the same time, Boyle’s novel also 
displays a sophisticated continuity with scientific discourses about climate change, 
species extinction, and wilderness conservation. 
Through irony, Boyle’s novel also engages the utopian tradition in American 
environmentalism.  In The Shape of Utopia (1970) Robert Elliott argues for the common 
origins of utopia and satire.  Elliott writes, 
utopia is the secularization of the myth of the Golden Age, a myth incarnated in 
the festival of Saturnalia.  Satire is the secular form of ritual mockery, ridicule, 
invective—ritual gestures which are integrally part of the same festival.  Thus 
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utopia and satire are linked in the celebration of Saturn, a god who reigns over the 
earthly paradise, but who also by reason of his concern with melancholy, disease, 
and death becomes the patron of snarling Renaissance satirists.  The two modes 
are formally joined in More’s eponymous work, and indeed the very notion of 
utopia necessarily entails a negative appraisal of present conditions.  Satire and 
utopia are not really separable, the one a critique of the real world in the name of 
something better, the other a hopeful construct of a world that might be.  The 
hope feeds the criticism, the criticism the hope.  Writers of utopia have always 
known this: the one unanswerable argument for the utopian vision is a hard 
satirical look at the way things are today. (24) 
Elliott’s comments help us to understand the ways in which Boyle’s novel operates as 
utopia.  The future that Boyle constructs in A Friend of the Earth derives not only from 
scientific reports on climate change and species extinction, but also from a satirical 
extrapolation of deep ecology fantasies that imagine dramatic decreases in future human 
populations.  What seems on the surface to be a dystopia becomes, on closer inspection, 
an ironic utopia.  The catastrophe that plays out in the story is, in fact, one that some of 
the characters might have wished for. 
Through irony, then, Boyle’s novel offers a productive consideration of the 
practical challenges and the ideological problematics of species preservation in the face 
of climate change.  In the “Prologue,” Tierwater describes himself as “an animal man” 
who manages Maclovio Pulchris’ private menagerie, “the last surviving one in this part of 
the world, and it’s an important—scratch that, vital—reservoir for zoo-cloning and the 
distribution of what’s left of the major mammalian species” (2).  Tierwater’s stream of 
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consciousness editing -- “scratch that, vital” -- highlights rhetoric, and highlights his 
doubts about the continued significance of his own place within a fundamentally changed 
system.  To conduct this satire, Boyle simply points to an already-occurring consequence 
of climate change.  The possibility of massive species extinction within the next century 
is a distinct threat.  In Red Sky at Morning (2004), James Gustave Speth writes that “few 
Americans appreciate how close at hand is the widespread loss of the American 
landscape.  The best current estimate is that…climate change projected for late this 
century will make it impossible for about half the American land to sustain the types of 
plants and animals now on that land” (16).  While Speth focuses here on the U.S. because 
of its leading role in carbon emissions, the problem of species extinction and biodiversity 
loss is global.  As Stephen Meyer explains in The End of the Wild (2006),  
Over the next 100 years or so as many as half of the Earth’s species, representing 
a quarter of the planet’s genetic stock, will functionally if not completely 
disappear.  The land and oceans will continue to teem with life, but it will be a 
peculiarly homogenized assemblage of organisms unnaturally selected for their 
compatibility with one fundamental force: us. (4)   
Boyle’s novel, set in 2025, might exaggerate the speed of species extinction, but he does 
not overstate the threat.  In abrupt climate change scenarios, massive species extinction 
within a time frame such as that imagined by Boyle is not impossible, and even in the 
longer context of gradual climate change scenarios, massive species extinction on the 
order of that described in the novel is virtually assured within a century – “and in this 
sense, the extinction crisis—the race to save the composition, structure, and organization 
of biodiversity as it exists today—is over, and we have lost” (Meyer 5).   
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A Friend of the Earth does not oversimplify this threat.  As Meyer reminds us, 
loss of biodiversity does not mean life will cease to exist.  Describing his quarters at the 
Pulchris estate, Tierwater remarks,  
The place smells of mold—what else?—and rats.  The rats—an R-selected 
species, big litters, highly mobile, selected for any environment—are thriving, 
multiplying like there’s no tomorrow (but of course there is, as everybody alive 
now knows all too well and ruefully, and tomorrow is coming for the rats too). 
(Boyle 8)   
Through the device of Tierwater’s knowledge as an “animal man,” Boyle interprets the 
salient aspects of his biologically diminished landscape for the reader.  Meyer explains, 
“at one extreme, we are making the planet especially hospitable for the weedy species: 
plants, animals, and other organisms that thrive in continually disturbed, human-
dominated environments” (Meyer 9).  At the other extreme, of course, humans are 
making the planet extremely inhospitable for species adapted to disappearing ecological 
niches.  Through our capacity to alter the world around us, humans are, Meyer asserts, 
creating a three tiered hierarchy of life—a world comprised of “weedy” species, “relic” 
species (those species that will continue to exist only through benign neglect or, 
increasingly, through active management), and “ghost” species (for whom extinction is 
guaranteed).  One proposal for preserving endangered species, with which A Friend of 
the Earth is most explicitly engaged, includes genetic engineering, but as Meyer explains, 
“this kind of Jurassic Park thinking ignores the fact that all of the factors that contributed 
to species loss in the wild will remain in place and probably be even more powerful” in 
the future.  “At best,” he argues, reengineered species “could exist as genetic relics in a 
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zoo” (61).  Boyle’s novel imagines a world in which the technology does not yet exist to 
attempt a large-scale genetic re-engineering project.  The species surviving in Pulchris’ 
menagerie already occupy the absurd space of zoo-bound genetic relics.  A Friend of the 
Earth represents Tierwater’s attempt to come to grips with the fact that, “nature doesn’t 
matter anymore—it’s not even nature, just something we created out of a witch’s brew of 
fossil fuel emissions and deforestation” (Boyle 103). 
 In the face of widespread and inevitable species extinction, Meyer argues, 
conservationists and environmentalists need to dramatically re-imagine their values and 
their strategies: 
we must abandon our humanist love affair with the wild, purging considerations 
such as landscape aesthetics and romanticist isolation, and instead applying the 
cold light of necropsy to dissect the collapsing processes of natural selection. 
(Meyer 78) 
T.C. Boyle’s A Friend of the Earth attempts precisely this purging of Romantic and 
aesthetic considerations in formulating the human relationship to the non-human natural 
world.  And, significantly, Boyle sets the “earliest” scene of his novel in 1989, the same 
year as Edward Abbey’s death and Bill McKibben’s publication of The End of Nature.  In 
The End of Nature, McKibben argues that,  
without realizing it we have already stepped over the threshold of such a change 
that we are at the end of nature.   
By the end of nature I do not mean the end of the world.  The rain will still 
fall and the sun shine, though differently than before.  When I say ‘nature’ I mean 
a certain set of ideas about the world and our place in it.  But the death of those 
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ideas begins with concrete changes in the reality around us—changes that 
scientists can measure and enumerate.  More and more frequently, these changes 
will clash with our perceptions, until, finally, our sense of nature as eternal and 
separate is washed away and we will see all too clearly what we have done. (8) 
McKibben’s argument provides the context for reconsidering Boyle’s satire in terms of a 
kind of realism – Boyle’s future imagines the world as it is, factoring in the 
environmental debt that we have already accumulated.  The seeming difference between 
1989 and 2025 only serves to highlight their figurative temporal simultaneity.  
Sylvia Mayer rightly points to Tierwater’s encounters with the abject as an important 
space in which this purgation / reformulation takes place.  Drawing upon Kristeva’s 
understanding of the abject as an encounter through which subject formation takes place, 
Mayer argues that in an ecological dystopia, the “body is exposed to dirt, wetness, stink, 
and prolonged phases of darkness.  There is hardly any relief for the senses.  The 
permeating quality of these experiences challenges the boundaries between body and 
outside world and asks for their redrawing” (Mayer 224).  Tierwater’s strategy of dealing 
with these encounters through irony and sarcasm, she argues, demonstrates that “Boyle’s 
protagonist has not yet been able to accommodate these changes, that he is preoccupied 
with integrating them into a new notion of self” (224).  In the future that Boyle imagines, 
“both body and mind have to adapt to this loss of received temporal patterns and spatial 
refuge.  The collapse of the biosphere calls for new anthropological conceptualizations 
and for a new conceptualization of the relation between nature and culture” (Mayer 224-
225).  Tierwater’s sarcasm in the face of the abject (and Boyle’s humor) arises from a 
tension between his nostalgia for the past and its discontinuity with the present.  
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Tierwater’s personal struggle to integrate his sensory experience of an altered ecosystem 
with his identity as “a friend of the earth” thus serves as a synecdoche for American 
environmentalism’s struggle to redefine itself in the face of global climate change.   
 Sylvia Mayer further argues that A Friend of the Earth performs a feminist 
critique of radical environmentalism by demonstrating they ways in which Ty’s “identity 
as an environmentalist was formed in confrontation with a model of masculinity that 
Andrew Ross has called the concept of the ‘ecological superman’” (228).  As Mayer 
explains, Ross’s notion of the ecological superman is just one more manifestation of the 
American ideal of the “self-made man,” (with its attendant valorization of white, 
heterosexual masculinity), in this case “characterized by its appropriation of the moral 
power of environmentalism” (229).  Mayer is surely correct, but I would argue that 
Boyle’s critique of radical environmentalism is even more comprehensive and 
intentionally situated within the history of radical environmentalist discourse than Mayer 
gives him credit for.  Through parody, Boyle’s novel rehearses a social ecology critique 
of deep ecology.  Describing the tenets of his environmentalism in the “Prologue,” 
Tierwater explains “I believe in Live and Let Live, Adat, Deep Ecology, No Compromise 
in Defense of Mother Earth” (Boyle 8).  Tierwater later reflects ironically on the 
character of his deep ecology: 
Friendship.  That’s what got me into the movement and that’s what pushed me 
way out there on the naked edge of nothing, beyond sense or reason, or even 
hope.  Friendship for the earth.  For the trees and shrubs and the native grasses 
and the antelope on the plain and the kangaroo rats in the desert and everything 
else that lives and breathes under the sun. 
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Except people, that is.  Because to be a friend of the earth, you have to be 
an enemy of the people. (55-56) 
Tierwater’s assertion of this strict dichotomy between concern for the non-human 
environment and concern for humans and issues of social justice alludes to a famous 
disagreement between social ecologist Murray Bookchin and several members of Earth 
First! in the late 1980s, in which Bookchin accused Earth First!, and by extension, deep 
ecology, of promoting neo-Malthusianism and eco-fascism.   
For Bookchin, Malthusian approaches to environmentalism fail to account for the 
primarily social nature of environmental problems.  Furthermore, they justify reactionary 
nativism more often than they produce positive change.  Building upon Bookchin’s 
critique, in Environmental Ethics for a Postcolonial World (2005), Deane Curtin 
demonstrates that a Malthusian approach to environmental concerns results in forms of 
violence at the level of policy-making: “Malthusian policies, pessimistic as they are about 
the ability of people to control themselves and plan rationally for the future, target the 
control of women as the main solution to population pressures.  Thus we have had many 
coercive approaches to population control” (Curtin 4).  And as Greg Garrard argues in 
Ecocriticism, “Neo-Malthusianism has been used to justify stronger immigration controls 
in rich countries and to protect their threatened carrying capacity, as well as ending food 
aid to famine-struck countries that have allegedly overshot their ecological limits.  In 
both cases, biological models are applied to human situations with results that directly 




Bookchin’s article, “Social Ecology Versus Deep Ecology” was written in direct 
response to Christopher Manes, who, under the pseudonym “Miss Ann Thropy,” 
published an article in Earth First! entitled “Overpopulation and AIDS,” arguing that the 
AIDS crisis was a natural and proper response to overpopulation.  Bookchin’s article is 
also directly critical of David Foreman, who in an interview with Bill Devall, suggested a 
similar, natural logic to famine in Ethiopia (Bookchin 220).  Boyle’s repeated references 
to the mucosa virus make the Malthusian tendencies of his characters explicit.  
Explaining her reasons for returning to the Pulchris mansion with Ty, Andrea explains, 
“Maclovio Pulchris.  We need him.  His money, anyway.  Earth Forever! is going to fly 
again, in a big way.  If this new mucosa strain is what we think it is, then the crash we’ve 
been talking about all these years is here, here right now” (Boyle 92).  And later in the 
story, after the animals have been moved inside because of flooding, Maclovio Pulchris’ 
neighbor comes to the door seeking shelter: 
‘Mr. Pulchris,’ Delbert Sakapathian says, addressing Mac with all the awe and 
humility of a communicant in the church of celebrity, ‘we need help.  I—this is 
Old Man Foley, from the Lupine Hill Retirement Home?—and there’s nothing 
left over but wreckage, and he needs shelter, I mean, if you can spare it, just till 
they can get the emergency crews in there to rebuild or take people to a 
gymnasium somewhere or something.  He’s been wet through to the skin for days 
now.’… 
Finally, Mac, in his sweetest voice, says no.  Shakes his head wearily, the 
eel whips slipping across the slick surface of his restored shades.  ‘I’d like to 
help,’ he says, ‘I really would, but I just can’t—we can’t—risk it.  It’s the 
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mucosa.  You understand, don’t you?  I want to help.  I do.  Money’s no problem.  
You want money? (Boyle 191) 
Pulchris’ failure to offer shelter to his neighbor in a time of need demonstrates the limits 
of his environmentalism.  A friend of the earth, Mac is no friend of people.  In a time of 
need he can offer only charity, but not cooperation.  Mac’s refusal to help his neighbor 
thematizes radical environmentalism’s failure to meet the ethical demands of social 
justice. 
Finally, as a parody of Earth First!, Boyle’s depiction of Earth Forever! also 
documents the private funding and upper-class origins of radical environmentalism as it 
developed during the 1990s.  Through narrative refraction, Boyle exposes EF! as a 
bourgeois radicalism: “This time the car was a smooth black BMW—one of the pricey 
models, 740i, Andrea’s car, and who’d bought it for her? ‘You did, Ty, and I love you for 
it.  We needed something with a little class for pulling up at the curb when they’ve got 
the cameras going, you know?’” (Boyle 319). 
Boyle’s novel produces a useful critique of late 20th century radical 
environmentalism, but falls short of inspiring a hopeful vision of the future.  His satire 
relies on a kind of defeatism with regard to climate change that offers no alternative to 
the deep ecology and radical environmentalism that it critiques.  Its scorn is reserved for 
activists instead of legislators, and to this extent Boyle refrains from a more productive 
political critique.  But perhaps this is Boyle’s point – direct action radical 
environmentalism never achieves a productive political critique.  Boyle’s negative 
critique hints at the positive vision of social ecology, but fails to imaginatively realize 
such a vision within his novel. 
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More explicitly than her other novels, Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (2003) 
and The Year of the Flood (2009) are books about radicalism and resistance in the 
Americas.  The Year of the Flood returns to the dystopian future of Oryx and Crake, 
expanding the scope of that earlier novel.  A “simultanequel,” narrated from multiple 
points of view, The Year of the Flood builds upon the story of Oryx and Crake, offering a 
more thorough set of critical perspectives on capitalism and collapse.  Taken together, 
these two novels constitute a “critical dystopia,” insofar as they operate, in Tom 
Moylan’s terms, “inside the ambient zone of anti-utopian pessimism with new textual 
tricks,” exposing the “horror of the present moment” (Moylan 196).   
Entering this ambient zone of anti-utopian pessimism, Atwood knows that she is 
writing in a genre with a long history, and the dystopian world of these two novels reads 
something like a tribute album, with explicit allusions to Orwell and Huxley, as well as 
references to Soylent Green (1973) and Dr. Strangelove (1964).  Atwood also draws 
heavily upon the Bible and Blake, and her more canonical literary allusions argue for the 
inclusion of speculative fiction alongside the ranks of high literature, if that argument still 
needs to be made.  Finally, Atwood’s own interest in dystopia is longstanding; although 
she won the Booker in 2000 for The Blind Assassin, she is perhaps more famous for her 
1985 novel The Handmaid’s Tale.  Though they arguably participate in the same genre, 
Oryx and Crake and The Year of the Flood offer something different than The 
Handmaid’s Tale – they present a broader socioeconomic and technological critique of 
contemporary society.    
Atwood’s novels are world-historical in their scope, but American in their focus.  
She imagines a future in which corporations have privatized the last vestiges of the public 
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sphere, strangling and then replacing the government as it withers away.  It is a dystopia 
extrapolated from Naomi Klein’s description of disaster capitalism in The Shock Doctrine 
(2007).  As a form of sociological thought-experiment, Oryx and Crake and The Year of 
the Flood amplify certain characteristics of contemporary society in order to achieve the 
descriptive insights such manipulation produces -- Atwood writes in her 
acknowledgements that “The Year of the Flood is fiction, but the general tendencies and 
many of the details in it are alarmingly close to fact.”  In this sense her novels operate as 
a form of scenario-thinking and as an important warning.  Atwood warns against 
bioterrorism, internet terrorism, and corrupt corporate security agencies.  Indeed, her 
novels tackle such relevant and timely scenarios that judge Richard Posner has weighed 
in with his opinion on the risk of a bioterrorist catastrophe like the one she describes.
14
  
Through the landscape she constructs, Atwood also offers prescient commentary on 
consumer desire, corporate advertising, food production, income disparity, health care, 
education, and climate change.   
According to Moylan, critical dystopias “adopt a militant stance that is informed 
and empowered by a utopian horizon that appears in the text—or at least shimmers just 
beyond its pages” (Moylan 196).  In The Year of the Flood, this utopian horizon moves to 
center stage in the form of the “God’s Gardeners” intentional community.  The Gardeners 
represent a form of radical resistance, and through their praxis, they offer a vision of 
change.   Atwood’s portrayal of radicalism in The Year of the Flood is decidedly 
agrarian; radicalism in this novel is about roots, about growing resistance from the 
                                                          
14
 Richard Posner’s Catastrophe: Risk and Response (2004) was inspired by a review of Oryx and Crake 
Posner wrote for The New Republic. 
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ground up – starting with the realm of necessity.  For Atwood’s Gardeners, radical 
change reconstructs our engagement with the realm of necessity – food, water, clothing, 
shelter, sex – to produce a principled social order.  Through her portrayal of the 
Gardeners, Atwood raises critical questions about the role of subsistence in resistance, 
about the importance of ritual and myth, and about the influence of gender and sexuality 
on the possibility for reconstructed human relationships.    
Ostensibly a nonviolent community, the Gardeners rehearse for a post-apocalyptic 
world, and with good reason – it quickly becomes clear that they are working to bring 
about the prophesied “Waterless Flood” that will take down the dominant social order.  
The Year of the Flood illuminates the horizons of Oryx and Crake, and we see that two 
utopias hang together in these novels – one a eugenics project, the Crakers, and the other 
a behavioral engineering project, the Gardeners.  What is insightful about The Year of the 
Flood is the way in which it reveals these two utopian visions to be in collusion with one 
another, both problematically class-bound and authoritarian, ultimately reliant upon a 
collapse that they must bring about themselves.  With traditional forms of civic 
engagement rendered obsolete, resistance in Margaret Atwood’s novels looks like a kind 
of biological eco-sabotage.  In this sense, Atwood’s novels should also be considered 
alongside Edward Abbey’s The Monkey Wrench Gang (1975) and Neal Stephenson’s 
Zodiac (1988).  Indeed, Atwood’s novel might aptly be described as “biopunk.”  And like 
The Monkey Wrench Gang, perhaps what is most valuable about The Year of the Flood as 
a resistance novel is that it is dialogic.  Atwood’s shifting point of view creates a 
comparative analysis as readers are exposed to a multiple forms of resistance in dialogue 
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with one another, from the non-violent lifestyle resistance of the Adam One and the 
Gardeners to the violent radicalism of Zeb and the MaddAddam group. 
The utopian horizons within these two texts are so clear that Atwood’s novels 
almost constitute a critical utopia, but Atwood’s portrayal is so negative that they might 
as well be considered anti-utopias.  In both novels, Atwood maintains a critical lens on 
the resistance by narrating the story from the perspectives of characters who join the 
resistance accidentally, rather than based upon ideological commitment.  This critical 
lens is important; Atwood thereby points to some of the problems associated with 
agrarianism as a form of resistance to capitalism -- for example, the ways in which, to be 
financially viable, the Gardener’s market enterprises depend upon a bourgeois consumer 
ethics.  Moreover, through a limited third person perspective, Atwood also levels a 
critique at violence.  Narrated primarily from female points of view, the more violent 
strains of resistance in these novels are overwhelmingly portrayed as adolescent and 
male.  The Year of the Flood thus reads a bit like Transcendental Wild Oats (1873) meets 
Fight Club (1996).  Atwood maintains an ironic distance from the resistance and its 
radicalism that allows for critique, but which also undermines the architectural functions 
her novels could perform.  Her portrayal of the Gardeners lacks the sincerity necessary to 
envision a positive alternative useful to productive change.   
More than anything else, Atwood’s novels tap into an eschatological 
apocalypticism that is very much in vogue these days.  It is disconcerting the extent to 
which we have internalized these narratives of catastrophe.  We believe ourselves to have 
already destroyed the planet, to have severed our connection with the non-human world.  
Part of the problem with this version of apocalyptic rhetoric is the extent to which it 
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produces political apathy by blaming human nature for the problem.  Human institutions 
are the problem, not human nature.  Human nature gives rise to various forms of social 
institutions, each of which works to emphasize different aspects of human nature in 
different ways – in ways with meaningfully various political and ethical significances, in 
ways more or less harmonious with non-human nature.  Atwood’s novels expose the 
extent to which our visions of change are often reliant upon a narrative of catastrophe, at 
the same time as she indulges in voyeurism about disaster and wallows in anti-utopian 
pessimism.  We have not given up so much that Atwood’s dystopia need be our future. 
If A Friend of the Earth demonstrates what’s wrong with the myopia and elitism 
of late 20
th
 century conservation policy and radical environmentalism, and if Oryx and 
Crake and The Year of the Flood emphasize the dangers of biotechnology and terrorism, 
Octavia Butler’s Parable of the Sower goes some distance towards offering a more 
comprehensive picture of the social problems that are likely to be created by climate 
change, and likewise some distance towards offering a useful vision of what a solution 
might look like—there is within Octavia Butler’s novel a more sincere eutopian, 
communitarian impulse that forms a liberatory response to crisis. 
Set in California during the 2020s, Octavia Butler’s Parable of the Sower (1993) 
imagines a post-climate change world from a class and race conscious perspective.  In 
Butler’s novel, ecological problems play a secondary role to the deterioration of civil 
society that they prompt.  The novel is structured as a series of journal entries by the 
protagonist, Lauren Olamina, a woman with a condition Butler describes as 
“hyperempathy” – the ability to actually feel the physical sensations of pain and pleasure 
experienced by those around her.  Growing up in a walled suburban enclave outside of 
75 
 
Los Angeles, Lauren develops her own religion, which she calls “Earthseed,” based upon 
the central tenet that “God is change.”  When vandals and thieves breach the walls of her 
community, destroying homes and murdering families, Lauren and two others are the 
only survivors.  They travel north along the coast from Los Angeles toward Oregon, 
where water is rumored to be plentiful and where workers are still paid with cash instead 
of company script.  Along the way, Lauren’s group accumulates new members, whose 
stories offer insight into the social effects of climate change on characters from a broad 
spectrum of economic and cultural backgrounds.  They must work together to survive, 
and as the plot resolves, they choose to settle on land in northern California, where they 
establish an intentional community based upon Lauren’s “Earthseed” religion.  Butler’s 
novel offers a class, race, and gender conscious critique of possible post-collapse social 
orders, juxtaposed with a eutopian counter-narrative of sustainable community coming 
together across ethnic, economic, and gender boundaries that often hinder cooperation.  
 Parable of the Sower marks an important expansion of the traditional canon of 
literary environmentalism, presenting an account of life in an anthropogenically altered 
ecosystem that exhibits literary continuity with discourses of African-American slave 
narratives and stories such as Fredrick Douglass’ Heroic Slave (1852).   Parable of the 
Sower offers a perspective on climate change that foregrounds issues of social justice 
rather than wilderness preservation.  Furthermore, Butler’s novel displays a sophisticated 
continuity with scholarship on climate change from both the natural and the social 
sciences.  As Frederick Buell argues, “Butler’s fiction lays bare the increasingly 
deterministic, systemic interplay between social marginalization, poverty, social 
breakdown, and environmental crisis” (Buell 314). 
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In Parable of the Sower Butler documents the years 2024 – 2027 through the 
narrative frame of Lauren Oya Olamina’s journal entries.  Set primarily in southern 
California, Butler imagines a future in which governments at all levels have lost the 
ability to maintain order, protect human rights, and provide basic public services.  Global 
warming and resource scarcity have led to ecological and social deterioration -- 
desertification and downpours in southern California, hurricanes, blizzards and tornadoes 
in other parts of the country.  Early in the novel, Lauren writes: 
There’s a big, early-season storm blowing itself out in the Gulf of Mexico.  There 
are over 700 known dead so far.  One hurricane.  And how many people has it 
hurt?  How many are going to starve later because of destroyed crops?  That’s 
nature.  Is it God?  Most of the dead are street poor who have nowhere to go and 
who don’t hear the warnings until it’s too late for their feet to take them to safety.  
Where’s safety for them anyway?  Is it a sin against God to be poor?...  I wonder 
if people on the Gulf Coast still have faith.  People have had faith through horrible 
disasters before.  I read a lot about that kind of thing.  I read a lot period.  My 
favorite book of the Bible is Job.  I think it says more about my father’s God in 
particular and gods in general than anything else I’ve ever read. (Butler 13)  
The full extent of Butler’s prescience in this passage has become clear only in the years 
after Hurricane Katrina.  Hurricane Katrina demonstrated clearly the character of 
environmental injustice in the event of natural catastrophe.  In a later passage, Lauren 
explains to her friend Joanne: 
“There’s cholera spreading in southern Mississippi and Louisiana,” I said.  
“I heard about it on the radio yesterday.  There are too many poor people—
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illiterate, jobless, homeless, without decent sanitation or clean water.  They have 
plenty of water down there, but a lot of it is polluted.  And you know that drug 
that makes people want to set fires?” 
She nodded, chewing. 
“It’s spreading again.  It was on the east coast.  Now it’s in Chicago.  The 
reports say that it makes watching a fire better than sex.  I don’t know whether the 
reporters are condemning it or advertising it.”  I drew a deep breath.  “Tornadoes 
are smashing hell out of Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee, and two or three other 
states.  Three hundred people dead so far.  And there’s a blizzard freezing in the 
northern midwest, killing even more people.  In New York and New Jersey, a 
measles epidemic is killing people.  Measles!” (Butler 47) 
Butler’s predictions match those of the International Panel on Climate Change, who, in 
their Fourth Assessment Report, warn that “poor communities can be especially 
vulnerable” to the impacts of climate change, as “they tend to have more limited adaptive 
capacities, and are more dependent on climate sensitive resources such as local water and 
food supplies” (12).  Natural catastrophes, increased malnutrition and the altered spatial 
distribution of disease vectors are likely to adversely affect the health status of millions of 
people, “particularly those with low adaptive capacity” (IPCC 12). 
 Like Atwood, Butler projects a climate change future that represents the logical 
outcome of what Naomi Klein describes as disaster capitalism: “orchestrated raids on the 
public sphere in the wake of catastrophic events, combined with the treatment of disasters 
as exciting market opportunities” (Klein 6).  In Butler’s dystopia, resources have been 
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depleted and privatized, and in the absence of functioning municipal governments, whole 
towns have ceded their authority to private companies.  Lauren describes, 
Something new is beginning—or perhaps something old and nasty is reviving.  A 
company called Kagimoto, Stamm, Frampton, and Company—KSF—has taken 
over the running of a small coastal city called Olivar.…  After many promises, 
much haggling, suspicion, fear, hope, and legal wrangling, the voters and officials 
of Olivar permitted their town to be taken over, bought out, privatized.  KSF will 
expand the desalination plant to vast size.  That plant will be the first of many.  
The company intends to dominate farming and the selling of water and solar and 
wind energy over much of the southwest—where for pennies it’s already bought 
vast tracts of fertile, waterless land.  So far, Olivar is one of the smaller, coastal 
holdings, but with Olivar, it gets an eager, educated work force, people a few 
years older than I am whose options are very limited.  Not as limited as ours, of 
course, but limited.  And there’s all that formerly public land that they now 
control.  They mean to own great water, power, and agricultural industries in an 
area that most people have given up on.  They have long-term plans, and the 
people of Olivar have decided to become a part of them—to accept smaller 
salaries than their socio-economic group is used to in exchange for security, a 
guaranteed food supply, and help in their battle with the Pacific. (Butler 104-106) 
Along these lines, Frederick Buell contrasts Butler’s fiction with other forms of 
speculative fiction, notably cyberpunk, which, according to his formulation, represents a 
libertarian, classically capitalist, strain of science fiction: “The novel…deflates 
cyberculture’s enthusiasm for headlong technological change, libertarian chaos, and 
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social Darwinism.   Butler’s depiction of the future argues that the real outcome of such a 
system is very different from what its proponents claim—it results not in a dynamic new 
era of capitalism and technology, but in synergistic increases in environmental 
deterioration and social injustice and disparity that put still further stress on both social 
and environmental systems” (Buell 315).  In a moment of meta-textual self-reflexivity, 
Lauren comments, 
Maybe Olivar is the future—one face of it.  Cities controlled by big companies 
are old hat in science fiction.  My grandmother left a whole bookcase of old 
science fiction novels.  The company city subgenre always seemed to star a hero 
who outsmarted, overthrew, or escaped “the company.” I’ve never seen one where 
the hero fought like hell to get taken in and underpaid by the company.  In real 
life, that’s the way it will be.  That’s the way it is. (Butler 110) 
Butler uses Parable of the Sower to reflect critically upon science fiction and to engage 
the potential of science fiction as a genre to produce a meaningful social and 
environmentalist critique. 
 Finally, Lauren’s story offers two related modes of adaptation / resistance to the 
prevailing ecological and social dystopia of Butler’s novel: religion and community.  
Within the walled community of Robledo, it is Lauren’s father, a southern Baptist 
minister, who knits the community together through religion by providing a venue for 
public gatherings in the space of the church and a message of hope, determination, and 
cooperation with his weekly sermons.  While still living in Robledo, Lauren begins to 




God can’t be resisted or stopped, but can be shaped and focused.  This 
means God is not to be prayed to.  Prayers only help the person doing the praying, 
and then, only if they strengthen and focus that person’s resolve.  If they’re used 
that way, they can help us in our real relationship with God.  They help us to 
shape God and to accept and work with the shapes that God imposes on us.  God 
is power, and in the end, God prevails. 
But we can rig the game in our own favor if we understand that God exists 
to be shaped, and will be shaped, with or without our forethought, with or without 
our intent. (Butler 22) 
Lauren’s conception of God as change offers a non-teleological, eco-feminist critique of 
male patriarchal theology.  Sylvia Mayer argues that Lauren ultimately rejects a Christian 
theology which, in her view, “obstructs any successful coping with social, political, and 
environmental problems—problems from which both humans, especially the poor and 
people of color, and nonhuman nature suffer” (Mayer 184).   
When Robledo’s community is destroyed, Lauren’s new religion, Earthseed, 
provides a necessary foundation for fellowship and an inspiration for survival that 
sustains Lauren’s group during the journey she and her companions undertake towards 
northern California.  In their mobility, however, it should be noted that Butler’s 
“protagonists share nothing with the fantasies of mobility (mobility through global 
cosmopolitanism, through cyborg enhancement and genetic shape-shifting, through 
immersion in cyberspace) that contemporary American postmodern global culture 
celebrates.”  Instead, Frederick Buell argues, “Butler’s future emphasizes what those 
fantasies repress: the limits on and vulnerability of the unassisted human body and the 
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challenges of finding food and shelter, staying healthy, having children, tending the ill 
and dying, and building community in an ecologically deteriorated world—the 
challenges, in short, of embeddedness and embodiment in a time of environmental crisis” 
(Buell 314).  Ultimately, however, Jerry Phillips argues that “Parable of the Sower rejects 
fatalism in favor of emancipatory human agency.  Butler would most likely agree with 
David Harvey that ‘it is not change per se that has to be explained, but the forces that 
hold down change and/or give it a certain directionality.  There is no single moment 
within the social process devoid of the capacity for transformative activity” (Phillips 
307).  The possibility of transformative activity in Parable of the Sower is achieved 
through the enactment of a communitarian ethos.  As they travel northward, Lauren and 
the other protagonists repeatedly contrast their mode of survival with that of people in the 
“company towns,” realizing that while company towns provide a measure of security, 
they demand the relinquishment of liberty.  In the absence of a meaningful public sphere, 
and in the face of growing environmental and social crisis, this communitarian response 
offers perhaps the best model for grassroots politics and human agency. 
Whereas Phillips describes Earthseed’s settlement at Acorn as a “diminished 
utopia,” Tom Moylan gives Butler more credit for her utopian vision.  Moylan argues that  
Butler offers an overtly collective narrative of political development and creates 
an evident utopian horizon in her critical dystopian contribution….  Butler’s 
willingness to explore the empowering force of a spiritually motivated but 
materially transcendent vision that is rooted in difficulty and difference allows her 
to posit a politicizing process that produces a vulnerable but viable utopian 
alternative. (Moylan 237) 
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According to Moylan, Lauren’s Earthseed community “suggests a possible model for an 
oppositional movement that is fundamentally and insistently diverse yet strategically 
united, one able to generate a level of totalizing analysis and coordinated action that can 
challenge the entire socioeconomic system of the transnational corporations” (237). 
In her 1976 introduction to The Left Hand of Darkness, Ursula LeGuin argues 
against a narrow understanding of science fiction as purely “extrapolative.”  According to 
this view, writers of science fiction take a phenomenon of the present, “purify and 
intensify it for dramatic effect,” and project it into the future.  Le Guin argues that 
extrapolation, while a useful device of the genre, is “far too rationalist and simplistic to 
satisfy the imaginative mind, whether the writer’s or the reader’s.”  LeGuin suggests 
instead understanding science fiction as a “thought experiment” in which “the moral 
complexity proper to the modern novel need not be sacrificed.”  She reminds us that the 
purpose of the thought experiment, as it was conceived of by Schrödinger and other 
physicists, was not to predict the future, but to describe the present.  Science fiction then, 
properly understood, “is not predictive; it is descriptive.” 
 LeGuin’s argument for the realism of science fiction is helpful for framing a final 
reconsideration of the generic complexities of these novels.  As Frederick Buell argues, 
Parable “reads more like a work of realistic, even naturalistic, fiction than like an 
extrapolative fantasy” (Buell 314).  Written in 1993, Butler’s novel comments as much 
upon the social upheaval in LA the previous year as it does the future.  Sylvia Mayer 
explains that “by aiming at verisimilitude in its imaginative mapping of a plausible 
future, speculative fiction calls for critical reflection of the reader’s present and past.”  In 
Parable of the Sower, Butler “uses realist conventions of representation to delineate the 
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features of her social and ecological dystopian future and by means of that facilitates 
reader identification” (Mayer 177). 
Both Boyle and Atwood offer a critique of radical environmentalism, but Boyle’s 
novel depicts radical environmentalism in a relatively benign light.  And in this sense, A 
Friend of the Earth offers a distinctively pre-September 11 portrayal of radical 
environmentalism.  Atwood’s novels provide a transition between Boyle and Butler 
insofar as they offer a reflection on the ways in which radical environmentalism gets 
refigured as domestic terrorism in the wake of September 11.
15
   Butler also offers a 
critique of radical environmentalism through a broader critique of naïve upper-class 
radicalism.  In Octavia Butler’s Parables, this upper-class radicalism is on the outside of 
the narrative, depicted with disdain.  Butler’s “Paints” are upper-class adolescents who 
take a drug called Pyro and want to destroy the system in a kind of Robin Hood 
movement.  Instead of focusing her narrative on those characters, Butler focuses on a 
community brought together by necessity.  From the perspective of the middle and lower 
classes, the vaguely socialist ideology of the Paints looks like terrorism instead of 
equality. 
Both Butler and Atwood are concerned with issues of food sovereignty.  The 
Gardeners constitute a resistance both similar and different from the Acorn community in 
Octavia Butler’s Parables.  The communities are similarly religious and ritualistic, but 
differently violent.  Whereas Lauren’s Earthseed community accepts the necessity for 
violence in self-defense, they do not advocate violence as a form of resistance, nor do 
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 Atwood began Oryx and Crake before 9/11, and then put it on hold and changed the shape of the 
narrative in response to that event. 
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they commit it on the kind of systematic scale that the Gardeners do.  And yet while the 
Gardener’s do not explicitly advocate violence, they are nonetheless covertly complicit 
with it.  Part of what emerges after the collapse in Atwood’s novel is just how difficult it 
is to live by the Gardener’s precepts in a chaotic world.  The first thing that Toby does in 
the novel is to go and get a gun that her father buried before the Corporations outlawed 
fire-arms.  What is so powerful about these stories is that they return us to the 
fundamental political question – how do we organize?  At the same time, they tend to 
indulge in a kind of voyeurism into the “state of nature” where life is nasty, brutish, and 
short.  Therein lies the danger of apocalyptic rhetoric; it is this spectacle of violence and 







IMAGINING ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
Only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change.  
When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the 
ideas that are lying around. 
      --Milton Freedman, Capitalism and Freedom 
 
 
Within months of taking office on January 20, 2001, President George W. Bush 
made his contrarian stance on global warming clear.  In a gesture symbolically akin to 
Regan’s removal of the solar panels that Carter installed on the White House, Bush 
promptly pulled the United States out of the Kyoto Protocol, doing his part to dismantle 
the first substantive international agreement to limit greenhouse gas emissions.  Justifying 
this decision, the Bush administration argued that scientific uncertainty about climate 
change was too great and that the Protocol’s emissions limits would harm the US 
economy.  When George W. Bush rejected the agreement in March of 2001, he made the 
United States the only industrialized country of its size to refuse participation altogether.  
Dessler and Parson argue that as the leader of the world’s most flagrant carbon emitting 
country, Bush’s rejection of the work done at Kyoto effectively stalled progress toward 
an international governmental solution to climate change.  As a result of the United 
States’ recalcitrance on climate policy, the legal fate of the Protocol, even for those 
countries who agreed to its terms, remained unresolved until late 2004, the final year in 
86 
 
which it could be ratified.
16
   It would not be until November of 2004 that Russia, whose 
intentions had wavered in recent years, submitted its ratification, finally allowing the 
Protocol to enter into force in February of 2005, even without U.S. participation (Dessler 
and Parson 15-16).  For the first time in the era of the nation-state, 141 countries agreed 
that anthropogenic climate change posed a serious challenge to the future of humanity’s 
tenure on the planet.  Led by Western Europe, these nations pledged to enact a variety of 
measures to restrict greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 rates by 2010. 
November of 2004 also determined important elections in the United States, with 
both the Presidency and important legislative seats in the balance at the polls.  In the 
context of this charged national and international political climate, a number of narratives 
of climate change were constructed and contested.  This chapter analyzes three fictional 
representations of climate change published or released in the Kyoto landmark year of 
2004:  Roland Emmerich’s film The Day After Tomorrow, Michael Crichton’s State of 
Fear, and Kim Stanley Robinson’s Forty Signs of Rain, the first novel in his Science and 
the Capital trilogy.  Of the three texts, Robinson’s novel was published first, in January, 
though only with limited release in Britain until June, when it gained circulation in the 
United States.  The Day After Tomorrow opened in movie theaters on May 28, just before 
Robinson’s novel reached American bookstores.  Crichton’s novel came last, arriving on 
bookshelves in early December, after the elections and just in time for the holidays.  
These three texts engage in an ideological debate whose terms have persisted in 
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 In order to enter into force, the treaty required ratification by 55 countries, including nations that 
contributed at least 55 percent of industrialized-country emissions in the baseline year (1990).  Without the 
participation of the United States, the Protocol would only enter into force if every other major 
industrialized country, including Russia, ratified the Protocol (Dessler and Parson 16). 
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mainstream cultural consciousness, sustained through DVD sales and rentals for 
Emmerich’s film, through lectures and congressional hearings featuring Crichton, and in 
the publication of Robinson’s next two novels in 2005 and 2007. 
Both The Day After Tomorrow and Forty Signs of Rain intend explicitly to do 
environmental advocacy work, depicting abrupt climate change scenarios brought about 
by a stall in the mid-Atlantic current.  Emmerich’s film, a summer blockbuster, 
exaggerates the possible effects of such an occurrence, depicting with computer 
generated special-effects a global super-storm that plunges the northern hemisphere into 
an ice age in a matter of days.  The Day After Tomorrow foregrounds spectacle over 
science, mapping the rhetoric of catastrophe onto climate change.  Crichton’s novel also 
deals with abrupt climate change, but in contrast to the other two texts, State of Fear 
operates as a rebuttal and palliative, suggesting that global warming is unproven theory 
and overstated threat, describing an elaborate plot by eco-terrorists, in collusion with the 
media, to generate catastrophic weather events in order to raise money and exploit 
misguided government grants.  Crichton adorns his narrative with the formal trappings of 
scientific scholarship, including charts, footnotes, and an annotated bibliography.  State 
of Fear self-consciously presents science fiction as science fact and vice-versa, 
intentionally highlighting the rhetorical and narrative elements of global warming 
discourse.  Finally, Kim Stanley Robinson’s Forty Signs of Rain, set in Washington D.C. 
with the NSF as its hero, imagines an abrupt climate change scenario and the policy 
measures that would be required to adapt successfully.  Described by one reviewer as 
“the first part of The Day After Tomorrow, but with good science and a more realistic 
time frame,” Robinson’s novel offers a nuanced engagement with the science of climate 
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change and thoughtful considerations of its social consequences.  In a character-driven 
plot that includes scientists, politicians, Buddhist monks, homeless veterans, children and 
animals, Robinson’s trilogy dramatizes a productive relationship between science and 
policy-making while raising important questions of intergenerational ethics, ecological 
economics, social justice, and sustainable cultural values.  Of the three science-fictional 
narratives under consideration, Robinson’s text offers the most useful touchstone for 
reimagining environmental politics in light of climate change. 
The relationship of climate change to literature and film is important and 
necessarily understood in interrelation.  The issue of representation is particularly 
complex with regard to climate change.  There are several difficulties inherent in the 
project of representing climate change.  As noted earlier, climate change exists at the 
level of averages and statistics rather than at the level of lived reality and concrete events.  
Moreover, climate change occurs on a global scale, but its effects are regionally variable 
and often counterintuitive, rather than uniform, straightforwardly chronological and 
linear.  Perhaps most significant with regard to these three texts, climate change is, thus 
far, happening gradually, and gradual change is difficult to perceive on a day-to-day 
basis.
17
  In fact, the climate has already begun to shift; we witness climate change every 
day, yet fail to perceive it meaningfully at the level of sense perception.   
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 I want to foreground these issues of temporality and emphasize that the adjectives “gradual” and “abrupt” 
climate change have traction only in relative terms.  The ‘gradual’ climate change we are currently 
experiencing, for example, is gradual only in human terms (rather than on a geologic timescale), and even 
in human terms, significant, measurable shifts in climate have taken place in the course of two generations.  
This puts the experience of climate change outside the realm of individual phenomenology but not outside 




Most scholarly attention to media representations of climate change exists not in 
literary critical journals and books, but instead in scientific publications, in 
communication studies journals, and in what might be termed environmental journalism.  
Rather than fiction,  most of these studies focus on news media.  Those few studies that 
analyze fiction tend to focus on the accuracy with which science is represented, the 
plausibility of particular meteorological events depicted, along with some discussion of 
the potential for fictional accounts to advocate for environmental concerns.
18
       
Anabela Carvalho’s article on journalistic coverage of climate change in Public 
Understanding of Science stands out for its theoretical complexity and offers a jumping 
off point for further consideration of the literary and cultural significance of science 
fiction representations of climate change.  “Ideological cultures and media discourses on 
scientific knowledge: re-reading news on climate change” examines ideological 
influences on representations of climate science in the British “quality” press.  Carvalho’s 
work builds upon Boykoff and Boykoff’s analysis of the U.S. press, which argues that 
adherence to the journalistic norm of “balanced” reporting has led to a significant 
divergence between popular and scientific discourses of climate change.  While peer-
reviewed scientific consensus has consolidated over the past twenty-five years, 
mainstream news media has continued to provide a platform for contrarian science in 
order to maintain an image of journalistic balance.
19
  Through a careful examination of 
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 In the era of new media, the internet also offers a vital tool for deconstructing narratives of climate 
change.  Of note are websites such as http://www.realclimate.org, where climate scientists act as self-
appointed fact-checkers, disambiguating representations of climate change in popular media. 
19
 See here Boykoff, Maxwell T. and Jules M. Boykoff.  “Balance as Bias: Global Warming and the US 
Prestige Press.”  Global Environmental Change.  Vol. 14, 2004.  pp. 125 - 136 
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climate change coverage in three British newspapers from 1985-2001 (The Guardian, 
The Independent, and The Times), Carvalho adds nuance to Boykoff and Boykoff’s 
analysis, detailing the particular narrative conventions that characterize the different 
ideological biases these papers represent.  In this group of newspapers, The Guardian is 
the only paper not owned by a conglomerate, and is the most leftist.  The Independent 
leans toward the Labour party but often oscillates toward the right.  And The Times is “a 
Conservative paper, committed to the establishment and to the sovereignty of traditional 
institutions,” dominated by neoliberal ideology (Carvahlo 226).  Carvahlo argues that 
certain rhetorical strategies characterize this perspective—the Times tended to take a 
Promethean view of man’s relation to the environment while maintaining an image of 
scientific non-closure (doubt), essential to contesting calls for regulations to curb 
greenhouse gas emissions (Carvahlo 229).  Notably, these rhetorical strategies also 
characterize the policy approach of the Bush administration to climate change.  In 
contrast, The Guardian and The Independent conveyed an image of scientific consensus 
that emphasized the risks associated with climate change, generally demanding stronger 
political intervention on the problem.  On both sides of the political spectrum, Carvalho 
argues, “by re-configuring the state of scientific knowledge in ways that justify and 
promote preferred courses of social, economic, and political action, newspapers 
discursively construct fields of action and inaction” (238). 
Carvalho’s analysis of news media offers a model for approaching fictional 
representations of climate change.  Ideology is at work in fiction as well as journalism, 
although it takes different rhetorical forms.  My analysis attempts to illuminate the 
complexities and contours of these various discursive, ideologically inflected narratives 
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of climate change.  Both The Day After Tomorrow and Forty Signs of Rain engage what 
might broadly be considered ‘environmentalist’ ideology.  Emmerich’s film, however, 
frames climate change in tragic apocalyptic terms; it casts climate change as an 
inescapable catastrophe precipitated by the hubris of the global north, and in particular, 
by the arrogant exceptionalism of the United States.  Although Emmerich intends his film 
to be “subversive,” it ultimately fails to think constructively about solutions and adaptive 
strategies for addressing climate change, effectively reinforcing and reifying neoliberal 
ideology, albeit while ironically extrapolating its demise.   
Crichton’s novel, in its skepticism, presents an inevitable and predictable 
counterbalance to the alarmism and exaggeration of The Day After Tomorrow.  State of 
Fear details the contrarian account of climate change and offers a critique of 
environmentalism, extolling the social virtues of the free market and the dangers of 
environmental market regulations.  Properly understood, Crichton’s novel takes its place 
within the line of contrarian anti-environmentalist texts that began to emerge in the 1980s 
and 1990s, including Julian Simon’s Hoodwinking the Nation, and, as a fictional 
narrative, it represents one of the most sophisticated media engagements to date for these 
anti-environmentalist discourses emanating from conservative think tanks, “celebrating 
high-profile skeptical scientists as innovators daring to speak truth to tyranny of political 
correctness exerted by the IPCC and the mainstream scientific establishment” (Lahsen 
156-157).  
Kim Stanley Robinson’s novel is the most ideologically complex of these three 
abrupt climate change narratives, escaping the seeming dichotomy established by 
Emmerich’s film and Crichton’s novel -- either climate change is going to destroy the 
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world, or climate change is not happening at all.   In contrast to the fatalistic role that 
climate change plays in Emmerich’s film, climate change in Robinson’s novel catalyzes 
an interactive landscape within which characters work to envision an alternative 
geopolitical and economic world order.  Robinson is sensitive to the pitfalls and 
possibilities of utopian fiction, and his work self-consciously investigates the interplay of 
multiple ideological perspectives, maintaining an open-ended and optimistic approach to 
his account of human adaptation to global warming.   
It is instructive to contextualize these stories within the scientific and public 
policy discourses they engage.  Comparison of these fictional texts to corresponding 
scientific and public policy scenarios illuminates an imaginative, literary impulse that is 
foundational to all thinking about climate change.  Furthermore, the conversation 
between these three fictional climate change narratives illustrates the political and 
rhetorical dilemmas facing environmentalists and the political left more broadly in the 
United States today with respect to climate change.   In these contesting narratives, we 
witness the shortcomings of a naive apocalyptic environmentalism for addressing the 
political, economic, and rhetorical challenges posed by climate change, the emotional 
appeal of free-market ideology together with the counter-narrative of climate change 
denial for the right, and finally, the necessity, on the left, of developing a platform that 
incorporates the insights of a progressive political ecology.  
In February of 2004, Fortune magazine publicized an unclassified Pentagon 
report entitled “Imagining the Unthinkable: An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its 
Implications for United States National Security,” written in October of 2003 by Doug 
Randall and Peter Schwartz.  Both authors are associated with the Global Business 
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Network, an international training and consulting firm dedicated to “enhancing client 
competitiveness” through scenario thinking.  Schwartz is the chairman and co-founder of 
the company, and Randall is a senior practitioner and co-leader of the consulting practice.  
Self-described as an “internationally renowned futurist and business strategist,” Schwartz 
is the former head of scenario planning for the Royal Dutch/Shell Group in London, and 
he served as a script consultant on Hollywood films, including The Minority Report and 
Deep Impact.  Schwartz’s role as script consultant reinforces the literary character of his 
work as a defense consultant and goes some distance toward blurring the distinction 
between fact and fiction with regard to scenario-thinking.  If science-fiction is a subgenre 
within the literary world, it is a primary mode of thought for the military-industrial 
complex. 
It seems initially significant that Pentagon even sponsored such a report, given the 
Bush administration’s contrarian position on climate change.  Schwartz and Randall 
effectively reverse the administration’s stance; rather than indulging in contrarianism and 
uncertainty, they cite science suggesting some of the most extreme scenarios for climate 
destabilization, and frame their report in terms of prudence: “past examples of abrupt 
climate change suggest that it is prudent to consider an abrupt climate change scenario for 
the future as plausible, especially because some recent scientific findings suggest that we 
could be on the cusp of such an event” (Schwartz and Randall 7).  They go on to explain 
the strategic purposes of scenario-thinking.  It is worth quoting their description of the 
project in some detail: 
Rather than predicting how climate change will happen, our intent is to dramatize 
the impact climate change could have on society if we are unprepared for it. 
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Where we describe concrete weather conditions and implications, our aim is to 
further the strategic conversation rather than to accurately forecast what is likely 
to happen with a high degree of certainty. Even the most sophisticated models 
cannot predict the details of how climate change will unfold, which regions will 
be impacted in which ways, and how governments and society might respond. 
However, there appears to be general agreement in the scientific community that 
an extreme case like the one depicted…is not implausible. Many scientists would 
regard this scenario as extreme both in how soon it develops, [and in] how large, 
rapid and ubiquitous the climate changes are. But history tells us that sometimes 
the extreme cases do occur, there is evidence that it might be and it is DOD’s job 
to consider such scenarios. (7) 
In Schwartz and Randall’s formulation, plausibility, rather than prediction, is the goal of 
useful scenario thinking and meaningful strategic planning.  Their description sounds like 
a definition of the parameters of science fiction.   Their suggestion that “even the most 
sophisticated models cannot predict the details of how climate change will unfold, which 
regions will be impacted in which ways, and how governments and society might 
respond,” highlights the importance of narrative in determining the shape of the future.  
The stories that we tell about how society and government might respond to climate 
change largely determine the field of possibility for those responses.  
An abrupt climate change occurs when the climate system is forced to cross a 
critical threshold, beyond which the shift accelerates unpredictably.  The most popular 
abrupt climate change scenario imagines that a large freshwater melt might trigger a salt 
advection feedback loop in the thermohaline circulation system, causing a slowing of the 
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conveyor.  This model for abrupt climate change comes out of paleoclimatolgy—a stall in 
the thermohaline pump is the most likely mechanism responsible for a mini-ice-age 
during the Younger Dryas.  “Imagining the Unthinkable” deploys this mechanism for its 
own thought experiment, describing a scenario in which melting Arctic ice floods the 
Atlantic with fresh water, dramatically slowing a local branch of the Gulf Stream.  While 
the rest of the globe gets warmer, Western Europe and the east coast of North America 
get drastically colder.  Climate destabilization leads to grain shortages around the world.  
Wars erupt over natural resources.  Schwartz and Randall anticipate dystopia:   
Violence and disruption stemming from the stresses created by abrupt changes in 
the climate pose a different type of threat to national security than we are 
accustomed to today. Military confrontation may be triggered by a desperate need 
for natural resources such as energy, food and water rather than by conflicts over 
ideology, religion, or national honor. The shifting motivation for confrontation 
would alter which countries are most vulnerable and the existing warning signs 
for security threats. (14)  
Despite their willingness to move beyond the Bush administration’s contrarian stance 
towards global warming, Schwartz and Randall’s report bears some important hallmarks 
of conservative ideology, particularly in its framing as a defensive concern.  There is also 
an evident strand of reactionary nativism that gets naturalized in the following passage: 
The United States and Australia are likely to build defensive fortresses around 
their countries because they have the resources and reserves to achieve self-
sufficiency.  With diverse growing climates, wealth, technology, and abundant 
resources, the United States could likely survive shortened growing cycles and 
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harsh weather conditions without catastrophic losses. Borders will be 
strengthened around the country to hold back unwanted starving immigrants from 
the Caribbean islands (an especially severe problem), Mexico, and South 
America. Energy supply will be shored up through expensive (economically, 
politically, and morally) alternatives such as nuclear, renewables, hydrogen, and 
Middle Eastern contracts.  Pesky skirmishes over fishing rights, agricultural 
support, and disaster relief will be commonplace. Tension between the U.S. and 
Mexico rise as the U.S. reneges on the 1944 treaty that guarantees water flow 
from the Colorado River. Relief workers will be commissioned to respond to 
flooding along the southern part of the east coast and much drier conditions 
inland. Yet, even in this continuous state of emergency the U.S. will be positioned 
well compared to others. The intractable problem facing the nation will be 
calming the mounting military tension around the world” (18). 
A spokesperson for the Pentagon officially played down the report, promising that it 
would not get passed along to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld.  That the report was 
commissioned in the first place, however, suggests a shift in conservative thinking about 
climate change, and the dissemination of the report in Fortune marks an important 
entrance of the concept of abrupt climate change into the public imaginary.   
Within the scientific community, serious discussions about similar mechanisms 
for abrupt climate change date back to the 1990s.  As Bill McKibben explains in a 2004 
review of the Schwartz and Randall document in the New York Review of Books, “The 
report is not novel—such visions of rapid and violent climate change have become 
common in recent years as our understanding of the wild weather swings in the climatic 
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temperature record has grown.  Nor is it extremely unlikely—a series of recent papers in 
Nature have noted just the sort of freshening of Atlantic waters that could set off this 
particular sequence” (McKibben NYRB).  I want to problematize McKibben’s response 
here – McKibben demonstrates the desire of the environmental community to seize upon 
and amplify the rhetorical power of an “abrupt” scenario.  McKibben elides the important 
issue of plausibility and evades the statistical issue of probability with the double 
negative of “not unlikely.”  The 2007 IPCC report, on the other hand, goes out of its way 
to indicate that this scenario is, in fact, unlikely.  What McKibben misses in his haste to 
capitalize on this dramatic imagery is the more subtle strategy of framing climate change 
as a defensive concern that justifies unilateral military action and argues against 
international cooperation. Schwartz and Randall’s report anticipates the fictional 
narratives of climate change that enter into circulation the following year.  Furthermore, 
it suggests the policy-making significance of scenario thinking projects, in all of their 
similarity to science-fictional thought experiment, for engaging the challenges and 
concerns of climate change. 
Roland Emmerich’s The Day After Tomorrow, released in U.S. theaters early in 
the summer of 2004, exhibits a remarkable similarity to Schwartz and Randall’s report.  
The Day After Tomorrow’s protagonist is Dr. Jack Hall (Dennis Quaid), a 
paleoclimatologist researching abrupt climate change for NOAA.  When it is not reveling 
in the destruction of Los Angeles and New York City, the first half of the movie focuses 
on Hall’s research and his attempts to model the quickly destabilizing climate; the second 
half follows Hall’s harrowing journey to save his son (Jake Gyllenhaal), who takes 
shelter in the New York Public Library as ice covers the northern hemisphere in a matter 
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of hours.  Like Schwartz and Randall, Emmerich imagines that polar meltwater causes a 
critical desalination in the current, leading to a precipitous drop in ocean temperatures.
20
  
Beyond this mechanism, however, Emmerich’s film develops a tenuous relationship to 
meteorological plausibility.  The drop in ocean temperature catalyzes a series of massive 
weather catastrophes around the globe.  Tokyo is bombarded by softball size hail.  
Tornadoes descend upon Los Angeles, decimating the city.  A massive storm surge 
floods New York City and then freezes in its streets.  As the world prepares for the 
onslaught of an instantaneous ice-age, Hall advises the president to evacuate the southern 
United States to Mexico.  The time frame is so short that inhabitants of northern states 
must be abandoned.   As ice engulfs New York, Hall sets out to rescue his son. 
The film’s release produced a somewhat schizophrenic response within the 
scientific community.  Concerned primarily with the portrayal of science in the film, 
scientists were eager to disambiguate the impossibilities and exaggerations of the film, 
while simultaneously trying to stress the urgency of responding to climate change.  The 
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute quickly published a webpage called “What’s After 
the Day After Tomorrow?” offering “a science perspective on the science fiction movie.”  
A Climate Modeling class at UC Santa Cruz initiated a grassroots public awareness 
campaign, sending students to local cinemas with fact sheets delineating science fact 
from science fiction and stressing the seriousness of global warming.  And in its DVD 
release, the 2007 collector’s edition of the film includes a documentary on the science of 
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 For more on the history of this scenario, Wally Broecker’s 1987 commentary in Nature, “Unpleasant 
Surprises in the Greenhouse” is frequently cited as an early account of the science behind thermohaline 
circulation, explaining why it is a potential variable in future climate scenarios, as well as addressing some 
of the problems such a scenario poses for policy response. 
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abrupt climate change, including interviews with scientists from Woods Hole, Roland 
Emmerich, and John McCain and Joe Lieberman (revealing the centrist extent of Fox’s 
“green” political agenda). 
After September 11, 2001, the Bush administration instituted a dual rhetoric of 
terrorism and nationalism, redirecting public attention towards issues of national security 
and away from opportunities for international cooperation.  Arguing for a world-
historical reframing of post-9/11 politics, the Bush administration launched a broad “war 
on terror,” justifying the opening of military fronts first in Afghanistan and Iraq.  There 
is, in this trajectory of international politics, something like a post 9/11 aesthetic, in 
which the world looks like dystopia.  In this discursive context, climate change and 
terrorism offer competing dystopian scenarios for the 21st century.   The Day After 
Tomorrow pointedly portrays climate change as a threat more dangerous than terrorism, 
making explicit, ironic allusions to September 11th, as two planes are brought down by 
turbulence as they fly through a super storm system.  In a parody of the dynamics 
between President George W. Bush and Vice President Cheney, the fictional President, 
looking worried, asks the Vice President, “What should we do?”  Completing the 
analogy, they decide to ground all planes in United States airspace.   
Significantly, Davis Guggenheim’s 2006 documentary An Inconvenient Truth 
uses a similar strategy to frame its argument.  Al Gore’s relatively low-fi Power Point 
simulation of New York City flooding under rising seas resonates with echoes of the 
dramatic images in Emmerich’s film.  As the water rises, Gore points to the moment 
when the former site of the World Trade Center would be submerged, asking whether the 
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U.S. government should be concerned about more dangerous threats than international 
terrorism.   
Each of these fictional texts depicts relationships between science and 
government worth parsing.  In The Day After Tomorrow, the warnings of scientists are 
put off until too late.  Science is depicted on the one hand as authoritative—Jack Hall’s 
paleoclimate model accurately accounts for the climate shift that takes place—and on the 
other hand as eccentric, isolated, and poorly understood by administrative figures, 
especially the Vice President, but also including NOAA administrators.  At a UN climate 
conference in India, the Vice President dismisses Jack Hall’s lecture, arguing for the 
priority of economic considerations over speculative risk preparedness. 
Problematically, however, Emmerich’s film maps the rhetoric of nuclear 
catastrophe onto climate change.  This analogy is implicit in the title, which echoes 
Nicholas Meyer’s 1983 film The Day After.  Meyer’s film centers on Lawrence, Kansas 
in the aftermath of a full scale nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union.  The Day After, 
made for TV, funded by ABC Circle Films, and originally aired without commercials, 
belongs in the genre of tragedy.  It was meant as a warning, an attempt to raise public 
consciousness and advocate for de-armament.  The Day After Tomorrow, on the other 
hand, was a summer blockbuster—an action-adventure movie—funded and released by 
20th Century Fox.  The Day After Tomorrow foregrounds spectacle over science, and 
thereby abdicates Schwartz and Randall’s fundamental component of meaningful 
scenario-thinking: plausibility.  The Day After Tomorrow also foregrounds spectacle over 
human drama.  The audience does not understand as tragic the tornadoes that tear through 
Los Angeles; instead audiences revel in the fear of the victims and the thrill of 
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destruction.  This concern for spectacle is characteristic of science fiction films.  In “The 
Imagination of Disaster,” Susan Sontag writes, “the science fiction film…is concerned 
with the aesthetics of destruction, with the peculiar beauties to be found in wreaking 
havoc, making a mess.  And it is in the imagery of destruction that the core of a good 
science fiction film lies” (213).  The limitations of The Day After Tomorrow in its 
advocacy project are, in large part, generic limitations.  Discussing the unique 
characteristics of film versus the written narrative, Sontag writes, “In place of an 
intellectual workout, they can supply something the novels can never provide—sensous 
elaboration.  In the films it is by means of images and sound, not words that have to be 
translated by the imagination, that one can participate in the fantasy of living through 
one’s own death and more, the death of cities, the destruction of humanity itself” (212).  
The imagination of disaster is undoubtedly important.  It is important as a warning, and it 
is important as a motivation for change.  In a post-nuclear era of international terrorism, 
however, our imagination of disaster is robust and well-developed.  Our utopian 
imagination, in contrast, has atrophied.   
In his “Introduction” The Ruins of Earth (1973), science-fiction author Thomas 
Disch gestures toward the complex relationship between nuclear catastrophe and 
environmental science-fiction: 
The fifties were also the age of the Bomb.  Nuclear catastrophe and its aftermath 
was then, for most of us, the worst nightmare we could imagine.  It was 
unequivocally awful and (unlike today’s horrors) direct.  The bombs themselves 




One learned to live with the bombs largely by looking the other way, by 
concentrating on the daytime, suburban side of existence.  And here we are, a 
quarter of a century after Hiroshima, and the bombs still haven’t dropped.  
Looking the other way seems to have worked. 
Now, in 1971, it isn’t possible to look the other way.  It is the daytime, 
suburban side of existence that has become our nightmare.  In effect the bombs 
are already dropping—as more carbon monoxide pollutes the air of Roseville, as 
mercury poisons our waters, our fish, and ourselves, and as one by one our 
technology extinguishes the forms of life upon which our own life on this planet 
depends.  These are not catastrophes of the imagination—they are what’s 
happening. (Disch 11) 
Writing in the early 1970s, Disch critiques the sense of helplessness inspired by 
narratives of nuclear apocalypse and points to the inadequacy of this narrative as an 
analogy for understanding environmental crises of toxicity and pollution.  The rhetorical 
and aesthetic challenges posed by toxicity are similar to those posed by climate change.  
Climate change, like toxicity, is not immediately perceptible at the level of sensory 
experience.  The powerful resonance of stories and images of nuclear catastrophe, along 
with Hollywood’s demand for spectacle, has led to a tendency in American 
environmentalist discourse to oversimplify climate change, to think of global warming as 
an event rather than a process. 
Nathan Hultman, professor of Science, Technology, and International affairs at 
Georgetown University, also emphasizes the importance of plausibility in narratives of 
climate change.  In an article for Geotimes he writes,  
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Many scientists, including Oceanographer Wally Broecker, climatologist Stephen 
Schneider, and Science’s Donald Kennedy, have observed, fiction-based media 
tend to emphasize low-probability, high-danger climate events.  This choice, of 
course, should not be surprising. (How exciting would it be to “escape from Low-
Security Detention” instead of “Escape from Alcatraz”?)  Yet, in the real world, 
the media coverage of potential climate change scenarios tends to emphasize the 
uncertainty surrounding them.  Unfortunately, this focus fosters the perception 
that much more probable – but still damaging – future scenarios are also unlikely 
and uncertain. (Hultman, June 2005) 
Hultman is openly disdainful of Emmerich’s disregard for science in The Day After 
Tomorrow, describing the film’s plot as “pseudoscience.” 
In his 1979 article for Science, Technology, and Human Values, “Disaster 
Thrillers: A Literary Mode of Technology Assessment,” John Woodcock, an English 
Professor at Indiana University, argues that disaster thrillers can “influence the public 
imagination without being perfectly plausible.  Disaster thrillers primarily seek to convey 
not precise information but something more diffuse and generalized—an experience on 
which ideas and attitudes may be based.  Because they are associated with an intense, 
engrossing experience, such ideas and attitudes may persist in spite of some evidence of 
their implausibility” (Woodcock 43).  Woodcock cites “narrative’s well known ability to 
effect suspension of disbelief” in defense of this theory.  None of the novels that 
Woodcock examines, however, offer scenarios analogous to climate change.  Two 
novels, Airport (1968) and Supership (1974) focus on transportation technology, one 
novel, The Prometheus Crisis (1975) focuses on the dangers of nuclear technology, and 
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the other two novels, The Andromeda Strain (1968) and The Nightmare Factor (1978) 
focus on the dangers of biotechnology and biological warfare.
21
  Does Woodcock’s 
argument, written in 1979 and formulated to address the environmental and technological 
anxieties of his day, also hold true for fictional accounts of climate change? 
Thomas Lowe et al. (2006) performed an empirical research project with joint 
funding from the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, the School of 
Development Studies and the Centre for Environmental Risk at East Anglia University, 
designed to gauge British viewers’ reactions to the film in four categories—their 
perception of the likelihood of extreme impacts from climate change, their concern about 
climate change versus other global problems, their motivation to take action, and their 
perception of responsibility for the problem of climate change.  In “Does Tomorrow Ever 
Come?  Disaster narrative and public perceptions of climate change,” the authors 
summarize their findings: “Overall, the film, like government policy, sends mixed 
messages, and, although it can be said to have sensitized viewers and perhaps motivated 
them to act on climate change, the individuals who participated in this study do not feel 
they have access to information on what action they can take or the opportunity in their 
daily lives to individually or collectively implement change” (Lowe et al. 453).  In other 
words, Emmerich’s film might succeed at generating concern, but it fails to motivate 
positive change or political action because it does not present solutions. 
If tales of nuclear catastrophe present parables about technology and the 
dangerous possibilities of science, containing their own dialectic of apocalypse and 
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 Interestingly, Michael Crichton’s nascent antagonism towards “politicized science” can already be seen 
in his early novel, which Woodcock rightly argues is about “the risk involved in science and government 
working together in complex biological areas, where knowledge is scant and control difficult at best” (40). 
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utopia, climate change offers a different lesson.  Climate change is less an indictment of 
technology than an indictment of industrial capitalism and political economics more 
broadly considered.  Its lessons entail a more thoroughgoing social critique.  The 
aesthetic of nuclear catastrophe is an aesthetic of the technological sublime.  Climate 
change, on the other hand prompts the necessity for a different aesthetic.  Climate 
change, a social problem, necessitates a social solution.  Climate change demands an 
aesthetic that integrates humans and nature, escaping the constraints of a discredited 
dichotomy and accounting for the complex relationships between the local and the global, 
the ecological and the economic.  If it must be apocalyptic, it should be apocalyptic in the 
etymological sense—it should reveal, laying bare unjust structures of power.  But climate 
change also demands a reconstructive vision—a new environmental aesthetic will 
inevitably maintain components of the pastoral and the georgic, as well as elements of a 
wilderness aesthetic, but ultimately, the social realities that coalesce around climate 
change call for a robust utopian aesthetic. 
Emmerich’s film fails to offer a useful heuristic for approaching climate change 
precisely because it fails to envision the possibility of a reconstructive response.  In 
accordance with Sontag’s assertion that “the science fiction film is concerned with the 
aesthetics of destruction,” it paints the lessons of climate change in such broad and 
cataclysmic strokes that the audience is unable to imagine any alternative to impending 
disaster.  The screen demands spectacle.  As Lowe et al. argue, “The ‘what ifs’ of an 
intangible yet dangerous climate shift are replaced with deadly storm surges and iconic 
images such as the Statue of Liberty engulfed by ice” (438).  The Day After Tomorrow 
ends up expressing anxieties that have nothing to do with climate change, or have to do 
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with it in only minimal ways—anxieties about the end of American empire and the ascent 
of the global South, for example, on whom Americans are forced to rely for help in the 
film.  Emmerich’s film is less about genuine opportunities for global community and 
cooperation than it is about an environmentally altered realpolitik that distributes 
retributive political justice.  Ostensibly, it acts as a warning – pay attention to 
climatologists!  But the vision of the future that Emmerich’s film portrays is naively 
apocalyptic, the reconstructive potential of his social commentary stunted by the 
camera’s indulgence in catastrophe. 
Michael Crichton’s State of Fear is a remarkable text.  It might well be 
understood as an ideological counter-narrative to Emmerich’s film, as it capitalizes on a 
sophisticated critique of the film’s shortcomings.  State of Fear might also be understood 
as an anticipatory strike against Al Gore’s upcoming collaboration with Davis 
Guggenheim on An Inconvenient Truth (2006).  With a first printing upwards of 1.5 
million copies, Crichton’s novel spent weeks on bestseller lists.  More interestingly, State 
of Fear immediately received glowing reviews from conservative media outlets, and in 
January of 2005, Crichton lectured before a joint session of the American Enterprise 
Institute and the Brookings Institute, well-known conservative think-tanks.  Soon after, 
Senate Environmental Committee Chair James Inhofe, the Oklahoma Republican who 
described global warming as “the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American 
people,” called upon Crichton for expert opinion during 2005 Senate climate change 
hearings.  Later that same year, Karl Rove, President Bush’s infamous Chief of Staff, 
arranged a private audience between the novelist and the President.  According to Fred 
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Barnes book Rebel in Chief (2006), Bush and Crichton “talked for an hour and were in 
near total agreement.”22   
Part action-thriller, part didactic tract meant to undermine the consensus science 
of climate change, State of Fear’s plot ranges from the Arctic to the South Pacific.  The 
protagonists—a well-intentioned but naive junior lawyer, a millionaire philanthropist, his 
beautiful female assistant, a mountain-climbing scientist and government secret agent, 
and his Sherpa sidekick—uncover a scheme by ecoterrorists to use stolen military 
equipment to amplify natural disasters and simulate the imagined impacts of a sudden 
climate change.  Through this investigation, the philanthropist learns that the National 
Environmental Resource Fund (NERF), an environmental organization to which he has 
been donating money, is actually a front for these eco-terrorist groups.   Along the way, 
the scientist, John Kenner, an MIT professor, risk management specialist, and 
counterterrorist agent, delivers a series of mini-lectures undermining the theory of climate 
change.  The young lawyer, with whom the reader is intended to identify, thus comes to 
understand that climate change is unproven theory and overstated threat.   
Crichton adorns his novel with the apparatus of scientific research, including 
footnotes, charts, appendices, and a bibliography.  Preceding the novel, Crichton offers 
an unusual disclaimer: “This is a work of fiction.  Characters, corporations, institutions, 
and organizations in this novel are the product of the author’s imagination, or, if real, are 
used fictitiously without any intent to describe their actual conduct.  However, references 
                                                          
22
 See here Michael Janofsky’s  “Michael Crichton, Novelist, Becomes Senate Witness” in the  New York 
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to real people, institutions, and organizations that are documented in footnotes are 
accurate.  Footnotes are real.”  Crichton dresses his novel in the trappings of scientific 
scholarship, presenting science-fiction as science fact and vice-versa, intentionally 
highlighting the narrative character of global warming discourse.  In 2005, the American 
Association of Petroleum Geologists gave Crichton its Journalism Award for State of 
Fear, an award that underscores Crichton’s footnotes and grants a kind of dubious 
legitimation to his scholarship.
23
 
In an “Author’s Message” at the end of the novel, Crichton summarizes his views 
on the science of climate change.  His bullet-point insights proclaim: “Nobody knows 
how much of the present warming trend might be a natural phenomenon;” “Nobody 
knows how much of the present warming trend might be man-made;” “Nobody knows 
how much warming will occur in the next century.”  Expressing optimism about the 
future, Crichton writes, “I suspect that the people of 2100 will be much richer than we 
are, have a smaller global population, and enjoy more wilderness than we have today.  I 
don’t think we have to worry about them” (Crichton 625-627).  Significantly, Crichton’s 
message here echoes Republican Party talking points in 2004, a crucial election year.  In 
April, prior to the release of Crichton’s novel, the Guardian broke a story about an email 
memo sent from the White House to press secretaries of all Republican congressmen on 
September 4, 2004, advising them what to say when questioned on the environment in the 
run-up to November’s election.  As Antony Barnett reports, “The memo -- headed ‘From 
medi-scare to air-scare’ – goes on: ‘From the heated debate on global warming to the hot 
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 See here Cornelia Dean’s  “Truth?  Fiction?  Journalism?  Award Goes to…”  in the New York Times,  
Feb. 9, 2006.   
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air on forests; from the muddled talk on our nations waters to the convolution on air 
pollution, we are fighting a battle of fact against fiction on the environment – 
Republicans can’t stress enough that extremists are screaming “Doomsday!” when the 
environment is actually seeing a new and better day.’” (Barnett, The Guardian, April 4, 
2004).    
In certain respects, Crichton’s novel actually functions similarly to Rachel 
Carson’s Silent Spring.  Indeed, it mimics successful publicity strategies and 
engagements with other media outlets employed by Carson and her publishers in 
pursuing policy reform.  In What a Book Can Do (2005), Patricia Coit Murphy argues 
convincingly for the materiality of Carson’s book as the most important characteristic 
accounting for its ability to prompt social change.  Published first as a New Yorker article 
and then by Houghton Mifflin as a book, Silent Spring operated differently in each 
medium.  As a book Silent Spring achieved a popularity and notoriety it could not 
achieve as journalism; it was picked up by various book clubs, passed from friend to 
friend.  Carson appeared in television and newspaper interviews and testified in 
congressional hearings. As only a book can do, Silent Spring circulated in material 
culture and interacted with other media in ways that contributed to its cultural 
significance.  State of Fear functions similarly.  Published and distributed by Harper-
Collins to an established and sizeable Crichton fan base, promoted by right-wing 
bloggers and talk-show hosts, touted by prominent Republican politicians like James 
Inhofe as “required reading” on climate change, and publicized by word of mouth, 
Crichton’s novel does not necessarily need to be read in order to spread its contrarian 
message.  Moreover, his novel offers a direct counter-narrative to Silent Spring.  At 
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several points in the story and then again in his afterword, Crichton specifically addresses 
DDT and contradicts popular (and peer-reviewed scientific) opinion about the chemical 
pesticide, arguing that banning DDT in developing tropical nations has caused hundreds 
of thousands of deaths from malaria and other mosquito-borne viruses.  If Carson argues 
for ecology and the precautionary principle, Crichton’s science is risk analysis 
emphasizing uncertainty combined with a promethean faith in human technological 
ingenuity. 
In this valorization of contrarian science, Crichton joins a distinctively American 
tradition of counterscience (fiction) that includes Julian Simon’s Hoodwinking the Nation 
(1999) and Ronald Bailey’s Ecoscam: The False Prophets of Ecological Apocalypse 
(1993).  These authors are part of a counterscience crisis-debunking industry that began 
to gain traction in the 1980s, funded in large part by conservative financial elites and 
right-wing think-tanks.  As Myanna Lahsen and others, such as Frederick Buell and Anne 
and Paul Ehrlich, have shown, the scientific mainstream, as represented by the IPCC and 
other scientific institutions, “has repeatedly been challenged by a coalition of actors 
advancing competing interpretations of the science underpinning environmental concern 
and opposing policy action on behalf of climate change.  This coalition has had 
significant impact on U.S. climate politics, both inside and outside of government” 
(Lahsen 143).  Lahsen explains that the “environmental backlash” has relied 
predominantly on a group of ten scientists as providers of essential scientific authority.  
Lahsen rightly emphasizes that the “high profile climate dissidents are largely a U.S. 
phenomenon” (143).  Germany, Sweden, and England, along with a few other countries, 
host one or two skeptics each, but no other country has such a high concentration.  
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Tranlating this counterscientific discourse into the realm of fiction, Crichton’s novel 
highlights the ideological production of scientific knowledge.  In his thoroughgoing 
ideological commitment in State of Fear, it almost seems that Crichton aims to become a 
kind of latter-day Ayn Rand. 
A potential hypothesis one might deduce from these examples is that 
neoconservative interests have embraced the ambiguity between fact and fiction, while 
liberal interests have tended to re-inscribe a more rigid distinction between the two terms.  
This valorization of “science fact” in discussions of climate change can be seen as 
extension of liberalism’s roots in Enlightenment thought and its attendant fetishization of 
rationalist discourse.  Perhaps the primary effect of indulging in the distinction between 
science fiction and science fact, rather than clarifying the proper subject of debate (the 
peer review process), however, has been the generation of a broad field of discursive 
equivocation -- tending to benefit those who wish to stall global warming policy 
initiatives as much as it bolsters those who wish to promote them.   
In his review of State of Fear for The New Republic, Michael Crowley 
summarizes Crichton’s career in this way:  
You can read these books in search of an ideology, but you won’t find a distinct 
one.  Clearly, Crichton is no liberal….  But a free-market conservative wouldn’t 
write an essentially protectionist book like Rising Sun, either.  What Crichton’s 
world-view really amounts to is a kind of hectoring contrarianism that is 
increasingly targeted at America’s know-it-alls, against the liberal elites, against 
the very type of expertise that had given him his professional cache.  And that 
worldview has reached its bitter, frothing apex with State of Fear. (Crowley 18)   
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Crowley gives Crichton less credit than he deserves.  Even if Crichton’s larger corpus 
does not express a consistent ideological position, State of Fear represents a cunning 
engagement with the far right of the political spectrum.  As Fredrick Buell argues in 
From Apocalypse to Way of Life “conservative antienvironmental rhetoric was crafted 
from the start as part of a larger package.  It cannot be discussed in isolation from the 
broader stream of right-wing political discourse” (Buell 6).  Conservatives have 
mobilized several counter-narratives to climate change, including narratives of terrorist 
dystopia, narratives of environmental stability, and narratives of technological progress, 
and Crichton deploys each of these counter-narratives in State of Fear.  As a form of 
scenario thinking, Crichton’s novel imagines a “global warming” scenario that reinforces 
free-market ideological biases, justifies the Bush administration approach to climate 
change, and reinforces the association of environmentalism with terrorism.   
Crichton’s novel performs ideological work in several registers.  Most notably, 
Crichton uses the rhetorical power of legal discourse to facilitate and legitimate his 
deconstruction of the environmentalist narrative.  Crichton frames his story in the context 
of a lawsuit brought by the fictional Pacific island nation of Vanutu against the 
Environmental Protection Agency of the United States over its failure to regulate carbon 
emissions.  Vanutu, perched only a few feet above sea-level, faces the prospect of having 
to evacuate its eight thousand residents because of rising sea levels.  The United States, 
the largest economy in the world, is also the largest emitter of carbon dioxide, and 
therefore the largest contributor to global warming.  NERF agrees to join forces with 
Vanutu in the lawsuit.  The book begins with the revelation that the lawsuit was never 
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filed, and unraveling the mystery behind this failure to file becomes the substance of the 
book’s plot.   
Crichton deploys the device of this court case several times throughout the 
narrative.  We witness the legal team’s difficulties each time Peter Evans visits the 
litigation headquarters in a warehouse south of Culver City.  In order to enter the 
complex, Evans undergoes a rigorous security check to ensure that he’s not wired.  
Crichton suggests a level of security indicative of paranoia and he repeatedly emphasizes 
the complexity of the operation.  As Evans scans the room, he is overwhelmed by the 
scale of the endeavor: 
They entered an old warehouse—a vast, high-ceilinged space, separated 
into large rooms by glass partitions.  Immediately to his left, behind glass, Evans 
saw a room filled with computer terminals, each manned by a young person with 
a stack of documents beside their keyboard.  In big lettering on the glass, it said, 
“DATA-RAW.” 
To his right, there was a matching conference room labeled 
“SATELLITES/RESONDE.”  Evans saw four people inside that room, busily 
discussing huge blowups of a graph on the wall, jagged lines on a grid. 
Further along, there was another room marked “GENERAL 
CIRCULATION MODELS (GCMS).”  Here the walls were plastered with large 
maps of the world, graphical representations in many colors. 
“Wow,” Evans said. “Big operation.” 
“Big lawsuit,” Jennifer Haynes replied.  “These are all our issue teams.  
They’re mostly graduate students in climate science, not attorneys.  Each team is 
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researching a different issue for us.”  She pointed around the warehouse.  “The 
first group does raw data, meaning processed data from the Goddard Institute for 
Space Studies at Columbia University, in New York, From the USHCN at Oak 
Ridge, Tennessee, and from Hadley Center in East Anglia, England…. 
“The team there is doing comparative analyses of GCMs—meaning 
computer generated climate models—from the 1970s to the present.  As you 
know, these models are immensely complex, manipulating a million variables or 
more at once.  They are by far the most complex computer models ever created by 
man.  We’re dealing with American, British, and German models, primarily.” 
“I see…” Evans was starting to feel overwhelmed. (Crichton 85-86) 
Evans’ awe at the size of the litigation team, comprised mostly of scientists, is meant to 
underscore the complexity of climate change as a scientific theory.  Evans, intelligent and 
well-educated, assumes that he clearly understands the theory of climate change, but 
when he is put in the hot-seat and interrogated, as he is each time he visits the litigation 
team, he is forced to admit that he knows surprisingly little scientifically accurate 
information about global warming. 
The 2007 Supreme Court decision in the case of Massachusetts v. EPA 
substantially undermines the rhetorical force of Crichton’s legal discourse.  While the 
possibility of another country suing the EPA is unlikely ever to overcome the hurdle of 
establishing standing within the court, the Supreme Court’s decision that Massachusetts 
(and its coalition of plaintiffs) does have standing suggests that international litigation 
may be unnecessary.  When State of Fear was published, however, Crichton’s treatment 
of the issue seemed warranted.  Massachusetts v. EPA, begun in 2003, was repeatedly 
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thrown out of lower courts over the issue of standing, until the Supreme Court reversed 
these decisions in 2007.  The court’s decision that Massachusetts does have standing, and 
moreover, that the EPA is obligated, under the provisions of the Clean Air Act, to 
regulate carbon emissions, suggests that the discourse of scientific uncertainty about 
climate change has begun to crumble in the face of scientific consensus about the 
anthropogenic origins and the impending danger of global warming. 
Crichton furthers the ideological agenda of the political right by tapping into post-
9/11 fears of terrorism.  In contrast to Emmerich’s desire to cast terrorism and 
environmental concerns as competing threats for the 21
st
 century, Crichton casts them as 
one and the same—portraying mainstream environmentalist groups as unwitting fronts 
for terrorist organizations.  Crichton’s novel thus reflects the fate of “radical 
environmentalism” during the Bush administration. 
Crichton aims his most sardonic wrath at Hollywood and the media, caricaturing 
with spite what might be termed “celebrity environmentalism,” including pointed jabs at 
“Leo” and a character named Ted Bradley, who shares with Martin Sheen the distinction 
of having “played the President on TV.”  Crichton’s portrayal of radical 
environmentalists using military technology to generate weather catastrophes parodies 
Hollywood’s use of special effects technology to generate jaw-dropping, spectacular 
representations of climate change.   
Crichton’s novel thus constitutes a counterbalance to the rhetoric of catastrophe 
found in films like The Day After Tomorrow.  He undermines scientific consensus by 
means of an archetypical romantic figure: a brilliant, good-looking, contrarian scientist 
and mountain climber turned NSIA (National Security Intelligence Agency) agent.  
116 
 
Generally, he inspires awe in military technology, a force more powerful than nature.  
State of Fear is more than just anti-expert; it is anti-nature.  Crichton invokes only the 
dangerous side of nature in the un-natural disasters that the book chronicles -- floods, 
tsunamis, earthquakes.  At the same time he advocates a pro-technology, free-market 
environmentalism.  
Nathan Hultman, in his article for Geotimes, argues that “the central tenet of the 
novel is that climate science suffers from a crippling lack of rigor – indeed, that it is 
driven by environmentalist dogma instead of dispassionate inquiry – and that the quest to 
mask scientific flaws leads the environmental lobby to criminal activity” (Hultman June 
2005).  Crowley takes Hultman’s argument a step further, suggesting that “Crichton has 
relentlessly propagandized on behalf of one big idea: that experts—scientists, 
intellectuals, reporters, and bureaucrats—are spectacularly corrupt and spectacularly 
wrong…Crichton’s oeuvre has promoted, for an audience of millions, a damning critique 
of expertise.  And the Bush administration has put this critique into action, trampling the 
opinions of government scientists, exorcising trained economists, muzzling the press, and 
stifling State Department wonks.  Crichton, in other words, primed America for the Bush 
administration” (Crowley 16).   
Crowley’s analysis correctly emphasizes the similarities between Crichton’s 
writing and the rhetorical stance of the Bush administration with regard to climate 
change, but the charge of anti-expert does not entirely fit Crichton’s strategy in State of 
Fear nor does it fit the Bush administration’s approach to climate change.  The disregard 
both Crichton and Bush demonstrate is not for expertise, per se, but for something more 
subtle and insidious to undermine: peer-review, consensus, cooperation and precaution.  
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John Kenner, the book’s debunker hero, is not anti-intellectual.  In fact, he is a highly 
trained and credentialed expert.  When Peter Evans looks up Kenner’s biography for 
Morton, he finds this resume: 
Richard John Kenner, William T. Harding Professor of Geoenvironmental 
Engineering…. He is thirty-nine.  Doctorate in civil engineering from Caltech at 
age twenty.  Did his thesis on soil erosion in Nepal.  Barely missed qualifying for 
the Olympic ski team.  A JD from Harvard Law School.  Spent the next four years 
in government.  Department of the Interior, Office of Policy Analysis, Scientific 
advisor to the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee.  Hobby is mountain 
climbing; he was reported dead on Naya Khanga peak in Nepal, but he wasn’t.  
Tried to climb K2, driven back by weather….  He then went to MIT, where I’d 
say his rise has been spectacular.  Associate professor in ’93.  Director of the MIT 
Center for Risk Analysis in ’95.  William T. Harding Professor in ’96 .  
Consultant to the EPA, the Department of the Interior, the Department of 
Defense, the government of Nepal, God knows who else.  Looks like a lot of 
corporations. (Crichton 61-62) 
 In their recent internal critique of American environmentalism, Break Through (2007), 
Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger add nuance to Crowley’s characterization of 
Crichton as contrarian, “What environmentalists misunderstood about Crichton is that he 
is motivated not by anti-environmentalism per se, but rather by scientific 
contrarianism….  What is common to both State of Fear and Prey is a faith in the rugged 
scientific individual motivated purely by love of Truth” (Nordhaus and Shellenberger 
139).  Shellenberger and Nordhaus contend that in State of Fear, “environmentalists 
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willing to look can see their own scientism reflected back at them, distorted only 
modestly by Crichton’s preference for the contrarian scientist” (140).   
Myanna Lahsen’s “Experiences of modernity in the greenhouse: A cultural 
analysis of a physicist ‘trio’ supporting the backlash against global warming,” offers 
further insight into the world of contrarian climate science.  Lahsen, a scholar at the 
University of Colorado’s Center for Science and Technology Research, performs an 
anthropological critique of physicists at the George C. Marshall institute who have lent 
their scientific authority to global warming skepticism.  She suggests that these scientists 
joined the environmental backlash to preserve a competing vision of modernity in which 
physics research received primary funding allocation and in which these particular 
figures remain part of a physicist elite.  During the Bush administration, they have 
maintained their positions of power by brokering skepticism in order to legitimate neo-
conservative policies and agendas with regard to climate change.  Lahsen’s article 
articulates a correlation between scientific paradigms and political ideology and argues 
that a shift must take place in both realms to appropriately address climate change 
(Lahsen 204-219).   
The ideological force of this scientific skepticism drives Crichton’s novel.  In 
State of Fear, the best and brightest scientists work for the government in a defense 
capacity, as counter-terrorist agents.  In State of Fear science is presented as authoritative 
only when it is contrarian, and according to Crichton’s terms, de-politicized.  Crichton’s 
purported desire to de-politicize science is, however, both impossible and disingenuous.  
In fact, Crichton constructs the politicized science that he claims to reject.  Crichton 
associates neoconservative ideology with scientific objectivity while he simultaneously 
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frames climate change as a naively liberal issue, characterizing government response in 
terms of economically detrimental regulations rather than positive initiatives. 
Acknowledging its questionable motives and unconscionable ambiguations, 
however, Crichton’s novel nonetheless constructs a critique of American 
environmentalism that hits surprisingly close to the mark.  In his author’s message, 
Crichton writes, “In the thirty-five-odd years since the environmental movement came 
into existence, science has undergone a major revolution.  This revolution has brought 
new understanding of nonlinear dynamics, complex systems, chaos theory, catastrophe 
theory.  It has transformed the way we think about evolution and ecology.  Yet these no-
longer-new ideas have hardly penetrated the thinking of environmental activists, which 
seems oddly fixed in the concepts and rhetoric of the 1970s” (Crichton 628).  Crichton’s 
commentary is substantively similar to the internal critique of environmentalism outlined 
in Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger’s recent book Break Through: From the 
Death of Environmentalism to the Politics of Possibility (2007).  Nordhaus and 
Shellenberger also accuse the environmental movement of being stuck in an outmoded 
conceptual framework, formulated in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  They contend that 
environmentalists exhibit an overdependence on visual imagery – the view of the earth 
from outer space, the Cuyahoga in flames, polar bears on melting ice, glaciers retreating, 
toxic waste dumps.  Shellenberger and Nordhaus argue that:  
the overreliance of environmentalists on visual evidence of humans’ degradation 
of nature is a consequence of the environmentalists’ interpretive framework; 
principally the idea of pollution….the meaning of the word pollution depends on 
the concept of nature as pure, harmonious, and separate from humans.  Pollution 
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is this kind of contamination, or violation of nature by humans.  Similarly, human 
development is an encroachment upon nature.  These are not simply analytical 
categories but moral ones as well.  Nature has been unjustly violated by mankind. 
(24-25) 
Shellenberger and Nordhaus contest these categories.  Of the three primary texts under 
consideration, Kim Stanley Robinson’s novel makes the greatest progress towards 
articulating the kind of original and progressive environmental position on climate 
change that Shellenberger and Nordhaus call for.   
Released in the United States in June of 2004, Robinson’s novel Forty Signs of 
Rain imagines an abrupt climate change scenario within more nuanced scientific 
parameters and with a more complex socio-political agenda than The Day After 
Tomorrow.  The novel is the first installment in Robinson’s Science in the Capital trilogy, 
and as such, Forty Signs of Rain lays the groundwork for much of what follows in the 
next two series installments.  Released in 2004, Forty Signs of Rain also operates in 
direct conversation with The Day After Tomorrow and State of Fear.  Set in an alternative 
present, Forty Signs of Rain explicitly parodies the Bush administration and its attitude 
towards climate change.  Like the other narratives of climate change produced in 2004, 
Robinson’s text also juxtaposes terrorism and climate change. In Robinson’s trilogy, 
however, the terrorist threat is one of domestic surveillance and “double black” 
intelligence agencies that operate without oversight.   
Like Schwartz and Randall’s Pentagon report and The Day After Tomorrow, 
Robinson’s novel imagines that a stall in the mid-Atlantic current initiates an abrupt 
climate shift.   And like State of Fear, Robinson’s novel is concerned with the fate of an 
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island nation threatened by sea-level rise.  Unlike The Day After Tomorrow, however, the 
abrupt climate shift in Forty Signs of Rain stays within the parameters of plausibility.  
While an abrupt climate shift remains a relatively unlikely scenario for how climate 
change will unfold, Robinson’s treatment of this scenario contains a level of nuance that 
makes it a useful thought experiment.  And unlike State of Fear, Robinson’s island nation 
of Khembalung does not pursue litigation as a solution to its problems; instead, it pursues 
diplomatic negotiation, offering the reader insight into the world of politics and lobbying 
on Capitol Hill.   
In his short essay “Imagining Abrupt Climate Change: Terraforming Earth,” 
Robinson describes his project in terms remarkably similar to Schwartz and Randall’s 
Pentagon report.  Robinson writes, 
Abrupt climate change has struck our species before, and we have adapted…in 
these past crises, even prospered.  It could happen again...; no reason to despair; 
no reason to deny all problems and carry on stupidly in our destructive ways and 
ridiculously unjust economic system; rather, time to adapt.  
But the story of that adaptation has to be told, and told many times over, I 
think, so we can imagine it better, and see how we might take the first small steps. 
(18) 
Where Schwartz and Randall portray climate change as a threat against which the United 
States must construct a fortress, however, Robinson imagines an opportunity for 
international cooperation and the transformation of global economic and political 
priorities.  Where Schwartz and Randall imagine dystopia; Robinson envisions utopia.  
Robinson’s novels can thus be seen as a counterpoint to the Schwartz and Randall piece.  
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One might argue that thinking through climate change in terms of defense inevitably 
involves a kind of fortress thinking, but fortress thinking nonetheless represents a failure 
of imagination.  While climate change poses a geopolitical challenge for the future, it 
need not necessitate war.  We need not consign ourselves, Robinson argues, to dystopia.  
Robinson explains,  
I have decided to write about characters who are scientists, working for the U.S. 
government (thus for all of us): a domestic comedy about global catastrophe—and 
how we might avoid it, or even counter it once it starts. I've taken this comic 
approach because ultimately I want the novel to be a utopian novel, despite the 
dangers outlined. It has occurred to me more than once that the imminent 
possibility of an environmental disaster—indeed the sheer fact that we are already 
entering one, either abrupt or not—might force us to change our ways sooner 
rather than later, and that this would be a very good thing for our children and our 
children's children, and all the generations to come. Thus, depending on how we 
react to it, the possibility of abrupt climate change could be a good thing. 
(Robinson IACC 17) 
Robinson’s optimism here is characteristic of his approach in the trilogy.24  We can begin 
to see Robinson’s approach to climate change as a challenge, rather than a catastrophe, by 
contrasting the tidal surge that decimates New York in The Day After Tomorrow with the 
flood that inundates Washington D.C. at the end of Forty Signs of Rain.  In addition to 
creating adversity, rather than catastrophe, Robinson’s flood also creates meaningful 
                                                          
24
 Asked in a 2006 World Watch interview with Eric Assadourian whether or not he is optimistic about “our 
future response to climate change,” Robinson responded, “I am optimistic as a matter of policy.” 
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opportunity—new forms of social interaction emerge, new forms of cooperation, even 
new forms of recreation.  
Forty Signs of Rain tells the stories of a wide-ranging cast of characters.  Frank 
Vanderwal is the book’s primary protagonist, a sociobiologist on leave from UCSD’s 
Department of Bioinformatics and working at the NSF for a research year.  Vanderwal 
“liked to see patterns emerge from the apparent randomness of the world.  This was why 
he had recently taken such an interest in sociobiology; he had hoped there might be 
algorithms to be found there which would crack the code of human behavior.  So far that 
quest had not been very satisfactory, mostly because so little in human behavior was 
susceptible to a controlled experiment, so no theory could even be tested” (Robinson 25).  
Vanderwal’s sociobiological approach to the challenges presented throughout the novel 
makes explicit otherwise unquestioned assumptions about human nature, in addition to 
highlighting the limits of human knowledge.  
Robinson strives to dramatize the practice of science, from research and 
experiment to peer-review.  Robinson makes a point of describing the peer-review 
process early in the novel:  “No part of the scientific community could afford to be too 
picky about conflicts of interest.  If they were, they’d never find anyone free to peer-
review anything; hyperspecialization made every field so small that within them, 
everyone seemed to know everyone.  Because of that, so long as there were no current 
financial or institutional ties with a person, it was considered okay to proceed to evaluate 
their work in the various peer review systems” (23).  Robinson’s clear and nuanced 
engagement with the peer-review process demystifies the world of science for the public.  
Robinson is further interested in the peer-review process because it offers a kind of 
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alternative economic model: “science didn’t work like capitalism…money was too 
simplistic and inadequate a measure of the wealth that science generated…science 
was…a place that one entered agreeing to hold to the strategies of cooperation, to 
maximize the total return of the game” (133). 
Robinson’s novels rely heavily upon his use of free-indirect discourse, and what 
we begin to see in Forty Signs of Rain is Robinson’s major achievement in these novels, 
the articulation of a distinctive kind of postmodern consciousness: a glocal 
consciousness, concerned with integrating both the global and the local.  Robinson 
attempts to articulate an ideology that makes sense of the complexity of the current 
economic and political world order.  Robinson’s articulation of this evolving form of 
consciousness emerges from the distinctive setting of his novel—set in Washington DC 
and emphasizing the role of the NSF in policy-making debates allows Robinson to 
transition back and forth between global and local concerns for the characters.  In Forty 
Signs of Rain, globalism is made concrete in the form of the Khembalis, and in their 
conversations with Frank, Anna, and Charlie, we begin to see a new glocal consciousness 








TERRAFORMING THE FUTURE 
 
It takes no great skill to decode the world system today.  A tiny 
percentage of the population is immensely wealthy, some are well 
off, a lot are just getting by, a lot more are suffering.  We call it 
capitalism, but within it lies buried residual patterns of feudalism 
and older hierarchies, basic injustices framing the way we 
organize ourselves.  Everybody lives in an imaginary relationship 
to this real situation; and that is our world.  We walk with scales 
on our eyes, and only see what we think. 
 
--Kim Stanley Robinson, Forty Signs of Rain 
 
If science fiction is the genre of climate change, Kim Stanley Robinson is its bard.  
Robinson’s literary career has been dedicated to exploring questions pertinent to 
ecological sustainability.  Alternately described as “hard science fiction,” as “literary 
science fiction” and as “environmental science fiction,” Robinson is well-regarded in the 
worlds of science fiction fans and in the ivory towers of academe, and as the winner of 
Time magazine’s 2008 “Hero of the Environment” award, he is increasingly recognized 
as an important figure in environmental circles as well.  He is most famous for his Mars 
trilogy, for which he won both Hugo and Nebula awards.
25
  Scholarly attention to 
Robinson stems in part from his own scholarly credentials and his continuing dialogue 
                                                          
25
 Hugo Awards are presented each year at the World Science Fiction Convention for excellence in the field 
of science fiction and fantasy.  Voting is open to members of the World Science Fiction Society.  Hugo 
Awards, named for Hugo Gernsback, the founder of Amazing Stories, were first awarded in 1953, and have 
been awarded every year since 1955.  The Nebula Awards are awarded by the Science Fiction Writers of 
America (SFWA) to acknowledge excellence in science fiction writing.  Nebula Awards have been given 
each year since 1965 for the best novel, novelette, novella, and short story eligible for that year’s award, 
and since 2000, for the best screenplay as well. 
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with the academic community.  Robinson earned a PhD in literature from the University 
of California at San Diego, where he studied under the direction of Fredric Jameson and 
wrote his dissertation on Philip K. Dick.  Robinson thanks Jameson in his 
acknowledgements for the Mars trilogy, and he acknowledges both Darko Suvin and 
Gary Snyder in his Science in the Capital trilogy.  Jameson holds Robinson in similarly 
high regard, naming “Kim” as one of his “comrades in the party of Utopia,” to whom he 
dedicates Archaeologies of the Future. 
Of his longer works, Robinson’s Californias trilogy looks the most like a 
scenario-thinking exercise.  Written during the 1980s, Robinson uses a series of three 
alternate histories to explore of the role of technology in society.  The Wild Shore (1984) 
imagines a future after nuclear disaster; The Gold Coast (1988) imagines a hyper-
technological dystopia; and Pacific Edge (1988) imagines an eco-technological utopia.  
These were his first major novels, and they earned him early critical attention, with 
Pacific Edge winning the John W. Campbell award. 
Much of Robinson’s work is invested in this kind of alternative historical 
thinking.  In his 1984 short story “The Lucky Strike,” Robinson imagines that the Enola 
Gay crashes before its mission to Hiroshima, leaving a different crew to deliver the 
bomb.  The bombardier of the Lucky Strike disobeys orders and delays his drop, missing 
Hiroshima and bombing the harbor instead.  More recently, Robinson’s Years of Rice and 
Salt (2002) presents an alternate history in which the plague takes such a toll on Medieval 
Europe that Islamic and Buddhist cultures become the predominant influences on 
Western history.  These alternative histories help to illuminate the ways that even 
Robinson’s outer-space fiction operates in a historical register -- the Mars trilogy presents 
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future history, for example -- while the Science in the Capital trilogy imagines an 
alternative present.  Robinson’s use of this historical mode hinges on turning points, or 
branch moments in history – moments of profound geopolitical opportunity, places on the 
time line where altering the course of events might produce radical changes in the 
structure of the future.  Scenario planning, as we have seen, also turns on this same 
concept. 
In his introduction to Future Primitive: the New Ecotopias (1994) Robinson 
describes science fiction narratives as  
historical simulations, which start at the present and then state if we do this we 
will reach here, or if we do that we will reach there.  It is a mode of thought that 
is utopian in its very operating principle, for it assumes that differences in our 
actions now will lead to real and somewhat predictable consequences later on—
which means that what we do now matters.  Science fiction is play that helps 
teach us how to act, like the wrestling of tiger cubs. (9)   
Combining scientific modes of thought, such as extrapolation and thought experiment, 
with what we might consider the more literary tools of fiction, from characterization and 
dialogue to metaphor and symbol, science fiction presents a unique laboratory in which 
writers explore consequences and possibilities and experiment with alternatives to the 
status quo.  In this sense as well, Robinson sees his work in similar terms as scenario 
thinkers, understanding storytelling as a way of rehearsing the future.   
Robinson has been writing about climate change since his Mars series, though not 
as explicitly as in the Science in the Capital trilogy.  As 1990s science fiction, the Mars 
trilogy belongs alongside Octavia Butler’s Parables, and also alongside Bruce Sterling’s 
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Heavy Weather (1994).  In this comparison, Sterling’s novel offers probably the most 
ironic vision, imagining a kind of extreme-sports cyberpunk environmentalism on an 
altered Earth.  In the Parables, Butler imagines a near future set on earth, and dreaming 
of a destiny amongst the stars.  Environmental catastrophe operates as a part of the 
background, and her depictions of the structural aspects of inequality in the future reveal 
the ways that the present is already barbaric.  The series ends as humans send the first 
colonists to space.  The Mars trilogy is the most world-historical in its scope, involving 
as it does several worlds within its narrative frame, and Robinson is probably the most 
optimistic of the three in terms of the possibilities that he lays out for an alternative 
future. 
The Mars trilogy imagines the successful human habitation of Mars, and it 
follows several hundred years of Martian history.  From Red to Green to Blue, humans 
terraform the Martian landscape, changing the atmosphere to raise the surface 
temperature and make it suitable for breathing, altering the biosphere by introducing 
lichens, plants, and animals, and eventually melting the polar ice caps so that there are 
oceans on the surface of the planet. Like Butler’s Parables, but longer, the Mars trilogy is 
a utopian epic of biblical proportions.  It mixes hard science fiction with political science 
fiction and uses realism as a descriptive mode.  Its primary critique is aimed at global 
capitalism, with equal emphasis on constructing a viable ecological politics.  In his 
“Afterword” to Patrick Parrinder’s Learning from Other Worlds, Darko Suvin describes 
the Mars trilogy as “thick history” and Robinson’s project as “the filling in of King 
Utopus’s trench” (253). 
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The characters in the Mars trilogy, especially members of the First Hundred, 
come to represent political positions on a spectrum from anarchist to corporatist, Red to 
Green, and the dialogue that emerges between them simulates the multiplicity of 
viewpoints that might be engaged around the scientific-political management of planetary 
ecology. The conflicts in these novels are frequently archetypal.  For example, the fight 
between Sax Russell and Ann Clayborne over the terraforming project -- Sax promotes 
deliberate terraforming, while Ann fights to preserve Mars as it was before human 
contact -- lasts throughout all three novels and maps roughly onto the split between 
conservationism and preservationism on Earth, although Ann’s view also deserves 
attention as a form of radical geocentrism.  Hiroko Ai represents a third position in this 
debate – one that might be described as spiritual biocentrism.  Her worship of “viriditas” 
– the life force – goes beyond anthropocentrism, but remains decidedly biological.  
Robert Markley argues that the more explicitly political leaders of the revolution -- John 
Boone, Frank Chalmers, and Maya Toitovna -- explore the relationship between political 
idealism and a more cynical power politics.  As the novels progress, the relationship 
between scientific, religious, and political positions becomes increasingly complex. 
In Science Fiction and Empire (2007), Patricia Kerslake reads the Mars trilogy as 
an important postcolonial narrative, arguing that it “gives us images both of the 
ineluctable nature of the imperial drive and of its oblique alternatives: a future which, 
Robinson suggests, sways between the poles of pessimism and optimism, with the 
ultimate outcome of a postcolonial functionality” (156).  Kerslake also comments upon 
Robinson’s use of realism in the novels:  
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Verging at times upon non-fiction, one of the reasons why his Mars trilogy has 
become such a consequential work is its acute correspondence with a likely 
reality, where the importance of both survival and moral vision is equally 
stressed.  With this narrative, Robinson has moved SF into new territory: an 
experimental meta-reality, blending the precision of a mathematical model with 
the study of ideas, concepts, and beliefs into an autonomous matrix capable of 
evolution and mutation. (156)   
Kerslake’s description of Robinson’s work – “blending the precision of a mathematical 
model with the study of ideas, concepts, and beliefs” – matches both the goals and the 
methodology of scenario planning for climate change.  Robinson’s hard science edge 
operates like the computer models through which the qualitative storylines are run.  
Kerslake’s biological metaphor is also interesting – her claim that Robinson’s stories are 
capable of evolution and mutation points to the ways that Robinson these concepts figure 
as themes within the narrative as it suggests that Robinson’s work somehow achieves the 
impression of unfolding independently of authorial intention. 
Jameson, also making reference to mathematics and computers, argues that 
science and politics are inextricable in the Mars trilogy:  
If all of Mars is one gigantic laboratory…then it is a unique laboratory in which 
the variables can never be isolated in the ordinary way, but always coexist in a 
multiplicity which can scarcely be mastered by equations let alone by the 
computer itself.  This means that whatever the scientific theme confronted – 
botany, biology, geology, physics, chemistry, astronomy – the projected solution 
to the imaginary problem will always involve the rehearsal of a specific kind of 
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thinking to which we are not often accustomed, namely the grappling with what 
Althusser calls “complex overdetermined concrete situations” which he also very 
specifically associates with history and above all with politics. (AF 395)   
Jameson’s point is to praise Robinson for grappling with the social nature of the scientific 
enterprise and with the complex relationship between science and its subject, between 
observer and observed.  Robinson’s feat is never to oversimplify.  In these novels, 
science is above all a social phenomenon, nature is a cultural phenomenon, and culture is 
a natural phenomenon.  Jameson’s insight here has significant relevance to thinking about 
climate change; indeed he describes precisely the difficulty in constructing emissions 
scenarios and climate projections. Climate change is a planetary engineering experiment, 
and it is a political issue as much as a scientific one.   
In his own writing and in interviews, Robinson also cites Althusser to discuss the 
concept of ideology.  In lectures that he delivered after the Science in the Capital trilogy, 
Robinson explains that he appreciates Althusser’s definition of ideology -- “an imaginary 
relationship to a real situation” – because it takes ideology out of the realm of the 
pejorative.  Robinson argues that ideology is necessary -- one needs a conceptual filter to 
understand reality.  He explains ideology using the metaphor of a lens, or a pair of 
spectacles.  What one wants out of an ideology, in this metaphor, is a wide view, free of 
blemishes, a lens that you might constantly re-grind (Google Tech Talks, December 11, 
2007).  The point is that it is impossible to operate without an ideology, and that 
therefore, one ought to be self-conscious of that ideology, to take some active and critical 
part in its construction.  There is a connection to be made between Althusser’s notion of 
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ideology and Kuhn’s conception of scientific paradigms.26  Robinson points towards this 
connection in the Science in the Capital trilogy, alluding to and directly citing Althusser 
and Kuhn at different moments within the plot.  These allusions argue that climate 
change presents a paradigm shift in science that necessitates an ideological shift in 
politics and culture. 
The Mars trilogy is so often praised for its realism – both the accuracy with which 
Robinson depicts the Martian landscape and the conceptual richness of his thought 
experiment – that it can be possible to forget the ways in which the Mars trilogy operates 
as analogy.  To do so overlooks the context of terrestrial climate change within which 
these novels were written.  In his essay “Imagining Abrupt Climate Change: 
Terraforming Earth,” Robinson writes, “Terraforming is climate change with a 
vengeance, and pretty early in writing my Mars books, while reading about the various 
environmental problems that were going to be caused by global warming, it occurred to 
me that we were already terraforming Earth, in the here and now, but by accident, and in 
ignorance of how it worked or what might happen” (1).  Robinson’s experiments with 
purposeful terraforming on Mars thus operate as analogy and critique, exposing the 
accidental terraforming that anthropogenic climate change produces on Earth, and 
suggesting an alternative form of ecological management.  Robinson explains that “as I 
wrote my Mars novels it was always present in my mind that what I was describing as 
                                                          
26
 Kuhn and Althusser were both influenced by Gaston Bachelard’s philosophy of science, particularly by 
his concept of  epistemological rupture.  Foucault’s concept of the episteme, also influenced by Bachelard, 
is relevant as well, and probably comes closer to Althusser’s ideology than to Kuhn’s paradigm.  Kuhn’s 
scope is not so broad, nor his focus so materialist as Althusser and Foucault.   
133 
 
happening on Mars—the conscious and successful management of an entire planet’s 
biosphere—might serve as a model for what we will have to do on Earth too” (2). 
This analogical purpose is clear in the trilogy, and it is all the more powerful for 
the realism of Robinson’s writing.  In Blue Mars, during a diplomatic mission to Earth, 
Nirgal explains to the crowd,  
Mars is a mirror…in which Terra sees its own essence.  The move to Mars was a 
purifying voyage, stripping away all but the most important things.  What arrived 
in the end was Terran through and through.  And what has happened since then 
has been an expression of Terran thought and Terran genes.  And so, more than 
any material aid in scarce metals or new genetic strains, we can most help the 
home planet by serving as a way for you to see yourselves.  As a way to map out 
an unimaginable immensity.  Thus in our small way we do our part to create the 
great civilization that trembles on the brink of becoming. (Blue, 172)   
Nirgal’s assertion of Mars’s significance for Earth at this literal level within the plot has a 
political resonance that rings true at a structural level for understanding the thought 
experiment of the entire trilogy. 
Robert Markley argues that “Robinson uses the terraforming of Mars to rethink 
the complex relationships between planetary ecology, the interlocking systems that create 
and sustain the tenuous, seemingly miraculous conditions that allow life to flourish, and 
political economy, the distribution of scarce resources among competing populations and 
interests” (357).  “Rather than utopian longings,” Markley writes, Robinson’s Mars 
trilogy “offers a carefully nuanced thought experiment in the greening of science, 
economics, and politics” (357).  Here, Markley uses the phrase “utopian longings” in the 
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pejorative to mean impractical and idealistic, descriptive of an end-state rather than a 
process.  Robinson’s narrative, he suggests, is so complex and carefully thought out to 
seem plausible, self-critical enough to avoid the charge of being naïve.  Robinson’s 
novels are, in their nuance, another example of what Tom Moylan terms “critical utopia.” 
The model for Robinson’s Martian economy is Herman Daly’s eco-economics, 
mixed with something like David Schweickart’s market socialism and Michael Albert’s 
participatory economics.
27
  We get an intimation of this economic experimentalism early 
in Green Mars, when Art Randolph attends a Praxis corporate retreat at which 
participants play various economic games.  Praxis is a “metanational” corporation, but 
one with a sense of social responsibility and ecological limits.  William Fort, the founder 
of Praxis, recognizes that the Terran economy is approaching a tipping point, and he is 
determined that Praxis should succeed within whatever system replaces it, even help to 
shape that system.  At the retreat, Fort lectures on full-world economics, citing Herman 
Daly:  
now as Daly said, man-made capital and natural capital are not substitutable.  This 
is obvious, but since most economists still say they are substitutable, it has to be 
insisted on.  Put simply, you can’t substitute more sawmills for fewer forest.  If 
you’re building a house you can juggle the number of power saws and carpenters, 
which means they’re substitutable, but you can’t build it with half the amount of 
                                                          
27
 See here, for example, Herman Daly’s For the Common Good (1989) and his “Economics in a Full 
World,” published in Scientific American, September 2005, Vol. 293, Issue 3.  See David Schweickart’s 
Against Capitalism (1993) and After Capitalism (2002).  See also his “In Defense of Market Socialism” in 
Market Socialism: A The Debate Among Socialists (1998) and “Is Sustainable Capitalism an Oxymoron?” 
in Perspectives on Development and Technology, Vol. 8, 2009.   See also Michael Albert’s Parecon: Life 
After Capitalism (2003).  
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lumber, no matter how many saws or carpenters you have.  Try it and you have a 
house of air.  And that’s where we live now. (Green 77)   
Fort’s insight here about natural capital, which is the foundational insight of eco-
economics, presents a challenge to classical economic models, both capitalist and 
Marxist.  One could argue that the very idea of “natural capital” is itself a kind of 
category mistake, a contradiction in terms that attempts to quantify an unquantifiable 
ecosystem service, but this argument further proves the point, which is that ecosystem 
services are not adequately accounted for within the framework of classic economic 
models. 
Notably, scenario thinking and computer modeling are both explicitly troped in 
the novels.  The “games” that William Fort has the participants play at the Praxis 
corporate retreat are exercises in modeling the future: 
The first game Fort wanted to play involved estimating maximum 
sustainable human populations.  “Doesn’t that depend on assumptions about 
lifestyle?” Sam asked. 
  “We’ll make a whole range of assumptions.” 
He wasn’t kidding.  They went from scenarios in which Earth’s every acre 
of arable land was farmed with maximum efficiency, to scenarios involving a 
return to hunting and gathering, from universal conspicuous consumption to 
universal subsistence diets.  Their lecterns set the initial conditions and then they 
tapped away, looking bored or nervous or impatient or absorbed, using formulas 
provided by the table, or else supplying some of their own. 
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It occupied them until lunch, and then all afternoon.  Art enjoyed games, 
and he and Amy always finished well ahead of the others.  Their results for a 
maximum sustainable population ranged from a hundred million (the “immortal 
tiger” model, as Fort called it) to thirty billion (the “ant farm” model). 
“That’s a big range,” Sam noted. 
Fort nodded, and eyed them patiently. 
“But if you look only at models with the most realistic conditions,” Art 
said, “you usually get between three and eight billion.” 
“And the current population is about twelve billion,” Fort said.  “So, say 
we’re overshot.  Now what do we do about that?  We’ve got companies to run, 
after all.  Business isn’t going to stop because there’s too many people.  Full-
world economics isn’t the end of economics, it’s just the end of business as usual.  
I want Praxis to be ahead of the curve on this….  Tomorrow we’ll play a game 
called Overfull.” (Green 79) 
The point of these games is to shake up the thinking of the attendees – to help them think 
outside their commonplace conceptual scheme.  The important thing is not predicting the 
future precisely, but having the imaginative wherewithal to think from a new perspective, 
to re-imagine the future in its possibility.  We later learn that Art is being groomed to act 
as an emissary to Mars from Praxis.  He travels to Mars, gets captured as a spy, wins the 
trust of the revolutionaries, and becomes an important voice in the construction of a new 
Martian constitution and economy.  During the revolution, Praxis becomes a model for 




      Robinson also tropes more “scientific” versions of modeling.  In Green Mars, 
Sax attends a scientific conference in Burroughs, where he reads about and reflects upon 
his own contributions to the Mars terraforming project at a poster session: 
When Sax had been made head of the terraforming project in 2042, he had 
immediately initiated the construction of factories to produce and release into the 
atmosphere a special greenhouse gas mix, composed mostly of carbon 
tetrafluoride, hexafluoroethane, and sulphur hexafluoride, along with some 
methane and nitrous oxide.  The poster referred to this mix as the “Russell 
Cocktail,” which is what his Echus Overlook team had called it in the old days.  
The halocarbons in the cocktail were powerful greenhouse gases, and the best 
thing about them was that they absorbed outgoing planetary radiation at the 8-to 
12-micron wavelength, the so-called “window” where neither water vapor nor 
CO2 had much absorptive ability.  This window, when open, had allowed 
fantastic amounts of heat to escape back into space, and Sax had decided early on 
to attempt to close it, by releasing enough of the cocktail so that it would form ten 
or twenty parts per million of the atmosphere, following the classic early 
modeling on the subject by McKay et al.  So from 2042 on, a major effort had 
been put into building automated factories, scattered all over the planet, to process 
the gases from local sources of carbon and sulphur and fluorite, and then release 
them into the atmosphere. (Green, 203-204) 
Robinson’s account of terraforming in this passage operates on several registers.  On the 
literal level, his explanation of the specific effects of various greenhouse gases offers a 
nuanced understanding of atmospheric physics.  On the figurative level, Robinson’s 
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description of the “automated factories” built for the purpose of putting greenhouse gases 
into the atmosphere estranges industrial factories on Earth built for other purposes but 
with the same effect.  Finally, in terms of futures thinking, and in contrast to the purpose 
of the scenario exercises that Fort has his employees play, which is to provoke fresh 
insights through a shift in perspective, the purpose of the computer modeling is to predict 
the future consequences of present actions. Sax thinks, “There was something so 
comforting about simple physics” (204).  And here Sax’s comment reads ironically; on 
the one hand because it points to the fact that the still debated theory of anthropogenic 
climate change makes sense at the level of simple physics; on the other hand because the 
“simple physics” of terraforming Mars requires such complex political negotiations to 
enact.  
While the terraforming of Mars operates in the foreground, climate change on 
Earth operates in the background of the Mars trilogy, as a part of a more general 
ecosystem decline.  At the literal level, Mars is a safety valve for an overpopulated Earth.  
When Zo visits Earth in Blue Mars, she describes it as “Steaming, clotted, infectious, a 
human anthill stuck with a stick; the panic pullulation ongoing in the dreadful mash of 
history; the hypermalthusian nightmare at its worst; hot, humid, and heavy” (Blue 498).  
The revolution on Mars depends upon this ecological crisis on Earth.  Though not the 
result of global warming, the trigger event in the Mars trilogy looks similar to climate 
change scenarios emphasizing the possibility of sea-level rise --the West Antarctic Ice 
Sheet becomes unstable, in this scenario because of volcanic activity, and breaks off into 
the ocean, causing sea levels around the world to rise dramatically.  The resulting 
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catastrophe causes a political distraction on Earth that allows the Martian colonists to get 
away with their second revolution.   
Frederick Buell finds this literal reading of Robinson’s Mars trilogy troubling.  
He writes, “Robinson’s off-world utopia does not provide a model for earthly ecological 
reconstruction; instead, it quite literally embraces the notion that earthly ecosystems and 
society are a lost cause.  Robinson’s novels thus subtly undercut, rather than inspire, 
contemporary efforts at reconstructing environments and repairing damaged ecologies” 
(279).  Buell memorably describes the Mars trilogy a “marvelously, baroquely imagined 
mousehole for popular fantasy in flight from the present degradation of the Earth” (279).  
Buell’s reading misses the analogical dimensions of the Mars trilogy, but there remains 
something to be said for his insistence upon this literal analysis.  As thoroughly as 
Robinson tries to fill Utopus’s trench, these stories seem to require their otherworldly 
setting to enact the radical alternatives that they present, and to that extent they remain 
impractical. 
       With the Science in the Capital trilogy, Robinson attempts to resolve this literal 
disconnect, turning his focus to Earth, to the United States, and to the near future, writing 
“a domestic comedy about global catastrophe—and how we might avoid it, or even 
counter it when it starts” (IACC, 17).  In contrast to the gradual climate change that takes 
place in the Mars trilogy, the Science in the Capital trilogy imagines an abrupt climate 
change scenario, triggered by anthropogenic global warming.  Citing the work of Richard 
Alley and the committee of scientists from the National Research Council who published 
the first book on the subject in 2002, Robinson describes the study of abrupt climate 
change as a paradigm shift within climatology.  He explains the history of the Greenland 
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ice-coring project and its revelations about Earth’s climate during the Younger Dryas, 
and he positions abrupt climate change as an extension of the 19
th
 century debates about 
“gradualism” and “catastrophism” in geology.  Robinson presents a conceptual 
framework for being able to understand abrupt climate change that includes new 
developments in the study of climatology more generally -- chaos theory in meteorology, 
supercomputers and advanced modeling capabilities, Euler’s work on non-linear 
dynamics, and new information in the paleo-record (IACC, 11).  For Robinson, as a 
novelist, perhaps the most significant characteristic of abrupt climate change is that 
“geologic timescales become individual timescales; and so, novelistic timescales” (IACC, 
13). 
It is noteworthy that Robinson’s two trilogies map onto the difference between 
pre- and post- 9/11 environmentalism outlined in earlier chapters.  The Mars trilogy 
includes three revolutions – two violent.  The Science in the Capital trilogy does not 
describe a violent revolution.  Instead it describes a peaceful transition toward a more 
equitable future, led by the United States.  It imagines voting as a sufficient force to 
change the political landscape.  The Mars trilogy is heavily invested in depicting a radical 
environmental politics, from MarsFirst! to the Reds and the Greens, while the Science in 
the Capital trilogy seems to avoid any mention of radical environmentalism.  There is not 
even a Green party in the Science in the Capital trilogy; electing a Democrat is 
sufficiently radical to save the world.   
In the climate change trilogy, then, Robinson’s ambitions seem somewhat less 
epic than in his Mars trilogy.  The time frame is considerably shorter.  There are fewer 
characters.  There is not the same kind of new beginning; there is not the same degree of 
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reconstruction; it is not so concerned with the uncanny phenomenology of living on 
another planet.  The Science in the Capital series is as concerned with the joys and 
difficulties of being a stay-at-home dad as it is with solving the environmental crisis of 
abrupt climate change.  And yet, in its concern with these aspects of contemporary life, 
Robinson’s trilogy aims to be practical and practicable – it operates as a kind of 
handbook to ethical lifestyle alternatives for the American middle-class citizen. 
Robinson traveled to Antarctica under NSF sponsorship in 1995 as a part of their 
Antarctic Artists and Writers program.  Antarctica (1997), the novel that he wrote as a 
culmination of that experience, introduces several characters who reappear in the Science 
in the Capital trilogy, in particular Senator Phil Chase and his advisor, Wade Norton.  
Antarctica operates within its own genre, and belongs alongside the other literature of 
that icy continent, such as Apsley Cherry Garrard’s The Worst Journey in the World 
(1922), to which Robinson makes regular reference.  And yet, set as it is in the near-
future, Antarctica cannot help but register the effects of climate change on the sensitive 
poles, and discussions of climate change come up occasionally between the characters in 
the novel, even when their focus is elsewhere.  The time Robinson spent in Antarctica 
researching the novel gave him access to scientists working on climate change and 
opportunity to talk with them about the mechanism for “abrupt” climate change in his 
next trilogy.  His affiliation with the NSF also gave him a level of insight into that 
organization that inspired his focus in the Science in the Capital trilogy. 
Describing his purpose in writing the Science in the Capital trilogy, Robinson 
writes, “I wanted to describe what the experience of abrupt climate change would feel 
like, from the point of view of a number of individuals.  I wanted also to describe how 
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science works in the real world, today, and how it relates to the worlds of power politics, 
capital, and daily life.  I wanted to explore some ideas about how certain Buddhist 
concepts might apply to the situation, and help us think our way through it” (IACC, 16).  
Robinson focuses on the NSF as an institution that could become activated as a change 
agent in tackling climate change.  Robinson quips, “Of course valorizing science and the 
NSF as one of its central institutions brings certain comic aspects to the fore, because, for 
a world-saving hero, NSF is fairly small, with a limited assignment in the federal array of 
bureaucracies; but as we have learned from climatology, sometimes small actions can 
have big effects, and the position of the NSF, at the intersection of science and 
government, seemed strategically full of potential” (IACC, 17).  Robinson means at least 
two things with this assertion – the NSF is strategically full of potential for a novelist 
looking to talk about the intersection of science and politics, and, as the plot of 
Robinson’s trilogy demonstrates, the NSF is strategically full of potential as a 
governmental organization that might influence policy more directly than it currently 
does.  
Forty Signs of Rain (2004) introduces the central characters and ideas that will be 
elaborated in the trilogy, as well as some of the supporting characters.  We meet the 
Quiblers, Anna and Charlie, Nick and Joe.  We meet the Khembalis, Drepung and Rudra 
Cakrin.  Most of all we meet Frank Vanderwal.  Forty Signs of Rain is concerned with 
explaining how scientific peer-review works – one of the major events in this novel is an 
NSF review board meeting where the board decides which grant proposals to fund.  
Similarly, Robinson begins to map out the intersection of science and capital as he 
describes a meeting between the biotech start-up Torry Pines Generique and a venture 
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capitalist firm interested in their algorithms.  Finally, this novel is concerned with the 
ways that science might change -- near the end of the novel, for example, Rudra Cakrin 
gives a lecture at the NSF on “The Purpose of Science from a Buddhist Perspective.”  
Forty Signs of Rain is also educative in terms of politics.  Robinson describes the process 
of hiring a lobbyist and meeting with a senator.  Later, we read about environmental 
legislation making its way through Congress – we see a bill get written, revised, and 
chopped up in Congress.  One of the more humorous scenes in the novel takes place 
when Charlie Quibler meets the President and his science advisor, Dr. Strengloft, with 
Joe on his back.     
After Forty Signs of Rain, Robinson published Fifty Degrees Below (2005) and 
Sixty Days and Counting (2007).   Thematically, these novels are largely concerned with 
a presidential transition of power and the potential for systemic change that comes with 
it.  Published in the years leading up to the 2008 presidential elections, they are 
positioned to engage contemporaneous public and political discourse on climate change.  
The title of the final novel refers to the first sixty days of the new presidential 
administration, and the novel models one set of policy shifts that might effectively 
confront the challenge of climate change.  Robinson’s novels are educative – they attempt 
to demystify both the peer-review process and the legislative process for the public.  
They also explore the relationship between the public and the private sphere and the role 
of industry and technology.  They aim at a civic scientific literacy.  Robinson also makes 
a conscious attempt to place himself in the tradition of American environmental 
literature.  His protagonists read Thoreau and Emerson quotations on internet websites, 
and he presents ecological footprint measurements and carbon calculators as a kind of 
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contemporary Thoreauvian accounting.  Characteristically, Robinson illuminates 
alternative economies and social arrangements in these novels, but more clearly than his 
speculations in the Mars trilogy, Robinson’s Science in the Capital trilogy, set in an 
alternate present, emphasizes utopian experiments already in existence.  Arguably then, 
Robinson shifts generic modes, blurring the line between utopia and manifesto. 
      Roger Luckhurst describes the aesthetic of Science in the Capital as proleptic 
realism – “a modeling of the present day tilted five minutes into the future.” (172)  
Luckhurst points out that the Science in the Capital trilogy raises interesting questions 
about its genre status.  He explains that “the series exists in a curious transitional space 
between fact and fiction, accumulated evidence and future modeling, and in a contested 
arena where research proposals, empirical findings, market reports, science 
popularization, political strategy documents and science fiction can become very hard to 
distinguish from each other, since climate change discourse across the board must use 
prolepsis” (171-172).  Luckhurst’s insight here points to the ways in which climate 
change discourse is informed by the narrative techniques of science fiction.  This is a 
point about method rather than content.  Luckhurst also notes the difference between the 
Mars trilogy and the Science in the Capital trilogy: “The radical thrust for reinvigorating 
the American polity comes not from the Marxian eco-economics of the Mars series, but 
impassioned speeches about the legacy of Abraham Lincoln or FDR’s ‘bold and 
persistent experiment’ of the New deal.  We are in a compromised and pragmatic utopia – 
something like The West Wing’s alternative presidency to the neoliberal hegemony of the 
Clintons and Bushes” (170).   
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     Luckhurst’s sense that this series is a “pragmatic utopia” is certainly accurate.  
His description of that utopia as “compromised” is more debatable, but it points to a 
sense that Robinson has moderated his views within this series.  Nonetheless, Luckhurst 
goes on to praise the series in terms of both its critical and its architectural functions.  
Luckhurst points to Lukacs’s Theory of the Novel to explain Robinson’s use of realism as 
a mode of political writing that attempts to capture the contradictions inherent in modern 
society: “Science in the Capital aims to describe if not a complete totality then at the very 
least a complex matrix of institutional forces that lie at the heart of the American political 
machine.  Against the immense inertia of the forces controlling this matrix, Robinson 
engineers a plot that sets about redirecting its energies away from the cycle of destructive 
neo-liberal denial and towards a productive, ecologised capitalism.  The books, in effect, 
construct a counter-hegemony out of actually existing elements of the American polity, 
and in a decidedly pragmatic rather than utopian mode” (172).  In its pragmatism, 
Robinson’s trilogy matches the political climate within which it was published.  The 
presidential campaign of Senator Barack Obama, a utopian project in its own right, and a 
point of comparison for Robinson’s imaginary candidate Phil Chase, built its platform 
upon a similar foundation of political pragmatism. 
      Robinson’s trilogy maps out the history of science, environmentalism, and 
politics over the last half century.  Characters in the novel do historical research on the 
history of the NSF -- Diane Chang and Frank Vanderwal, largely through internet 
searches, discover what Luckhurst describes as a “thirty year development of 
antiscientific Republicanism that began with Richard Nixon’s temporary abolition of the 
role of scientific advisor to the president and the expulsion of the National Science 
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Foundation from the buildings adjacent to the White House in 1973” (173).  It could be 
argued that these internet searches invite the reader to conduct similar research – in 
effect, they model and invite popular research methods.  As such, they stand in contrast to 
Michael Crichton’s State of Fear, which operates as a self-contained document – in 
Crichton’s novel, all the research the reader might need is identified within the novel 
itself, fully referenced at the end. 
      Towards the end of Forty Signs of Rain, Diane Chang calls Frank in to explain 
to the NSF board members his recommendations for how the NSF could be more 
effective in tackling climate change issues.  Frank’s presentation amounts to a manifesto.  
His recommendations include stimulating synergistic efforts across the disciplines to 
work on climate change issues, looking for immediately relevant applications from 
already funded projects, and commissioning new work on important projects.  He also 
argues that they should assign:  
up to fifty percent of NSF’s budget every year to the biggest outstanding problem 
you can identify, in this case catastrophic climate change, and direct the scientific 
community to attack and solve it.  Both public and private science, the whole 
culture.  The effort could be funded by something like Germany’s Max Planck 
Institutes, which are funded by the government to go after particular problems.  
There’s about a dozen of them, and they exist while they’re needed and get 
disbanded when they’re not.  It’s a good model. (Forty 321)   
Frank’s utopian vision for the NSF is motivated by specific concrete examples.  It is, as 
Luckhurst suggests, a pragmatic vision.  It is also, even within the context of the plot, a 
radical proposal.  Frank’s suggestions take the board by surprise – he seems to say what 
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they have been thinking, but what they have been too fearful or cynical to believe 
possible. 
      Frank argues that “you should make more efforts to increase the power of 
science in policy decisions everywhere.  Organize all the scientific bodies on Earth into 
one large body, a kind of UN of scientific organizations, which would then work together 
on the important issues, and would collectively insist they be funded, for the sake of all 
the future generations of humanity” (Forty 321).  Recognizing that this line of 
argumentation might seem initially anti-democratic, Frank argues that instead, the board 
should think of it as a paradigm shift in the way that science interacts with society.  
Rehearsing Kuhn’s theory of paradigm shifts, Frank then facilitates a brainstorming 
session in which everyone offers ideas that break from the status quo.  As the scene goes 
on, Frank explains the necessity of politicized science:  
“The thing is…the way we have things organized now, scientists keep 
themselves out of political policy decisions in the same way that the military 
keeps itself out of civilian affairs.  That comes out of World War Two, when 
science was part of the military.  Scientists recused themselves from policy 
decisions, and a structure was formed that created civilian control of science, so to 
speak. 
“But I say to hell with that!  Science isn’t like the military.  It’s the 
solution, not the problem.  And so it has to insist on itself.  That’s what looks wild 
about these ideas, that scientists should take a stand and become a part of the 
political decision making process.  If it were the folks in the Pentagon saying that, 
I would agree there would be reason to worry, although they do it all the time.  
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What I’m saying is that it’s a perfectly legitimate move for us to make, even a 
necessary move, because we are not the military, we are already civilians, and we 
have the only methods there are to deal with these global environmental 
problems.” (Forty, 325) 
Luckhurst explains that “in proposing to overturn the strategy of apparently preserving 
scientific ‘objectivity’ by refusing to engage in everyday politics, Frank advocates 
abandoning the position taken by the scientific establishment since Nixon’s punishment 
for Democrat-advocacy in 1964.  This strategy has resolutely failed in the face of the 
ideological use of ‘sound science’ by Republicans in the 1990s” (175).  Frank asks the 
scientific community to embrace its own politics -- the scientific community ought to 
organize, and use its political power.  This is where the radical politics of the Science in 
the Capital trilogy appears.  Climate change is inevitably political – it is impossible to 
take an apolitical position on the subject.  In contrast to Crichton’s essay on “Why 
Politicized Science is Dangerous,” Robinson’s trilogy might be thought of as a treatise on 
why politicized science is inevitable, and therefore worthy of critical engagement.  In an 
interview with Terry Bisson in 2009, Robinson explains the radical scientific politics of 
climate change: 
What’s been set up and is playing out now is a Huge World Historical Battle 
between science and capitalism.  Science is insisting more emphatically every day 
that this [climate change] is a real and present danger.  Capitalism is saying that it 
isn’t, because if it were true it would mean more government control of 
economies, more social justice (as a climate stabilization technique) and so on.  
These are the two big players in our civilization, so I say, be aware, watch the 
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heavyweights go at it, and back science every chance you get.  I speak to all 
fellow leftists around the world: science is now a leftism, and thank God; but 
capitalism is very very strong.   So it’s a dangerous moment.  People who like 
their history dramatic and non-utopian should be pleased. (Interview, 101) 
Robinson’s assertion that “science is now a leftism” lends credence to the critique from 
the other end of the political spectrum that climate science has a liberal political agenda.  
Indeed, Robinson’s assertion accepts these criticisms as true, but argues for them as a 
positive aspect of climate science, rather than a deficiency.   Robinson’s trilogy asks 
science to consider its political implications more carefully, to embrace the ways in 
which it has political significance.
28
 
    Roger Luckhurst points to Bruno Latour’s Science in Action (1987) as a 
framework for understanding Robinson’s portrayal of climate change.  Luckhurst 
explains that “climate change is what Latour calls a tangled object, uncertainly located 
between nature and culture…and thus lying confusingly between object and subject, fact 
and artifact, and so has inherent disputations” (176).  Luckhurst describes The Science in 
the Capital trilogy as “a Latourian manifesto for re-mapping the matrix of heterogeneous 
sources of power to accept the findings of climate science, countering the brilliant 
ideological exploitation of networks that has been demonstrated by the Right in blocking 
the facts of climate change” (176).  Luckhurst’s reading is insightful on a couple of 
levels.  Its insight about climate change – that it is both natural and cultural, fact and 
artifact – echoes Jameson’s claim about terraforming in the Mars trilogy.  Latour’s notion 
                                                          
28
 Frank’s position here echoes the mission of the Union of Concerned Scientists.  The Union of Concerned 
Scientists was founded in 1969 at MIT, calling for greater emphasis on applying science to pressing social 
and environmental problems rather than military programs. 
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of the tangled object thus has some correspondence to Althusser’s complex 
overdetermined concrete situations.  Luckhurst’s further insight that Robinson’s trilogy is 
a manifesto has implications for its status as within utopian fiction.  Once again, it points 
to the pragmatism of the series and its contemporary relevance, emphasizing the utopian 
possibilities already in existence, calling them into the spotlight as a model for change. 
     Luckhurst argues that the anger of the Science in the Capital series is driven by 
the context of ideological neo-conservative skepticism about climate change, but that 
ultimately, Robinson is “less interested in mapping the contours of what George Monbiot 
calls the ‘denial industry’ and more committed to tracing out the alliances and 
connections needed for a counter strike to establish science at the core of Washington 
decision making” (174).  This is the way in which Robinson’s novels act as manifesto.  
Luckhurst explains that “Robinson uses clusters of characters to explain how science is 
done along the line from the outlying small laboratory to the White House advisory staff” 
(174).  As points on the map, Luckhurst identifies Torrey Pines Generique, the biotech 
start-up in San Diego; Anna Quibler, a section head of the NSF and the “model of a 
quantitative scientist;” Diane Chang, the head of the NSF who becomes President 
Chase’s science advisor and whose “trajectory oversees the return of the NSF from an 
organization long marginalized by Nixon into the lynch pin of federal and global 
mitigation projects;” and Charlie Quibler, a part time environmental policy advisor to 
Senator Chase who reluctantly becomes a full-time staffer to the President.  In his new 
position Charlie “can now coordinate large-scale mitigations and lecture the neo-
conservatives of the World Bank about their rapacity, realizing with a shock that he has 
the power to decapitate its obstructive leadership” (174).  Each of these characters, both 
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in their own actions and through their connections with other characters, models ways 
that individuals might become more effective in confronting climate change.  They give 
the reader a sense of the structural power of the positions that they hold while retaining a 
sense of the individual holding those positions. 
      In “Living Thought: Genes, Genres and Utopia in the Science in the Capital 
Trilogy,” Gib Prettyman focuses on Robinson’s playful use of genre.  Prettyman argues 
that Robinson’s trilogy “presents a genetic conception of genres and their role in human 
life, both historical and potential” (182).  Here we might remember Patricia Kerslake’s 
assertion that the Mars trilogy is capable of mutation, of evolution.  Prettyman argues that 
the series “represents genres, and indeed all human thought and culture, as living and 
evolving expressions of material…at once imaginative and material categories, complex 
material encodings of lived human experience, in short, ‘living thought’” (182).  Within 
this framework, Robinson’s trilogy “raises the possibility of modifying genres to express 
therapeutic restructuring of life under late capitalism” (182).  Prettyman argues for both 
etymological and analogical connections between genes and genres: 
Genre is thus at heart a biological metaphor, and Robinson’s novels literalize that 
biological perspective through such thematic topics as biotechnology and genetic 
modification, sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, ecology and 
environmentalism, and new disciplines such as bioinformatics.  Genres and other 
habitual forms of thought are related to biological and ecological processes both 
analogically and literally, allowing genres to be explored for their genetic function 
in social organisms.  These thematic insights are also reinscribed into the novels 
as generic experiments with the narrative itself, in a process we could think of as 
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Robinson’s generic modifications.  Both types of experiment – with thematic 
connections and with narrative form – serve as political allegories for the material 
transformations in thought and habit necessary for a revolutionary break from late 
capitalism.  Arguably, they also serve as direct political actions in the form of 
“bold and persistent experimentation” with contemporary forms of “living 
thought.” (185) 
We might look here to the ways that Robinson’s novels are explicitly concerned with 
their own literary and cultural inheritance.  In Antarctica the importance of narrative is 
evident in the ways that the contemporary expeditions rely upon accounts of the past as 
they travel the frozen continent.  For the characters in that novel, Apsley Cherry-
Garrard’s account of Scott’s expedition to the pole is more than just literature; it is a 
guidebook.  In the Science in the Capital series, we get a sense of this material value of 
literature primarily through the character of Frank Vanderwal, who reads Emerson, 
Thoreau, and Laura Ingalls Wilder while he camps in Rock Creek park through the 
winter.  Prettyman cites an interview in which Robinson claimed that he wants his books 
to “have it both ways” – to “‘stand as modernist novels’ and also be ‘read by lab techs 
who have no training in literature’” (184).  Frank’s character, whose entry into 19th 
century American literature comes through discovering “Emerson for the Day” on the 
internet, models a version of this imagined audience, while Robinson’s descriptions of 
the natural landscape often enter a descriptive mode reminiscent of 19
th
 century nature 
writing. 
      Prettyman also points to the utopian formal experimentation taking place at the 
characterological level: “each plotline explores how concrete or even mundane actions – 
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the ongoing ‘good work’ beneath the dystopian ‘nightmare’ of capitalist macro-political 
history – can potentially lead to systematic transformations.  Specifically, they imagine 
modifying structures of habitual thought such that new social organisms would be 
expressed, with the goal of a sustainable social and material ecology designated 
‘permaculture’” (187).  Robinson’s novels are at once a laboratory and a handbook, and 
this is how we might understand the emphasis on each character’s lifestyle – in particular, 
the lifestyles and homestyles of the Quibler family and Frank Vanderwal, and less 
centrally, the lifestyles and the shifting domestic sphere of the Khembalis. Robinson 
presents small modifications to the domestic sphere with the aim of describing a set of 
lifestyle possibilities that maximize happiness at the same time as they work towards 
minimizing environmental harm.  He achieves this effect through formal shifts and 
modifications of expectations – for example, Charlie’s character resists gender 
expectations in his decision to stay at home with his son during the day.   Robinson 
explores uncommon modes of middle-class life in the common details of Charlie’s days 
with Joe, his internal wrestling with decisions about the requirements of his career and 
his desire to spend time with his children.  In another example, Anna researches carbon 
calculators, and the Quiblers make family decisions about altering their energy 
consumption and lifestyle in order to reduce their carbon footprint.  Decisions about how 
to change habitual forms of behavior are explicitly examined within the plot.  Frank’s 
decision to live in Rock Creek park is not directly motivated by carbon calculations, but it 
is another way for Robinson to illuminate alternative lifestyles with smaller footprints.  
Through Frank, we are introduced to a group of homeless veterans who live in the park as 
well as to a group of Freegans who squat in abandoned buildings and host potluck feasts.  
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Frank’s character, more than any other, moves between different groups, offering the 
reader entry into multiple lifestyles and ways of being in the early 21
st
 century. 
    Throughout the trilogy Robinson narrates most often from Frank Vanderwal’s 
point of view in free indirect discourse.  Frank is a sociobiologist in his middle forties, a 
reluctant academic, and always just a little outside of his element.  Frank is a kind of 
comic-romantic action hero -- just athletic enough to be involved in the action, but 
clumsy enough that he’s usually lucky to get out alive.  Roger Luckhurst calls him “an 
impressively weird creation” (177).  He tracks Frank’s development from a “reductive 
sociobiologist” who rationalizes “modern human behavior through evolutionary 
speculations confidently delivered as fact” through his experiment in Rock Creek Park 
with “repaleolithization” to his broken nose and subdural hematoma, which cause 
problems with decision making, to his eventual marriage to Caroline at the resolution of 
the trilogy.  According to Luckhurst’s analysis of Frank, “At the characterological level 
then, Science in the Capital seems to suggest that optimodality is the subjectivity of a 
time of crisis, but that the readjustment of nature and culture that comes from a 
committed ecological politics will allow a more holistic sense of self to emerge” (178).  
Responding to charges that realism imposes formal closure that seems to circumscribe the 
ideological limits of character action, Luckhurst argues that “Proleptic Realism…cannot 
offer closure, hovering as it does in a finally indeterminable near future where the 
modeling of reality remains fundamentally incomplete….  Character can never be 
complete, but the radical pressures on coherent subjectivity demonstrated in Robinson’s 
portrayal of Frank gives us a concrete determination of the forces in play” (178). 
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      Prettyman describes Robinson’s depiction of Frank’s lifestyle experiments as a 
modification of the “Robinsonade” – “the archetypal story of Robinson Crusoe.   As 
Prettyman explains, “Defoe’s fantasy is…one of a fortunate crisis providing a radical 
escape from the restrictions of conventional society and enabling a technocratic dream of 
socioeconomic reinvention” (193).  Prettyman correctly reads Robinson Crusoe as a 
utopian story – “a foundational break from existing society, a reinvention along new 
material and ideological lines, a thought experiment or fantasy about a rational 
reconstruction of life” (193).  It is more instructive, however, to place Frank’s experiment 
in the park within an American literary context.  In particular, Fifty Degrees Below and 
the first part of Sixty Days and Counting, with their focus on Frank’s lifestyle 
experiments and his trip to Maine, stand as contemporary adaptations of Walden and The 
Maine Woods. Robinson is explicitly interested in creating this connection to an 
American literary heritage.  Frank discovers “Emerson for the Day” on the internet, and 
in his tent during the harsh winter, he reads Laura Ingalls Wilder’s The Long Winter.  
Frank describes it as “a real beauty, the story of a small Dakota town surviving the 
extreme winter of 1880.  The town had lost all contact with the rest of humanity, cut off 
by huge snowpacks from October to May.  Talk about island refugia!” (Fifty 434).  The 
site where the homeless veterans sleep becomes known as “Sleepy Hollow.”  In the 
passage where Frank discovers “Emerson for the Day” we get a sense of the ways that 
Robinson plays with these literary affiliations: 
Recline on his groundpad, then, in the open doorway of his tent.  Only 
when it was windy did he retreat fully inside.  As long as the air remained still, his 
heavy sleeping bag had kept him warm on climbs in Alaska and the Canadian 
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Arctic; it would do the same here.  And the nights were too beautiful to miss.  The 
highest branches spiked around him like a forest of giant thorns, the stars brilliant 
through their black calligraphy.  He watched the stars, and read his laptop, or a 
paperback set under the lantern, until sleep came on him; then snuggled into the 
bag; slept well; woke serene, to the sight of treetops bobbing and rustling on the 
dawn breeze.  Lines of blackbirds flew out of town to look for food, under a flat 
sky of pewter and lead.  Really the important thing was to be out in the world, to 
feel the wind and see the full spaciousness of being on a planet whirling through 
space.  A feeling of beatitude; was that the right word?  Sit up, click on the laptop, 
google “beatitude”; then, there on the screen: 
“beatitude dips from on high down on us and we see.  It is not in 
us so much as we are in it.  If the air come to our lunges, we 
breathe and live; if not, we die.  If the light come to our eyes, we 
see; else not.  And if truth come to our mind we suddenly expand 
to its dimensions, as if we grow to worlds.” 
My.  Ralph Waldo Emerson, from a website called Emersonfortheday.net.  
Frank read a little more: quite amazing stuff.  He bookmarked the site, which 
apparently featured a new thought from the philosopher’s writings every few 
days.  Earlier samples read like some miraculously profound horoscope or fortune 
cookie.  Reading them, Frank suddenly realized that the people who had lived 
before him in this immense hardwood forest had had epiphanies much like his.  
Emerson, the great Transcendentalist, had already sketched the parameters or the 
route to a new kind of nature-worshipping religion.  His journal entries in 
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particular suited Frank’s late night go-to-sleep reading, for they had the feel of 
someone thinking on the page.  This was a good person to know about. (Fifty 
334-335) 
In the first part of this passage, Robinson’s depiction of Frank’s internal monologue 





 centuries – full of metaphor and a Romantic sense of nature as transcendent and 
rejuvenating.  Then Robinson breaks into a distinctively 21
st
 century mode, with Frank 
looking up the word “beatitude” on the internet and discovering Emerson.  As a 
representation of postmodern thought, there is the appearance of a radical contingency in 
this passage – a stochastic disruption in an otherwise continuous stream of thought.  
Robinson mixes high and low art in this passage, calls attention to the fact that the 
language he uses possesses a distinctive literary heritage.  “Beatitude” – the word that 
Frank is self-conscious about using correctly, finds its most appropriate, if apparently 
random, definition in Emerson’s use of the word.  Frank amusingly describes Emerson as 
a “miraculously profound horoscope or fortune cookie” at the same time as he proclaims 
value in the insights of those “who had lived before him in this immense hardwood 
forest.”  The website Emersonfortheday.net does not exist, but since the publication of 
Robinson’s trilogy, a reader and fan of Robinson’s work has created a website called 
Emersonfortheday.com.   
      Frank’s discovery of Emerson leads to his discovery of Thoreau as well.  Frank 
describes Thoreau as “the great philosopher of the forest at the edge of town, and as such 
extremely useful to Frank—often more so, dare he say it, than the old man himself” 
(Sixty, 15).  Fifty Degrees Below recounts Frank’s experiment in going feral, moving out 
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of his apartment and building a treehouse, while Sixty Days and Counting follows him 
into the Khembalis’ farm, where he helps to construct another treehouse, as well as 
following him on his journey to Maine to find Caroline.  Frank moves into Rock Creek 
Park along with the animals from the National Zoo who have been displaced by the flood.  
In addition to this ecological community, Frank befriends a group of homeless veterans.  
He also meets other homeless characters who reappear throughout the series – Chessman, 
a younger man who the others seem to watch over, and a woman who is trying to stay 
sober, counting days. During the harsh winter, Frank becomes known as “Johnny 
Appletent” as he helps the homeless men at site 21 fix their campfire so that it provides 
better heat.  Later he begins distributing tarps and surplus down jackets around town to 
homeless people trying to stay warm.    
      In certain aspects, Frank’s attitude towards the veterans in the park resembles 
Thoreau’s attitude towards the poor.  In Walden, Thoreau quips, “There are those who 
have used all their arts to persuade me to undertake the support of some poor family in 
town….  However when I have thought to indulge myself in this respect, and lay their 
heaven under an obligation by maintaining certain poor persons in all respects as 
comfortably as I maintain myself, and have even ventured so far as to make them the 
offer, they have one and all unhesitatingly preferred to remain poor” (69).  Frank 
expresses a similar impatience when he examines the shelters that the homeless veterans 
have constructed: 
They had actually built the little shelters Zeno had proposed, Frank saw, in the dip 
they now called Sleepy Hollow, just to the west of the site.  Some of them were 
already tucked into their low shelters, staring out red-eyed at the fire and the 
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snowflakes.  Cardboard, trashbags, branches, sheets of plywood, drop cloths, two-
by-fours, cinder blocks: under that, dirty nylon or even cotton sleeping bags, 
toeing into snowbanks.  You needed a groundpad under a sleeping bag for it to 
work. 
     Frank found himself vaguely annoyed.  Living like rats when they didn’t have 
to; it was incompetent.  Even if it was all they could find to build with. (Fifty, 
342) 
While this kind of pick-yourself-up-by-the-bootstraps mentality forms a mainstay of 
arguments against government-supported social policies, Frank’s exasperation comes 
from a different kind of hard-edged care.  Living outdoors himself, Frank is most 
concerned with the practical possibilities for staying warm.  Frank rejects the idea that the 
homeless need to fall victim to the cold, and to this extent, his expectations constitute a 
form of empowerment.  Thoreau’s cynicism towards philanthropy and his somewhat 
distasteful sense of self-righteousness derive from a similar sense that he is comfortable 
with a simplicity that is perceived by others as too austere to emulate.  Frank’s attitude 
resembles Thoreau’s cynicism, but Robinson’s portrayal of Frank’s relationship to the 
homeless veterans is more complex.  We might read this as another of Robinson’s 
generic modifications, and as a consequence of Robinson’s preference for the novel as a 
form.  Frank’s discussions with the veterans add voices that are absent from Thoreau’s 
monologue.  Unlike Thoreau, Frank is in community with the vets, and his care coincides 
with that community. 
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     Frank’s trip to the Maine woods happens early in Sixty Days and Counting.  
Frank travels to Maine in order to warn Caroline that she’s probably being surveilled.  
Robinson describes Frank’s drive northward like this: 
95 kept on coming, and endless slot through endless forest, a grass sward and two 
concrete strips rolling on for mile after mile.  Finally he came to Bangor, Maine, 
and turned right, driving over hills and across small rivers, then through the 
standard array of franchises in Ellsworth, including an immense Wal-Mart.  
During the night he had driven north into full winter; a thin blanket of dirty snow 
covered everything.  He passed a completely shut-down tourist zone, the motels, 
lobster shacks, antique stores, and miniature golf courses all looking miserable 
under their load of ice and snow, all except the Christmas knickknack barn, which 
had a full parking lot and was bustling with festive shoppers. (Sixty, 65) 
Considered in contrast to Thoreau’s travels, there is considerable irony in Robinson’s 
depiction of Frank’s trip to Maine.  In contrast to Romantic nature writing, Frank’s 
account of strip malls and tourist kitsch gives articulation to a particularly contemporary 
experience of the New England landscape.  Frank encounters older versions of that 
landscape only virtually.  Frank travels to Mount Desert Island, which, he learns, once 
again by googling in a cybercafé, was where Fredric Church had “rusticated” in the 
1840s, painting landscapes that helped to define the American wilderness movement.  
Church, Frank learns, “took offense at the clear-cut logging on the island, and worked to 
get the legislature of Maine to forbid it, in some of the nation’s first environmental 
legislation.  All this was happening at the same time as Emerson and Thoreau were 
writing.  Something had been in the air” (Sixty, 66).  Finally, in a way that links these 
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different times and modes of experience in the same place, Frank encounters the Maine 
landscape through physical endeavor as well, as he and Caroline attempt to outrun their 
pursuers by windsurfing on frozen lakes. 
      As mentioned, Fifty Degrees Below and Sixty Days and Counting were 
published in the years leading up to the 2008 Presidential elections in the United States.  
It is worth considering the way that these novels intervene in the political discourse 
around those elections.  While there is no Green Party in the Science and the Capital 
trilogy, the role of the third party candidate does exist.  In the middle of Fifty Degrees 
Below, the reader learns about the “Social Science Experiment in Electoral Politics” or 
SSEEP.  According to Edgardo Alfonso’s notes, SSEEP is “designed to ask, if the 
scientific community were to propose a platform of political goals based on scientific 
principles, how would it be formulated, and what would the platform say?  In other 
words, what goals for improvement in society and government might follow logically 
from the aggregate of scientific findings and the application of the scientific method to 
the problem of change?” (Fifty, 319).  Edgardo notes that the platform could take the 
form of something like the “Contract with America” adopted by the Republican Party 
before the 1994 election.  The NSF decides to fund the experiment, and when research on 
the project begins, the SEEP candidate achieves an unexpected popularity.  Describing 
the progress of Phil Chase’s campaign for president, Robinson writes, 
One unexpected problem for his campaign was that the “Scientific Virtual 
Candidate” was polling pretty well, up to five percent in blue states, despite the 
fact that the candidate was nonexistent and would not appear on any ballots.  And 
this of course was a problem for Phil.  Most of those potential votes came from 
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his natural constituency, and so it was accomplishing the usual third party disaster 
of undercutting precisely the major party most closely allied to its views. (Fifty, 
546-547) 
The Scientific Virtual Candidate performs the discursive function of a third party 
candidate, and even seems to have the same effect on the election itself.  But in 
modifying the genre of the third party candidate, Robinson creates a loophole: 
The moment came in late September, when a hurricane veered north at the last 
minute and hammered New Jersey, New York, Long Island, and Connecticut, and 
to a lesser extent the rest of New England.  These were blue states already, but 
with big SSEEP numbers as well, so that after the first week of emergencies had 
passed, and the flooding subsided, a SSEEP conference was held in which 
representatives of 167 scientific organizations debated what to do in as measured 
and scientific a manner as they could manage—which in the event meant a perfect 
storm of statistics, chaos theory, sociology, econometrics, mass psychology, 
ecology, cascade mathematics, poll theory, historiography, and climate modeling.  
At the end of which a statement was crafted, approved, and released, informing 
the public that the “Scientific Virtual Candidate” was withdrawing from all 
campaigns, and suggesting that any voters who had planned to vote for it consider 
voting for Phil Chase  as being an “electable first approximation of the scientific 
candidate,” and “best real current choice.  Support for preferential or instant run-
off voting  method was also strongly recommended, as giving future scientific 
candidates the chance actually to win representation proportional to the votes they 
got, improving democracy if judged by representational metrics. (Fifty, 548) 
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The SSEEP candidate offers a metaphor for the political intervention of the entire trilogy.  
The SSEEP candidate operates as a utopian alternative to the candidates who are actually 
running.  It performs the positive functions of a third party candidate, in terms of 
broadening the scope of political debate, without the negative consequence of taking 
votes away from the mainstream candidate who comes closest to the third party platform.  
At a structural level, Phil Chase (and the trilogy as a whole) operates as a kind of “Virtual 
Science-Fiction Candidate” in the lead up to the 2008 presidential elections.  Phil Chase 
has no bearing on electoral politics, but he offers a low-stakes alternative with a practical 
agenda that might inform the debate, if not the policy decisions of the actual candidates. 
In this way, Robinson’s novels are more explicitly policy relevant than the scenario 
documents produced by the IPCC; indeed, they are policy proscriptive.   
     The focus in Sixty Days and Counting is the first sixty days of Phil Chase’s 
presidency and what a new administration could do to tackle climate change.  Robinson 
makes regular reference to the First Hundred Days of FDR’s administration – an analogy 
that also emerged in the media as President Barak Obama’s administration came into 
power at the height of the financial crisis.  In the novel, President Chase reverses the 
Nixon administration’s exile of the NSF, and Diane Chang and Frank Vanderwal both 
move into the White House – Diane as the President’s new science advisor, and Frank as 
Diane’s advisor.  Chase sets the White House up as a solar energy demonstration site, 
using every kind of solar technology available.  After Phil and Diane meet in person, they 
fall in love and by the end of the novel decide to marry – a marriage of science and 
politics.  Throughout this novel, Robinson reflects on the power of the presidency to 
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shape world politics.  Through Charlie’s reflections as advisor to the new president, 
Robinson suggests that:  
The president of the United States was many things, but unpowerful was not 
among them.  Many of the administrations preceding Phil’s had worked very hard 
to expand the powers of the executive branch beyond what the constitutional 
framers had intended—which campaigns made a mockery out of the “strict 
constitutionalist” talk put out by these same people when discussing what 
principles the Supreme Court’s justices should hold, and showed they preferred a 
secretive executive dictatorship to democracy, especially if the president were a 
puppet installed by the interested parties.  But never mind; the result of their 
labors was an apparatus of power that if properly understood and used could in 
many ways rule the world.  Bizarre but true: the President of the United States 
could rule the world, both by direct fiat and by setting the agenda that everyone 
else had to follow or be damned.  World ruler.  Not really, of course, but it was 
about as close as anyone could get. (Sixty, 43) 
Charlie’s reflections are pragmatic – he seems to suggest that in the wrong hands, the 
office of the Presidency could do real damage, while in the right hands, it could do real 
good.  And here we get a sense of the “compromised” utopia that Luckhurst describes.  
Charlie doesn’t seem to think that it is a good thing that the President has so much power 
– his account of the way in which the office of the President achieved that power is a 
critical insight.  And yet, the argument seems to go, since that power is there, good 
people ought to hold the office and use it to good ends.  Prettyman argues that “Political 
heroism is another element of the American Experiment that Robinson reincorporates as 
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an altered genre….   Here again, the genre is necessarily modified in order to extract its 
utopian potential and neutralize its undesirable effects” (194).  Prettyman identifies 
Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt as the leaders from whom Robinson takes the 
most influence – leaders who used their power to create positive change in times of crisis.   
Prettyman also points out that by appealing to political heroes, Robinson engages a 
version of the “great man” story of history, a position he occupies with irony.  
Nonetheless, the utopian potential is clear – “combined with the catalyst of major 
crisis…political heroism and governmental politics provide another possible model for 
systemic change” (Prettyman, 194).  As Chase explains to his team, “We got ourselves 
into this mess and we can get out of it.  The problems create an opportunity to remake our 
relationship to nature, and create a new dispensation.  So—happy days are here again!  
Because we’re making history, we are seizing the planet’s history, I say, and turning it to 
the good” (Sixty, 6).    
      One evolving voice of the novels is President Phil Chase’s blog “Cut to the 
Chase.”  Chase’s posts become a place for Robinson to experiment with idealistic global 
political-economic policies.  From the President’s blog in Sixty Days and Counting: 
Globalization has gotten far enough along that the tools are there to leverage the 
whole system in various ways.  You could leverage it towards justice just as 
easily as you could leverage it towards extraction and exploitation.  In fact it 
would be easier, because people would like it and support it. (Sixty, 464) 
It is this sense that we inhabit a post-scarcity world that these novels insist upon.  All of 
the resources that we need to solve the social problems of the planet are at hand; we just 
need to imagine how we could use them to better ends than personal profit.  Phil Chase’s 
166 
 
inauguration speech lays out a bold platform of international cooperation and social 
justice.  Chase promises to “go to the United Nations and tell them that the United States 
is ready to join the international effort” (Sixty, 91).  About the problem of population 
growth and carrying capacity, Chase suggests that “what is very striking to observe is that 
everywhere on this Earth where good standards of justice prevail, the rate of reproduction 
is about the replacement rate….  It is a positive feedback loop with the most profound 
implications.  Consider: for the sake of climate stabilization, there must be population 
stabilization; and for there to be population stabilization, justice must prevail” (Sixty, 91-
92).  Here Robinson tackles the population problem while avoiding the standard critique 
that focusing on population constitutes a form of eco-fascism.
29
  Chase further promises 
to commit the United States to the global justice project: 
This means accepting the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, and the 
jurisdiction of the World Court in the Hague.  It means abiding by all the clauses 
of the UN Charter and the Geneva Conventions, which after all we have already 
signed.  It means supporting UN peacekeeping forces, and supporting the general 
concept of the UN as the body through which international conflicts get resolved.  
It means supporting the World Health Organization in all its reproductive rights 
and population reduction efforts.  It means supporting women’s education and 
women’s rights everywhere, even in cultures where men’s tyrannies are claimed 
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to be some sort of tradition.  All these commitments on our part will be crucial if 
we are serious about building a sustainable world. (Sixty, 92) 
Chase is good on his word.  By the end of the novel, President Chase has worked with the 
UN and the Chinese government to institute the “Great Leap Forward at Last.”  The US 
provides its nuclear submarine fleet to power the Chinese electric grid while they convert 
their dirtiest coal-burning plants to clean power.  The United States offers all the 
technological and scientific help that the Chinese need, along with money to build the 
new power plants.  In partial exchange, the Chinese agree to recognize Tibet as an 
autonomous region. 
      In terms of climate change, the presidency of Barack Obama stands in contrast 
to the fictional presidency of Phil Chase.  President Obama did not make the strides 
hoped for at Copenhagen in 2009 or in Cancun the following year.  During his 
presidency, public concern about climate change has dropped to an all time low, largely 
because of the United States’ inability to negotiate effectively with China.  In 2011, 
Republicans in Congress have voted along party lines not to recognize the legitimacy of 
climate science and are currently working to strip the EPA of its power to regulate 
greenhouse gas as pollution.  In the weeks before the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico, the major domestic environmental disaster of his presidency, President Obama 
spoke in favor of expanding offshore drilling.  On the other hand, President Obama’s 
primary domestic concerns have been the flagging economy and reforming health care, 
while his primary international concerns have been the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in 
which the United States is still embroiled.  Looked at from this perspective, Robinson’s 
novels, in their concern with abrupt climate change, do not seem as immediately relevant.  
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Iraq and Afghanistan are almost entirely absent from the Science in the Capital trilogy.  
Robinson also fails to imagine anything resembling the Tea Party to oppose Phil Chase in 
his eagerness to reform the system and cooperate with the UN.  Octavia Butler’s novels 
come closer to imagining this kind of conservative opposition to progressive change. 
     The major geo-engineering projects in the novels include the salting of the 
North Atlantic Ocean in order to re-start the thermohaline pump, the release of 
genetically modified lichen in Siberia to increase the metabolism of the forest, increasing 
its capacity to draw down carbon, and an Antarctic water pumping project, designed to 
move water from the ocean to the center of the continent, where it will re-freeze.  Along 
the lines of Frederick Buell’s literal reading of the Mars trilogy, one could find a 
similarly troubling aspect to Robinson’s descriptions of large-scale geo-engineering 
projects in the Science in the Capital trilogy.  From this perspective, there is a level of 
technological optimism in the series that coincides with an acceptance of environmental 
catastrophe as inevitable.  Robinson himself has said that he does not see geo-engineering 
of the type he describes in the trilogy as an advisable approach to dealing with climate 
change, and he approaches geo-engineering with his characteristic nuance and self-
criticism throughout the trilogy.  And yet, despite this nuance, the novels still promote 
geo-engineering solutions to catastrophic climate change.
30
  Along the same lines, one 
might criticize Robinson’s choice to depict an abrupt climate change scenario.  The IPCC 
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explicitly excludes abrupt shift scenarios from the scenarios it uses in modeling future 
climates.  By relying on an abrupt climate change scenario, then, Robinson gives up a 
certain amount of relevance.  One is forced to ask, would it be possible to muster the 
political will to enact these changes in the absence of an abrupt shift? 
      The Science in the Capital trilogy makes important use of humor and comedy.  
Prettyman identifies several examples of comedic moments in the text, from the 
President’s science advisor being named Dr. Strengloft, an allusion to Stanley Kubrick’s 
dark comedy, to the outrageous facts that Edgardo posts in the “Department of 
Unfortunate Statistics,” to the oil tanker named Hugo Chavez that Frank and Diane board 
to watch the restarting of the Gulf Stream.  In thinking about the rhetoric of climate 
change, there is something important in Robinson’s use of humor.  There is a tendency 
toward paralysis in the more apocalyptic framings of climate change, a sense that the 
problem is too big to be solved.  Robinson’s sense of humor works against this kind of 
paralysis.  It is a mode of coping – once again pragmatic – and a way of moving forward 
in spite of overwhelming catastrophe.
31
  At the beginning of Sixty Days and Counting, 
Frank thinks of his own life: 
It was a relief to think that all these personal problems were as nothing compared 
to the trouble all life on Earth now faced as a functioning biosphere.  There were 
days in which he welcomed the bad news, and he saw that other people were 
doing the same.  As this unpredictable winter blasted them with cold or bathed 
them in Caribbean balm, there grew in the city a shared interest and good cheer, a 
kind of solidarity. (7) 
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Frank’s thought here matches Robinson’s sense that climate change presents a productive 
challenge for humans. It calls upon our better natures – and it also gives us a healthy 
sense of our significance within the planetary ecosystem – as individuals, as a 
community, as a species.  We see in Kim Stanley Robinson’s writing an alternative take 
on the disaster story.  Instead of catastrophe, Robinson offers a narrative of fortunate 
crises.   
      Finally, it is worth considering the way that Robinson works within his medium – 
there is not the spectacle of the screen in his novels.  Instead, there is an appreciation for 
character development and the opportunity for exposition.  His novels aim to educate and 
to prompt nuanced critical thought.  They also aim to entertain, but the pleasures to be 
had in Robinson’s work are not the titillation of the Hollywood narrative, they are rather 
the pleasures of sustained contemplation.  There is an insight to be had here about 
representing climate change.  Robinson comments on the way that geologic time scales 
become human time scales with abrupt climate change.  As Jameson has commented 
about the Mars trilogy, there is significance to the sheer length of time it takes to read the 
series.  It creates a physical experience that corresponds metaphorically to the extended 
duration of a terraforming experiment on Mars.   Similarly, it takes time to describe 
climate change on Earth, more than just two hours – the length of a Hollywood movie 
like The Day After Tomorrow.    Robinson’s Science in the Capital trilogy thus makes an 
important generic argument – science fiction is the genre of climate change, and in 
particular, long science fiction is the form that best expresses the scale of climate change.  
This issue of duration, of effectively representing timescales that exceed human lives, has 
significance for scenario thinking practices.  Climate change takes time, sustained 
171 
 
concentration, to confront effectively.  There is pressure to make scenario descriptions 
concise for rhetorical effectiveness in the policy realm.  In the scientific realm this is less 
of a concern, because there is pressure to elaborate scenarios at various scales for fullness 
of description, but even in the scientific realm, the length of Robinson’s trilogy presents a 









In 2009, the Yale Project on Climate Change and the George Mason University 
Center for Climate Change Communication published a report called Global Warming’s 
Six Americas: An Audience Segmentation Analysis.  As the title suggests, the report 
identifies six categories of response to climate change: alarmed, concerned, cautious, 
disengaged, doubtful, and dismissive.  The initial surveys were conducted in 2008, and 
the project has continued with follow-up reports.  Between 2008 and 2010, the 
proportions of the different categories shifted significantly.     




The group of Americans who are dismissive, who think that global warming is not 
happening and is probably a hoax, more than doubled in size between 2008 and 2010.  At 
the same time, the group who are alarmed about climate change decreased by almost half.  
Less dramatically, but following the same trend, the number of Americans concerned 
decreased while the number of doubtful increased.  The authors of the report speculate 
that a “perfect storm” of events – high unemployment numbers, public frustration with 
Washington, attacks on climate science, and mobilized opposition to national climate 
legislation – caused this shift in public concern about climate change.  At the same time, 
however, the authors note that majorities in all six groups favor the development of clean 
energy, support funding for research into renewable energy sources, and support tax 
subsidies for people buying solar panels and energy efficient vehicles. 
 One way to interpret these data is to consider that the apocalyptic narrative of 
climate change has reached a kind of saturation point.  The numbers in the “alarmed” 
category have decreased while the number of people dismissive of climate change have 
increased in part because the public has come to see climate change as a story.  And the 
story of the end of the world, while titillating, always arrives at a dead-end.  The utopian 
narrative of climate change, on the other hand, continues to hold interest for the 
respondents.  The 2010 respondents support constructive policy measures that promote 
positive change – particularly the development of clean energy technologies.  One 
reading of this consensus is that the respondents have access to enough plausible visions 
of alternative energy to agree on this aspect of a better future. 
Considering again that the numbers of “doubtful” and “dismissive” respondents 
have increased, it seems that at another level, the question of whether or not climate 
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change is “really happening” might fade into the background, while the question of what 
the global community will do to manage the Earth’s resources in the future, both human 
and non-human, must move to the foreground.  There is in this shift a return to politics.  
Constructing positive visions of alternative futures is a political act, inevitably raising 
questions about means -- how we get from here to there.  What policy measures must be 
enacted (to create a better world)?  What regulations and deregulations must be put into 
place?   
 I want to argue for utopian storytelling itself as a necessary and potentially 
democratic technology – and to consider what it would mean for utopia to move in this 
direction.  I return here to Erin McKenna’s notion of “process utopia” and Ruth Levitas’ 
conception of utopia as a methodology.  Because of the danger in emphasizing ends over 
means, process must become the focus of utopian inquiry.  Furthermore, for utopia to 
become a democratic technology, the issue of authorship must be addressed – the 
authorship of utopia must become collective, diverse, and participatory.  Whose vision of 
a better future?  Better for whom?  How many visions are possible?  We might imagine 
multiple storylines coexisting, operating on multiple scales, sometime in harmony, 
sometimes in conflict with one another.  As a democratic technology, utopian storytelling 
operates as a tool for exploring collective futures, for expressing diverse values within an 
optimistic framework that turns on the possibility of a better world. 
I would like to end by pointing to two projects that illustrate the possibilities of a 
reinvigorated utopian methodology.  First, launched in 2003, the Tellus Institute’s “Great 
Transition Initiative” is a network of scholars and activists elaborating positive scenarios 
of the future.  Paul Raskin directs the project, Orion Kriegman is the coordinator, and 
175 
 
Tariq Banuri and Allen White are senior advisors.  The Great Transition Initiative was 
preceded by the Global Scenario Group, an international scenario group convened by the 
Tellus Institute in Boston and the Stockholm Environment Institute to examine the 
requirements for a sustainable and desirable future.  The scenarios developed by the 
Global Scenario Group were used as the basis for the scenarios in the United Nations 
Environment Programme’s Global Environmental Outlook reports.  The Global Scenario 
Group’s culminating essay was entitled Great Transition: The Promise and Lure of Times 
Ahead, and the Great Transition Initiative was created as a way to continue this project.  
Perhaps most interestingly, the Great Transition Initiative has developed a paper series 
entitled “Frontiers of a Great Transition,” which expands the scope of the original essay, 
focusing on aspects of the original project that are enhanced by further elaboration.  For 
example, the essays include “Visions of Regional Economies in a Great Transition 
World,” “Transforming the Corporation,”  “Feminist Praxis: Women’s Transnational and 
Place-Based Struggles for Change,” and “Great Transition Values: Present Attitudes, 
Future Changes.”  These essays are written by multiple authors and explore perspectives 
that both interrogate and expand the vision described in the original essay.  Cited by 
James Gustave Speth in The Bridge at the End of the World, the Great Transition 
Initiative provides a model for what utopian scenario thinking might look like at the 
policy level and how a network of scholars and activists might coordinate to construct an 
ever-expanding vision of positive alternative futures. 
On a more local level, I want to point to Gwen Dismukes’ book Black 2 the 
Future (2007).  A resident of The Farm, a utopian community in Summertown, 
Tennessee, Dismukes published her book through The Farm’s educational press.  Writing 
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under the pseudonym gwen.evolution, she structures her story as a dialogue between two 
youthful narrators – Immanuel and Yasmin – who live in the future, but because of  
negligent behavior, have been required to return to the reader’s present and tell their 
story.  They describe the formation of a community that comes together for fellowship 
and growth and then becomes one of the few groups to survive economic collapse: “We 
envisioned our community as a prototype of a society that was integrated at all levels of 
being and that cared for the physical, emotional, and spiritual needs of all living things as 
a whole” (9).  As the community grows, the members gain insights and produce 
innovations in social organization from education to healthcare, from governance to 
entertainment.  With subheadings like “A new approach to government” “Meditation in 
the classroom” “From faith-based to spirit-informed,” Black 2 the Future employs the 
conventional utopian trope of a narrator who returns from utopia and operates in the 
descriptive mode, explaining various aspects of society in the future.  Dismukes makes 
reference to the Highlander Folk School, R. Buckminster Fuller, and Martin Luther King, 
Jr. as important influences on the community from the past.  Dismukes also includes real-
life figures with slightly less notoriety.   
In a section entitled “Riding on the Rhythm” she includes a description of “Sizwe, 
our South African gardener” who “taught several people drumming and how to make 
their own drums, so that we always had the primal force of rhythm” (11).  The Sizwe of 
Black 2 the Future is a fictionalization of Sizwe Herring, an environmental educator in 
Nashville.  Sizwe directs EarthMatters Networks, a non-profit organization promoting 
environmental awareness and social justice.  Through EarthMatters, Sizwe runs programs 
like Kids to the Country – a multicultural summer nature study program for Nashville’s 
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at-risk youth.  He also runs the George Washington Carver Food Park, a community 
garden and composting site in Nashville.  In the story, explaining to the community how 
to deal with disruptive forces through the metaphor of weeding a garden, Sizwe describes 
his role: “Protecting what is in my care is what I do in my garden.  And that’s what I do 
in my life” (25). 
Dismukes begins her book with the premise that “We are crossing over; as a race 
of human beings we are becoming more than we have ever been, while still only touching 
the surface of what we will yet evolve to be” (3).  Explaining the title, she further 
suggests that “nobody knows more about crossing over than black folks….  The black 
experience—its faith and sensibility, its history, its expression through art, culture, and 
lifestyle—can make an enormous contribution in leading all of us humans into a new 
understanding of our common, transcendent spirit and the essence of life” (3).  Black 2 
the Future draws upon the wisdom of the black experience in order to articulate a vision 
of the future that might resonate across race and ethnicity.  In Nashville, Sizwe runs 
EarthMatters with a similar sense of purpose and identity.  With an emphasis on art and 
connection to nature, as well as a mission to promote green jobs education, EarthMatters 
works to envision a better world, and also to enact it.  There is an important 
intertextuality at work here – a way in which Black 2 the Future, The Farm, and the 
George Washington Carver Food Park are mutually reinforcing utopian projects.  Sizwe 
Herring is an inspiration for Sizwe the gardener in Black 2 the Future.  At the same time, 
Sizwe Herring takes inspiration from Dismukes’ story.  Black 2 the Future celebrates and 
inspires on-the-ground utopian experiments.  
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 In the spring of 2011, the George Washington Carver Food Park was partially 
destroyed by the Tennessee Department of Transportation.  TDOT tore down a pavilion 
that provided shelter and a gathering space, and they bulldozed the compost pile, which 
had been shaped as earth art to look like a heart.  The Food Park is located on TDOT 
land, where it has been for over twenty years with TDOT’s permission and local 
government support.  As neighborhood demographics changed over time, however, 
newer residents were less enthusiastic about the Food Park.  Of particular concern was 
the compost pile, which they considered an eyesore.  Also of concern was the noise that 
came from events that the Food Park hosted.  The destruction of the Food Park raises 
many issues, from issues of race and class to those of property ownership and public 
land.  In its relation to utopia, I want to suggest that part of what was lost in the 
destruction of the Food Park was a shared vision of the future. 
 These examples prompt reflection on the issue of scale.  The challenge of climate 
change can appear overwhelming.  Efforts to confront climate change have tended to 
focus on either the global scale, emphasizing international policy measures, or on the 
individual scale, emphasizing consumer choices.  These approaches are important, but 
perhaps the most important scale at which we need to re-imagine the future is that of the 
community.  A democratic utopian technology will put neighbors back in touch with one 
another, and it will promote new forms of local affiliation.  In Black 2 the Future, 
gwen.evolution writes, “Fortunately, our growing consciousness is allowing us to see that 
we are, in fact, determining what we evolve into by thinking about it as we go along.  We 
Create our own reality, and we are creating our future” (3).  It is only by imagining a 
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